Cognitive mechanisms underlying emotion regulation by King, Rosemary
Cognitive mechanisms underlying emotion regulation 
Rosemary King 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
The University of Leeds 
Institute of Psychological Sciences 
March, 2008 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that 
appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of 
others. 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and 
that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
11 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Professor Martin Conway at Leeds University for giving 
me the opportunity to do this research, Professor Margaret Bradley at the University 
of Florida for answering at least one of my emails and helping me to get started, and 
Dr. Alexandre Schaefer for his inestimable patience, support, guidance, advice, 
criticisms and encouragement throughout the long and often distressing process. I'd 
also like to thank Gareth Tuck at Leeds University for his initial support with 
biopac, Hamish Aboud at Biopac Systems Incorporated, California, with 
troubleshooting enquiries and the loan of equipment to check the system, and Robert 
James at Linton Instrumentation, U. K., who inspected sample waveforms and 
offered invaluable technical advice on many occasions. I also owe a large debt of 
gratitude to Mark Hullah and the technicians here in the psychology department at 
Leeds without whose expertise I would not have set up the equipment, run the 
experiments and collected the data successfully. They were always available and 
always ready to help solve the next crisis. Many thanks. 
This work would not have reached completion without the support of my long- 
suffering office colleagues. Therefore, I would also sincerely like to thank Eleanor 
Bryant, Therese Shepherd, Elizabeth Andrews and Tamara-Turner Moore for their 
sheer persistence in talking me through to the end. Without them, I would have left 
early. Finally, I would like to thank Barbara James who kept me going with a ready 
supply of emailed jokes and promises of seaside holidays when I finished, and 
Amanda Cardwell who kept reminding me that bad days were always followed by 
good ones. Many thanks to you all. 
111 
Abstract 
Traditional theories of emotion have emphasised the automatic and 
unconscious nature of emotion generation and hence emotion regulation via 
antecedent and response focused strategies. Response strategies either inhibit the 
expression of an emotional response or modulate it via cognitive reappraisal. 
Antecedent strategies involve avoidance behaviour i. e. avoiding situations in which 
the emotional response is likely to occur. Recent evidence has now demonstrated, 
however, that the cognitive and emotional systems are highly interactive and that 
conscious attention may be necessary to generate emotion. Conscious attention can 
be controlled via executive functioning and the requirements of immediate goals. 
This evidence opens up the possibility of regulating emotions by executive 
functioning on-line i. e. as they occur. 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate on-going emotion generation and the 
mechanisms and processes that regulate it. A series of experiments manipulated 
cognitive functioning via direct instructions to Feel and Not Feel emotional 
responses to negative and neutral pictures and, indirectly, by manipulating cognitive 
resources available for processing the pictures. Participants in the latter experiments 
were required to maintain visual attention to the stimuli in order to rate the strength 
of their emotional responses to them whilst simultaneously holding in mind pictures 
or words requiring a subsequent same-different decision to a following item. It was 
believed that depleting cognitive resources could attenuate emotional responses. 
Results from the experiments showed that emotional responses can be 
attenuated by depleting cognitive resources available for processing emotional 
iv 
stimuli; an explanation that can explain both direct and indirect manipulations of 
cognitive functioning. It was not clear, however, whether emotion generation is not 
automatic or whether automatic processing requires some input from cognitive 
resources. Further research is also required to discover whether the cognitive 
resources required to generate emotions involve executive functioning for visual 
attentional processing, to maintain conscious attention for higher order processing, 
or for low level cognitive appraisals. 
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Preface 
Introduction 
Emotion is a change in affective state that accompanies a change in perception. 
It may be experienced as positive or negative feelings (emotions) and may be 
expressed in behaviour. 
According to James Gross most researchers agree that emotion is a complex 
multicomponential concept consisting of a physiological, experiential and 
behavioural component (Gross, 1999a). Current definitions of emotion are prolific 
because most tend to focus on the component of particular interest to the researcher. 
The definition above is an attempt to incorporate all the components of an emotion 
into one definition without losing specificity. Essentially, the definition is part of a 
communication model of society in which individuals and social groups are believed 
to construct their own understandings of the world around them and live their lives 
within their shared realities. Within this model, perceptions of reality are understood 
to be cognitively constructed via unconscious processes in the brain, and feelings 
function to signal changes in perception to both the individual and interacting 
others. Communication of feelings is essential for empathic processing and human 
understanding of each other. It is also a useful predictor of behaviour. The model 
has its roots in evolution and Charles Darwin's work, `The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals' (Darwin, 1872). Discourse analysts have done 
much to update it. 
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The definition above, makes an important distinction between emotion (i. e. an 
uncountable state) and emotions (countable feelings). Emotions are easy to define as 
readily understandable feelings such as fear and sadness. Emotion, however, is more 
complex. The following analogy based on Eleanor Rosch's work on concept 
formation (Rosch et al., 1976), is an attempt to explain how it is used in the 
definition above. 
In object recognition, when we see a dog barking and wagging its tail, we 
don't focus on the head or the bark or the tail in order to recognize it as a dog. A 
dog's head on a giraffe's body would not be sufficient to label the animal `dog'. 
Neither would a dog's head issuing monkey chatter. Though perhaps not all equally 
important, features consistent with a dog (e. g. head, tail and bark) are all necessary 
features. An emotion can be understood in a similar way. Perception of a knife 
without the hand that holds it, or the hate in the eyes of the aggressor, or the feelings 
of fear, helplessness or anger that the perception generates, is just a knife. The knife 
together with the contextual information and the meaning constructed from it, 
produces a change in perceived reality and a general change in affective state: in this 
case, a change from a general sense of well-being to one of insecurity. It is this 
change that defines the word emotion above. 
In the modem world, it is not always safe or advantageous to express emotions 
and signal changes in affective state. In a given situation, expressed fear may change 
perceptions of the balance of power and control, and a potential survivor of an 
assault may become a victim. Too much expressed care and concern for a child may 
suffocate rather than strengthen family bonds. Emotion regulation is hugely 
influential in the management of social relationships, and perceptions of how it 
works underpins social interactions at the level of the individual and society. Legal, 
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political and social policies and practices are underpinned by knowledge of how 
emotion works e. g crimes of passion and leniency versus rational, predetermined 
action and zero tolerance. It is essential, therefore, that research continues to try and 
elucidate the mechanisms and processes that underpin emotion regulation. 
In this thesis, references to emotion, emotions and emotion regulation attempt 
to reflect the definitions specific to the perspectives and research discussed. 
However, the understanding that guides and drives the thesis itself is the 
understanding of emotion embedded in the definition above and explained in the 
analogy. The rationale for the focus of the thesis is the importance of emotion 
regulation in social interaction, and the specific interest, the way in which biological 
constraints may facilitate or constrain success. 
Broadly speaking, the thesis itself is a record of a journey from a common 
sense understanding of emotion to an empirically tested, and testable, scientific 
discourse. It is divided into three parts. Part 1 provides a grounding for later work by 
briefly summarising existing research and methodologies and informing early 
experimental designs, design issues and initial explorative experiments. Part 2 
focuses specifically on distraction as a method of regulating emotions and, using the 
n-back and startle paradigms, tries to identify the mechanisms and processes that 
underlie it. Part 3 brings together the evidence into a single, eclectic scientific 
discourse that may have implications for cognitive appraisal theory and a potential 
understanding of situational factors that may affect PTSD. The thesis concludes with 
suggestions for further research required to validate the findings 
Part I 
Conscious and Intentional Control 
2 
Chapter 1 
Emotion Generation Mechanisms and Regulation Strategies 
1.1. Emotion Generation Mechanisms 
1.1.1. Cortical and sub-cortical pathways 
Elucidation of the neural pathways involved in fear conditioning by Joseph 
LeDoux and colleagues has been fundamental to all emotion research. The 
identification of two major pathways involved in the registration and storage of an 
emotional stimulus and in the generation of a response (i. e. the thalamo-amygdala 
and cortico-amygdala pathways), underpins all research on emotion generation and 
regulation (see Figure 1). 
Sensory Cortex 
High road 
Low road 
Amygdala 
Sensory Thalamus 
Emotional Emotional 
Stimulus Responses 
Figure 1: The High and the Low Roads to the Amygdala (LeDoux, 1996) 
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The thalamo-amygdala pathway, the route that directly connects the sensory 
thalamus to the lateral nucleus of the amygdala, is believed by many to be the route 
by which emotions are unconsciously and automatically generated. Visual and 
auditory cells in the sensory thalamus that respond to very basic physical features of 
sound and vision, produce fast, though crude, information about the external 
environment, that bypasses cortical networks and thus generates immediate 
physiological and behavioural responses. Signals from the sensory thalamus are 
transmitted to the central nucleus of the amygdala and thence to other amygdala 
nuclei to produce appropriate responses (see Figure 2). Signals to the central gray, 
for example, induce freezing behaviour, to the lateral hypothalamus, change heart 
rate and blood pressure, to the paraventricular hypothalamus, release stress 
hormones and to the reticulo-pontis caudalis generate the startle reflex. The 
processes are thought to be fast, unconscious, automatic (LeDoux, 1996) and, when 
triggered, produce responses that together can be called an emotion. 
The cortico-amygdala pathway, on the other hand, is believed to be slower but 
registers more detailed information and functions to inhibit inappropriate responses 
rather than to generate appropriate ones. LeDoux believed that co-ordination of the 
two sets of information appeared to be controlled by the lateral nucleus of the 
amygdala where the two pathways converge (see Figure 2). 
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Central 
ý 
DNVMA Gray RDV 
Anterior edull 
Pituitary 
Stress Para- Emotional Sympathetic Reflex 
Hormone Sympathetic Behaviour Activation Potentiation 
Release Activation pain suppression 
Figure 2: Fear conditioning pathways 
BNST: bed nucleus of the stria terminalis ; DMV: dorsal motor nucleus of the 
vagus; NA: nucleus ambiguus; RPC: nucleus reticularis pontis caudalis; RV 
Medulla: rostral ventrolateral nuclei of the medulla; PVH: paraventricular 
nucleus of the hypothalamus. (LeDoux, 1997, p1720) 
5 
1.1.2 The amygdala 
Though a key mechanism in the emotion generating process, the amygdala is 
also crucial in the storage of `emotional memories', in prioritizing information for 
conscious and unconscious perceptual processing, in biasing resources towards the 
processing of that information, and, as a result, in influencing the content of explicit 
memory. 
Memory of the emotional stimulus and the generated response is stored as an 
implicit, non-declarative `emotional' memory. 'Implicit memories are outside 
conscious awareness and, unlike explicit memories, cannot be consciously recalled. 
LeDoux makes the distinction between `emotional memories'(i. e. the implicit 
memory), and `memory of an emotion' (i. e the explicit memory) (LeDoux, 1996). 
The implicit memory involves the crude perception of the external stimulus 
registered by the cells in the thalamus that directly trigger the amygdala and thence 
physiological and behavioural responses. NMDA (N-methyl D-aspartate) receptors 
in the amygdala that bind glutamate from simultaneously firing neurons, producing 
long term potentiation (LTP i. e. strengthened synapses between neurons) (Malenka 
and Nicoll, 1999, Maren, 1999), link together small groups of neurons that are 
triggered automatically by the external stimulus (LeDoux and Muller, 1997). This 
type of learning and memory was originally referred to as fear conditioning since 
research primarily concentrated on the registration and storage of fear responses 
(Lang et at., 2000, LeDoux, 1996, LeDoux and Muller, 1997), but later also became 
known as classical conditioning. Over time, changes in the cells themselves that 
make them more sensitive to the conditioned stimuli (LeDoux and Muller, 1997) 
ensure the hard-wiring of the event in memory. Since hard-wired into neural 
networks, this type of memory can only be controlled via inhibition (i. e. the control 
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of responses by the prefrontal cortex). The spontaeous recovery of memories after 
desensitization has occurred is taken as evidence of their endurance and required 
inhibition to control (LeDoux, 1996). 
The explicit memory is more detailed, involves higher order cortical 
processing, involves the hippocampus in storage processes and can be consciously 
recalled. Whilst damage to amygdala NMDA receptors disrupts fear conditioning 
(LeDoux, 1996, Maren, 1999), damage to hippocampal NMDA receptors impairs 
explicit memories and memory for the context in which fear conditioning occurred 
(LeDoux, 1996). According to LeDoux, the two memory systems only meet in 
working memory when current external stimuli activate the thalamo-amygdala 
pathway and generate the same responses that were triggered at the time of the 
original event. These responses are then experienced alongside current explicit recall 
of the memory, forming an impression of past emotion (LeDoux, 1996). 
More recent research (Clark et al., 2002) has also identified differences in the 
conditioning processes that store the two types of memories i. e. delay conditioning 
and trace conditioning. Delay conditioning that requires the cerebellum and 
associated brainstem structures but no forebrain structures offers a mechanism for 
implicit memory construction. Trace conditioning, however, that requires both the 
hippocampus and the neocortex in addition to the cerebellum and therefore also 
involves conscious awareness, offers a mechanism for explicit memory construction. 
Although emotion and cognition have long been thought of as separate systems 
functioning in different ways (LeDoux, 1996, Zajonc, 1980), it is the interaction of 
the two rather than their separateness that appears important. For example, recent 
research has highlighted more general functions for the amygdala such as attentional 
control (Davis and Whalen, 2001, Phelps, 2004, Phelps, 2006), visual awareness 
7 
(Duncan and Barrett, 2007), and the modulation of memories of emotion in the 
conscious explicit memory system by unconscious amygdala activation (Phelps, 
2004, Phelps, 2006). 
In a review of animal and human literature investigating the role of the 
amygdala in fear conditioning, Davis and Whalen cite much research that 
demonstrates an attention or orienting reflex generated by electrical stimulation of 
the central nucleus in the amygdala (Davis and Whalen, 2001). In humans, pictures 
of snakes, spiders and angry faces have been shown to capture attention more 
quickly than neutral stimuli (Öhman et al., 2001) and are believed to be the result of 
evolutionary hard-wired responses. The increased state of arousal that follows 
stimulation of the central nucleus in the amygdala is believed to enhance sensory 
processing. Conscious instruction has also been shown to influence attention. 
Research by Halgren, (Halgren, 1992 in Davis & Whalen, 2001) has demonstrated 
that an N200/P300 evoked response that is prominent within the amygdala, for 
example, is larger when subjects are instructed to attend to a stimulus. By 
processing a stimulus early (see Figure 3), it is thought that signals from the 
amygdala could, via feeback connections, enhance later perception and thereby 
increase perceptual encoding of emotional stimuli (Duncan and Barrett, 2007, 
Phelps, 2004). Evidence for early and late perceptual processing is well established 
(Adolphs, 2002, Codispoti et al., 2006, Codispoti et al., 2007) and could support 
such a function for the amygdala. 
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Stimulus onset 170ms : detailed >300ms: 
120ms: fast perception : conceptual 
early perceptual emotional knowledge of 
processing of reaction the stimulus 
highly salient involving the signalled by the 
stimulus body face 
Figure 3: Early and Late perceptual processing (Adolphs, 2002) 
The role of the amygdala in visual awareness is much debated but has 
important implications for emotion generation and regulation. The debate was re- 
opened recently by Pessoa who claimed that results from experiments manipulating 
attention (Pessoa et al., 2005a, Pessoa et al., 2005b) suggested that conscious 
awareness was necessary for the activation of the amygdala. However, in a reply to 
the claim, Duncan and Barrett maintain that amygdala involvement in perceptual 
processing is well documented and that conscious awareness may be the result of 
amygdala activity rather than a requirement for amygdala activation i. e. the 
amygdala's enhancement of perceptual processing could help generate conscious 
awareness though may not always do so (Duncan and Barrett, 2007). Though 
further research is necessary to resolve the issue, the role of the amygdala in the 
processing of stimuli in the ventral visual stream is evidence of at least some 
mechanisms that are shared by both cognitive and emotional systems. 
The interaction of the amygdala with hippocampal dependent explicit 
memories appears to occur during both the encoding and storage stages of 
information processing. By enhancing perception and attention, the amygdala 
increases the likelihood of the encoding of the attended stimulus, and by releasing 
stress hormones such as adrenaline, it can modulate the consolidation of such stimuli 
in memory (Phelps, 2004, Cahill and Alkire, 2003). In this way, the interaction of 
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the cognitive and emotion systems, once again, influences experiences of both 
`memories of emotion' and future experiences. 
1.1.3. The neocortex 
Although many psychologists accept the evolutionary model of emotion 
generation implicit in the description of emotion mechanisms outlined above, many 
do not. In the 1960s and 1980s, in particular, psychologists such as Richard Lazarus, 
Nico Frijda, Magda Arnold and the social constructivists argued vehemently in 
favour of a cognitive approach (Arnold, 1960, Frijda, 2004, Lazarus, 1982). Though 
some acknowledged a dual process in which fast, unconscious, low level appraisals 
may precede slower, more detailed, higher level reflective ones involving 
evaluation and interpretation processes (Arnold, 1960, Kappas, 2006), many 
maintained that cognitive appraisals of situations and events must precede emotion 
generation with the constructed meaning for the individual giving rise to the emotion 
itself. 
A description of the cortical regions involved in cognitive appraisal is more 
difficult, though, since it must virtually describe the entire information processing 
network, knowledge of which is still limited. A search through the emotion 
regulation literature, however, reveals much general agreement on some of the 
cortical regions involved. Using EEG (electroencephalography), fMRI (functional 
magnetic resonance imaging), and PET (positron emission tomography), for 
example, researchers have shown that activation of the prefrontal cortex occurs 
during evaluations of external context (Green and Malhi, 2006) whilst activation of 
areas in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) occurs during evaluations of self 
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relevance and monitoring of an internal emotional state (Green and Malhi, 2006, 
Gusnard et al., 2001, Lane et al., 1997). More specific functions of the PFC 
identified include a general monitoring of the external environment by the lateral 
prefrontal cortex (LPFC) (D'Esposito et al., 2000), an evaluation of the significance 
of the context by means of interactions with memory and attentional systems by the 
PFC and LPFC (Green and Malhi, 2006, Ochsner et al., 2002) and an interpretation 
of the precise meaning of a stimulus within that context by the medial orbital frontal 
cortex (MOFC) (Green and Malhi, 2006). 
Special areas for face perception have also been identified and involve 
multiple bilateral regions of the ventral temporal and association cortices. More 
specifically, facial movement appears to be the concern of the lateral temporal 
cortex, and the direction of eye gaze and mouth movement the concern of the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Green and Malhi, 2006). Cortical regions identified 
in facial expressions of emotion include the insula for disgust (Phillips et al., 1998, 
Phillips et al., 1997) and the left dorsolateral frontal cortex and right fusiform gyrus 
for expressions of fear (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998). 
More specific functions of the MPFC appear to involve the means by which 
self relevance can be evaluated. It is the MPFC, for example, that is believed to 
monitor internal experiential and physiological responses to external stimuli and to 
construct interpretations of the mental state and the intentions of others. 
Direct connections between the MPFC and the amygdala (Ochsner et al., 2002) 
suggest an appropriate pathway by which the outcomes of cortical appraisals can 
activate the amygdala and generate emotional responses. 
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1.2. Emotion Regulation 
"Emotion regulation refers to the processes by which individuals influence 
which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience 
and express them. Emotion regulatory processes may be automatic or 
controlled, conscious or unconscious, and may have their effects at one or 
more points in the emotion generative process" (Gross, 1998a). 
This general definition of emotion regulation by Gross captures the diversity in 
emotion generation and regulation theories and highlights the importance of both 
the thalamo-amygdala pathway and the thalamo-cortical pathway in the modulation 
of emotional responses. According to Gross, most researchers accept a 
multicomponential description of the emotional process (see Figure 4) even if they 
disagree on the precise definition of emotion (see Chapter 2) and the source of the 
emotional trigger. Regulation strategies, therefore, are generally accepted as 
attempts to modulate activity in one or more components of the emotional process 
and since the process itself is automatic once generated, fall into two groups: 
antecedent and response focused. 
Emotional 
Emotional Response Tendencies Emotional 
Cues 
"Behavioral 
Responses 
'Experiential 
"Physiological 
Evaluation Modulation 
Figure 4: A consensual process model of emotion (Gross, 1998a) 
Antecedent strategies tend to be anticipatory strategies, whilst response 
focused strategies attempt to modulate outcomes. Successful modulation of any one 
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of the components of an emotion (i. e. the physiological, behavioural or experiential 
component) is believed to result in modulation of the others. Regulation strategies, 
therefore, focus on one or more of these components and target either anticipatory or 
post hoc responses. Four major emotion regulation strategies have been investigated 
by researchers in some depth: suppression, detachment, distraction, and cognitive 
appraisal. Of the four, suppression is the only one that addresses non-cognitive 
responses and will be described first. 
1.2.1. Suppression 
In commonsense discourse, use of the term suppression has been heavily 
influenced by Freud and is often implicitly defined as the inhibition of emotional 
feelings. In emotion literature, however, it usually either refers to the inhibition of 
the expression of emotion (Gross, 1998a, Gross, 1999a) involving some cognitive 
control, or is sometimes used as a synonym for cognitive re-appraisal (Phan et al., 
2005). In early studies, it was defined as, "inhibiting emotion-expressive behavior 
while emotionally aroused" (Gross and Levenson, 1993). Since cognitive appraisal 
and suppression are very different, cognitive re-appraisal will be described 
separately. 
Some of the earliest studies investigating suppression, however, concentrated 
on thought suppression rather than behaviour. Wegner's famous `white bear' 
experiments, for example, were an attempt to manipulate direct control of thought 
via an instruction not to think of a white bear (Wegner et al., 1987). Unfortunately, 
Wegner discovered that newly formed associations between distracting items and 
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the unwanted thought provided numerous associated cues to activate the memory at 
a later date. 
Suppression of the expression of emotion has been more successful. 
Suppression of emotional expression is often conscious and effortful and can 
involve the modulation of facial expressions, tones of voice and overt action. In all 
instances, the behavioural response is triggered by the generation of the emotion and 
suppressed via cortical inhibition executed by the prefrontal and premotor cortex. 
Evidence for PFC involvement in suppression has been confirmed recently in 
studies that demonstrated the mediation of sustained changes in the allocation of 
control processes by the PFC, a transient role for the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
when additional control is required (Mitchell et al., 2007) and the crucial function of 
the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) for inhibitory control (Chambers et al., 2007). 
When physiological responses alone were thought to generate emotion 
(James, 1884) suppression of motor responses was thought to dampen the emotion 
automatically. "Refuse to express a passion, and it dies" (James, 1884). However, 
more recent research suggests that the effort involved in suppressing such responses 
may, in fact, increase physiological responses such as heart rate (Gross, 1998b, 
Gross and Levenson, 1997b) and thereby, presumably, the intensity of the emotion. 
In later studies evidence also suggests that expressive suppression impairs memory 
(Richards and Gross, 2000, Richards and Gross, 2006). As a strategy for regulating 
emotion, therefore, suppression would appear to be one of the least successful. 
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1.2.2. Distraction 
Two types of distraction are described in the literature, attentional and 
cognitive distraction. Attentional distraction is defined as "thoughts and behaviors 
that take the individual's mind off his or her symptoms of depression and put it onto 
pleasant or neutral activities" (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987,1991). It is a form of 
attentional bias that is used in an attempt to reduce the experience of negative 
emotion. By reducing perception of the negative stimulus, experiential, 
physiological and behavioural responses that may have been activated are avoided. 
At Arizona State University, results from a study of undergraduates that measured 
an association between attentional avoidance and cortisol levels found that high 
anxiety individuals utilized attentional avoidance more often than low anxiety 
individuals and showed lower cortisol levels during avoidance (Appelhans and 
Luecken, 2006). The results demonstrate a clear link between perception of a 
negative stimulus, a physiological response involving cortisol production and a 
successful emotion regulation strategy involving reduced attention. 
Another attentional strategy designed to reduce the experience of high negative 
arousal is distraction via activity. For young children rocking, sucking and grasping 
can distract them (Dodge, 1989), whilst for adults physical activity such as walking, 
bowling and jogging can reduce attention to the negative stimulus (Morrow and 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). Physical activity has been shown to counter depression by 
increasing positive mood (Berger and Mod, 2000) but Morrow and Nolen- 
Hoeksema also claim an effect of distraction. However, they do state that activity 
distraction is less successful than cognitive distraction because individuals can still 
ruminate on depressive moods whilst exercising. 
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Rumination is defined as, 
"thoughts and behaviors that focus the depressed individual's attention on his 
or her symptoms and the possible causes and consequences of those 
symptoms" (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987,1991). 
Rumination is a cognitive distraction strategy that removes attention from the 
external stimulus but replaces it with an internal focus that is largely unsuccessful 
since it tends to increase the duration and likelihood of negative mood rather than 
relieve it (Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990, Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000, Nolen- 
Hoeksema et al. ). By continually reflecting on negative experiences, a negative 
mind set may develop that increases the likelihood of interpreting new information 
negatively, reinforces negative impressions of the self, distracts attention from 
potentially positive forms of action, and generates a sense of hopelessness (Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 2000, Nolen-Hoeksema et al. ). Cognitive distraction tendencies that are 
more successful tend to involve effortful distraction and the processing of 
information that is totally unrelated to the emotion generating stimulus, and which, 
in a limited capacity cognitive system, must replace it. 
Effortful cognitive distraction can be used as an antecedent or response 
focused strategy. It is a strategy that focuses on the generation of emotion via 
cognitive appraisal rather than automatic biologically determined response 
tendencies, and thus suggests an explanation of the modulation of emotional 
experience via the reduction in cognitive resources available to process the stimulus. 
As stated previously, various cortical regions process different aspects of an external 
stimulus and have been shown to modulate amygdala activation. Of relevance to 
cognitive distraction is the role of the LPFC and MPFC in modulating amygdala 
activity (Ochsner et al., 2002). In the 2002 study, Ochsner et al demonstrated that 
activation in the ventral LPFC was inversely correlated with activation of the 
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amygdala ' and the MOFC, suggesting that activating the LPFC will modulate 
emotion processing. Both regions (i. e. the LPFC and the MPFC), he maintained, are 
similar to the regions activated during working memory and may well modulate 
emotion by modulating the amount of cognitive processing of the emotion 
generating stimulus. In cognitive distraction studies using fMRI, activation of the 
anterior rostral MPFC, by use of a distracting working memory task, has been 
shown to `down regulate' registered negative emotion in both the MPFC and the 
amygdala (Erk et al., 2006). In a study measuring self reported mood ratings, 
increasing task difficulty was also found to reduce negative mood ratings (Van 
Dillen and Koole, 2007). Both studies showed success in modulating antecedent 
responses to emotion generating stimuli. 
1.2.3. Detachment 
Detachment has been defined as "reappraisal by denial of relevance" (Kalisch 
et al., 2005). Basically, a situation is appraised as potentially emotional, but the 
appraiser adopts an objective perspective and denies the relevance of both the 
situation and the emotion to themselves. Successful detachment can result in 
attenuated physiological responses to unpleasant stimuli and has been shown to be a 
common factor in psychopathy (Patrick et A, 1993), although the strategy can be 
used by normal populations (Kalisch et al., 2005, Osumi et al., 2007). Detachment is 
also sometimes referred to as disengagement, dissociation and isolation. 
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1.2.4. Cognitive appraisal 
According to Clore and Ortony, appraisal refers to the `assignment of value or 
emotional meaning' (Clore and Ortony, 2000). Cognitive appraisal describes the 
emotion regulation strategy that focuses on interpretations and evaluations of stimuli 
that then modulate the emotion itself. Research by Gross and Ochsner has been 
particularly useful in highlighting the way in which cognitive appraisals can 
modulate amygdala activity (Ochsner et al., 2002, Ochsner and Gross, 2005). 
Basically, it works by changing a negative appraisal to an objective or more neutral 
interpretation. Appraisal processes that activate the MOFC also modulate activity in 
the amygdala with negative interpretations producing greater activation than neutral 
(Ochsner et al., 2002), but reappraisals either enhance or attenuate activity 
depending on whether they involve changes in meaning from negative to positive, or 
increased negativity. Of particular interest, was evidence that a conscious instruction 
to re-appraise a stimulus could affect amygdala activation (Schaefer et al., 2002). 
This suggests that in addition to affect modulation, affect generation may be less 
automatic than previously thought and may be open to at least some degree of 
conscious control. 
1.3. Aims and objectives of this study 
In 1999, Gross highlighted the fact that cognitive, behavioural and 
pharmacological means could all be used indirectly to modify the emotion 
experience. However, he also maintained that " it is less certain whether emotion 
experience can be modified directly" (Gross, 1999b). Today, with the evidence of 
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cortical modulation of amygdala activity outlined above, direct control may be a 
possibility. The aim of this study was to test the possibility of direct regulation i. e. 
the possibility that an individual could control perceptual change and thereby a 
change in affective state. 
19 
Chapter 2 
Methodology 
1.1. Introduction 
"Nothing proceeds from itself. Nothing is given. All is constructed. " 
Gaston Bachelard (1934) 
One of the initial aims of this study was to take an empirical, scientific 
approach and test the Freudian assumption of suppression that is embedded in 
common sense discourse and which suggests that feelings can be consciously and 
intentionally controlled. Though opting for scientific methodology, the aim is not to 
search for scientific `truths' but simply to test common sense assumptions about 
emotion regulation against empirical validity. 
Scientific methodology has been attacked for its pursuit of `truth'. 
Philosophers question the validity of such pursuits when ontological reality appears 
to have no meaningful existence outside language and discourse (Bachelard, 1934; 
Wittgenstein 1953/1967). Social and radical constructivists challenge beliefs in a 
single, objective reality with beliefs in multiple socially and cognitively constructed 
discourses that compete for interpretative supremacy (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 
von Glasersfeld, 1984). For sociologists of knowledge, scientific `truth' has been 
replaced by competing discourses vying for power and control in society (Foucault, 
1967, Foucault, 1977). Even for `soft' scientists, however, discourse must still have 
empirical validity and though science itself may be a discourse, it may still function 
to compare, falsify and thus evaluate other discourses. Scientific research still 
20 
requires a `descriptively accurate and prescriptively useful methodology' (Lakatos, 
1970) capable of testing, falsifying (Popper, 1994) and thereby informing political, 
legal, social and common sense discourses, policies and practices. Though specific 
discourses may change with political function, science would still appear to have a 
role to play in providing a measure of validity that subverts the potential for 
discursive anarchy. 
The problem for emotion researchers attempting to differentiate between 
discourses or theories that are useful and those that violate tests of validity and 
reliability, is that technological limitations constrain tests of empirical validity. 
fMRI and PET scans cannot yet trace activation in specific neurons, or between one 
neuron and another. The result is a knowledge base that is largely theory dependent, 
fragmented and piecemeal: a plethora of theories and therapies with theory 
dependent definitions of key concepts that make comparability, falsification and 
unification difficult. 
Although this study will do little, if anything, to overcome the problem, it is 
hoped that it will test an assumption that has real effects in everyday social and legal 
understandings of emotion and corresponding policies and practices. 
1.2. Current research: concepts and methodologies 
A brief review of current research to identify key concepts and methodologies 
with which to inform design decisions, reveals little coherence in the knowledge 
base. With technological limitations constraining empirical power, old ideas and 
assumptions continue to be influential. Descartes' mind/body dichotomy, for 
example, still underpins ubiquitous references to `cognition and emotion' and thus 
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reinforces ideas of separate systems and separate functions i. e. cognition, rationality 
and the cerebral cortex; emotion, irrationality and the limbic system. Echoes of the 
James-Canon debate, though long since resolved, linger still in research as diverse as 
studies of facial expression and the generation of emotion (Ekman, 2004, Oatley, 
1992) and cognitive evaluations of the self-relevance of external stimuli and the 
generation of `states of action readiness' (Oatley, 1992). However, though a single, 
comprehensive theory of emotion, as yet, eludes researchers, a brief review of 
current thinking and practice highlights the importance of clearly defining the 
research area, constructing precise definitions of key concepts and selecting 
appropriate methodologies. The following information provides the basis on which 
such decisions were made for this study. 
1.2.1. Definitions of Emotion 
Though much research into `hot cognition' is now rejecting the separation of 
cognition and emotion, present definitions of emotion are still theory dependent. A 
slight flavour of the current position is captured by the following question: 
"Are emotions to be conceptualized as brain modes, actions or action 
tendencies, reflexes, instincts, attitudes, cognitive structures, motives, sensations or 
feelings? " (Russell, 2003). 
A brief definition of five of the most commonly used conceptualizations may 
help clarify current thinking. 
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1.2.1.1. Affect 
Affect is a difficult term to define not least because it is often used 
interchangeably with words like emotion and feelings. It has been defined as the 
`conscious, subjective aspect of an emotion considered apart from bodily changes' 
(Merriam-Webster, 2007-2008), but both the `conscious' and `subjective' 
descriptors may be debatable. Most research involving affect, for example, tends to 
focus on amygdala activation and the unconscious and automatic nature of the 
generative process (Bradley et al., 1988, Bradley et al., 1990, Bradley et al., 1993a, 
Bradley et al., 1999b, Bradley et al., 1992, Bradley et al., 1993b, Öhman et al., 2001, 
Vuilleumier, 2005). At one time, it was used by Titchener as a label for the pleasant- 
unpleasantness dimension of feeling (Reber, 1985) and it is this usage that appears 
most common, although the term `feeling' may be contentious. In modern research, 
it is often regarded as one of the early components in emotion generation and is 
believed to have evolved from appetitive and aversive, approach and avoidance 
behaviour that proved to be adaptive (Bradley and Lang, 2000). Presumably via 
generalization processes, it has become attached to numerous objects and events that 
give rise to positive, negative and neutral affective responses. Whether biologically 
triggered as a hard-wired evolutionary response (Bradley and Lang, 2000) or the 
intuitive product of a cognitive process (Arnold, 1960), it is usually associated with 
amygdala activation. In the description of emotion generating mechanisms and 
emotion regulation strategies described above, affect is probably the definition of 
emotion that is referred to there. 
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1.2.1.2. Basic emotions 
Conceptualizations of basic emotions are derived from Darwin's theory of 
evolution and the identification of a limited number of universal facial expressions 
that communicate feelings. Apart from the five basic emotions of fear, anger, 
disgust, happiness and sadness, there is no agreement on what constitutes a basic 
emotion or how many there are. Basic emotions are usually thought to be 
biologically generated and, for some, are the products of the particular muscle 
configurations that form the facial expression (Ekman, 2004). According to Ekman, 
basic emotions are adaptive ways of dealing with fundamental life tasks (e. g. to 
develop and regulate attachments, to accelerate or decelerate aggression) and share 
four common characteristics: they are all universal signals, have distinctive 
physiology, involve automatic appraisal, and have universal antecedent events such 
as the loss of a significant other (Ekman, 1999). For researchers with a more 
cognitive perspective, however, they may be linguistic labels used to describe the 
outcomes of cognitive appraisals involving value judgements based on goal 
relevance, social standards or attitudes and tastes (Clore and Ortony, 2000). 
1.2.1.3. Response tendencies 
The automatic physiological, experiential and behavioural responses that are 
triggered automatically via the thalamo-amygdala pathway in response to an 
external stimulus are called response tendencies. For some researchers, response 
tendencies are emotions (Gross, 1998a) but for others they may be viewed as only 
one type of emotional response in a process that more often involves more 
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sophisticated cognitive evaluations that culminate in responses such as feelings of 
guilt or shame (Clore and Ortony, 2000). 
1.2.1.4. States of action readiness 
Researchers who focus on higher order emotional responses, such as guilt and 
shame, that are believed to be the outcomes of appraisals of stimuli in terms of self 
relevance and goal achievement, define emotions as states of action readiness 
(Frijda, 2004, Frijda, 2005, Oatley, 1992). Within this perspective, it is the 
motivation, or the `urge' to carry out an action (i. e. to hit, shout, run, cry or sing) 
' that characterizes an emotion and differentiates it from the alternative, objective 
response. 
1.2.1.5. Feelings 
As stated above, for some researchers and in common sense discourse, feelings 
are used synonymously with basic emotions and describe discrete emotions such as 
disgust and fear. For others however, since emotions are generated automatically 
and unconsciously, feelings are just an epiphenomenon of the emotion generating 
process that describe human experience, and which have no real relevance to the 
emotion generating process (LeDoux, 1996). Damasio, however, goes further and 
defines feelings as `private, mental experiences of emotion' (Damasio, 2000) and 
describes them as `a reflection of body-state changes' (Damasio, 2000), p22). Frijda 
on the other hand, maintains that they are the conscious experience, of an emotion 
and, crucially, function to `broadcast' messages to vast and disparate neural 
networks in order to recruit all potential resources for information processing 
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(Frijda, 2005). Thus they play a vital role in the construction of the reality by which 
we live and act. By activating some actions, stopping or interrupting others, 
changing expectations and adjusting beliefs and attitudes they are highly influential 
in determining behaviour. Although many researchers argue that feelings may 
simply give rise to post hoc rationalizations of unconscious appraisals of preceding 
events, Frijda maintains that `sources, or presumed sources' can be retraced and 
explicated by reflection, deliberated and acted upon and thence inform subsequent 
behaviour (Frijda, 2005). 
1.2.1.6. Summary 
Athough the definitions above are very diverse, there now appears to be a 
move to understand emotion in terms of a process starting with the generation of 
primitive affect and ending with high level, self relevant appraisals of external 
stimuli that generate complex emotions and guide behaviour towards goal 
achievement (Kappas, 2006). Understanding emotion with this kind of temporal 
perspective makes sense of the multi-definitional alternatives for the concept of 
emotion outlined above and provides some clarity. 
1.2.2. Methodologies: Measuring Emotion 
Measures of emotional responses may tap into the thalamo-amygdala pathway 
or the thalamo-cortical pathway, or both. Depending on focus of interest, researchers 
may typically adopt a psychophysiological or psychoneurological approach or a mix 
of the two. Following the identification of the amygdala as a key mechanism in 
emotional responding (LeDoux, 1996), most researchers attempt to measure 
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amygdaloid activity. Since the amygdala triggers behavioural and physiological 
responses, psychophysiologists tend to measure heart rate and skin conductance 
responses (SCR), or galvanic skin responses (GSR), as indicators of amygdala 
activity (Codispoti et al., 2001, Lang et al., 2000, Lang et al., 1993, Palomba et al., 
2000). Often facial EMG is also recorded as a measure of emotional expression that 
provides indications of response valence (e. g. zygomaticus major activity: smiling; 
corrugator supercilli activity: frowning) (Lang et al., 1993, Vrana, 1993). 
Neuropsychologists tend to focus on techniques such as 
electroencephalography (EEG) (Carretie et al., 1996, Esslen et al., 2003, Junghöfer 
et al., 2001, Palomba et al., 1997) that records brainwaves and offers good temporal 
information such as the precise timing of the onset and offset of amygdala activity. 
fMRI techniques identify good source location information for neural activity during 
emotional responding that can be used to describe functional neuroanatomy 
(Mitchell et al., 2007, Ochsner et al., 2002, Ochsner et al., 2004, Phan et al., 2005) 
and can provide EEG studies with highly reliable concurrent validity, although 
modem EEG equipment can now also provide source location information. PET 
scans, on the other hand, provide information regarding simultaneously active 
regions and the intensity of activation in each region. Neurological techniques are 
also used to identify interactions between brain regions and help trace important 
neural pathways between mechanisms (Phan et al., 2002). 
As Gross summarised in his consensual process model of emotion generation 
(Gross, 1998a), however, an emotion is multicomponential with concomitant 
physiological, behavioural, experiential and, perhaps, cognitive components. 
Therefore, as Bradley and Lang maintain, measures of emotional responding should 
tap into all components (Bradley and Lang, 2000). Whilst physiological responses 
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provide indirect measures of amygdala activity, self reports are often used to access 
the experiential component (Beauregard et al., 2001, Jackson et al., 2000, Ochsner et 
al., 2002, Ochsner et al., 2004, Phan et al., 2005). Where appropriate, behavioural 
responses may be observed via video recordings, and reaction times provide 
indicators of cognitive activity. 
1.3. Early Designs and Design Issues 
1.3.1. Feelings versus Affect 
According to Keltner et al (2003) the choice of studying emotion by category 
or dimension tends to follow theoretical approach. Evolutionary theorists suggest 
that each emotion triggers a specific adaptive response and therefore tend to focus 
on discrete emotions. Theorists who emphasise the socially constructed nature of 
emotion and differences across cultures, tend to favour a dimensional approach. The 
discrete emotion approach tends to focus on basic emotions. Often the number of 
basic emotions identified varies around the numbers five to seven but no agreement 
has yet been reached concerning the exact number. Fear, happy, sad, angry and 
disgust, however, always appear to be included in a list of basic emotions. Within 
the dimensional approach, all emotions are believed to lie on a continuum. A small 
number of dimensions are identified and emotions on any one dimension are thought 
to differ in degree of emotion only. Thus, a valence dimension situates positive and 
negative emotions on a continuum with fear, anger, disgust and sadness lying along 
the negative section and happy, joy and excitement along the positive. Since the aim 
was to investigate the common sense understanding of emotion the initial decision 
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was to concentrate on feelings. A preliminary study was run to check responses to 
IAPs pictures in a British population. The results are discussed below. 
1.3.2. Materials: slides versus film stimuli 
Although film excerpts have been used successfully to elicit specific, discrete 
emotions (Gross & Levenson,, 1995; Hagemann et al, 1997; Palomba et al, 2000; 
Philippot, 1993) it was decided to use slides for design simplicity, to minimise 
expressive behaviour and to ensure that the stimuli were not age or culture specific. 
The decision to use the International Affective Picture Set (TAPS) was largely to 
ensure that the visual stimuli used had been standardised but also to be certain of 
meeting ethical requirements. The picture set includes a large variety of positive, 
negative and neutral pictures, and generates a picture viewing activity that is highly 
motivational and ecologically valid. It is a fairly passive activity, however, so motor 
movements are minimised and picture presentation carefully controlled. Although 
dimensional theorists have used the IAPS material (Palomba et al, 1997; Carretie et 
al, 1996; Carretie et al, 2001), it has been found to generate a number of discrete 
emotions and analysis of such studies have shown it to produce substantial `stability 
of affective evaluations across laboratories in different countries' (Davidson et al, 
2003 p. 191). In addition, good associations have been found between picture 
valences and physiological responses and between physiological responses and 
evaluative judgements (Davidson et al, 2003). Differences in heart rate and skin 
conductivity measures have also differentiated between specific feelings such as 
fear, disgust and happiness (Lang et al, 1993). In order to select pictures from the 
IAPS picture set for use in the final experiments, a preliminary study was carried out 
to identify pictures that reliably generate discrete emotions. 
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Preliminary Study 1 
One hundred and seventy one negative pictures and 196 positive pictures 
valenced by the Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention (CSEA-NIMH) were 
identified initially as potentially useful. The initial selection was limited to avoid 
boredom before a sufficient number had been identified for the task. Pictures that 
were thought to be potentially offensive were omitted from the selection as were a 
large number of repetitions of same category photographs e. g. in sport and food. 
Potentially offensive pictures were omitted to help avoid participant withdrawals at 
a later stage and to be sure of ethical acceptance. 
The software programme Superlab was used to construct a computer 
programme that would present the pictures to participants and record their responses 
i. e. emotion labels, intensity ratings and reaction times. Thirty participants were 
asked individually to view the pictures and identify the emotion each picture 
generated. Each picture was presented for 100 milliseconds and then six emotion 
words appeared together with the picture on the screen. Five basic feelings were 
selected for presentation, anger, fear, disgust, happy and sad and two additional 
feelings, calm and neutral. These basic feelings were selected since they were 
believed to be universal, physiologically distinctive and easily verifiable. 
Participants were selected via volunteer sampling and were paid for their time. 
The sample consisted of 9 men and 21 women in the twenty to fifty years age range. 
The mean age was 30.93 years. Use of an internationally " tested picture set to 
generate the feelings standardised the procedure and also ensured ethical 
acceptability. No pictures were selected that were not found in the media although, 
prior to taking part, participants were also questioned about potential responses to 
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fear, violence and disease to make sure that events in personal life histories would 
not cause distress. 
The procedure was simple. Participants were instructed to look at each picture 
as it appeared on the computer screen, select the best fit emotion word to describe 
their response and record the intensity of their response by pressing the first letter of 
the selected emotion on the computer keyboard. A 5-point rating scale then 
appeared on the screen and participants were required to register the intensity of the 
emotion felt i. e. Low 12345 High. Following the response, again recorded by 
pressing the appropriate key on the keyboard, the next picture appeared. Emotions 
and intensity ratings were then analysed using frequency data. 
In addition to the main activity, a smaller study was also conducted to see if 
repeating the pictures a number of times would produce habituation. It was 
predicted that if participants habituated to both positive and negative pictures, 
response times would show a trend towards faster times as novelty decreased and 
cognitive processing was reduced. 
In this study, seven pictures were randomly selected from the three picture 
categories with low, medium and high valence ratings to represent fear, neutral and 
happy emotions. Five different fear, neutral and happy pictures were selected for 1 
presentation each. One picture from each category was selected for 5 presentations, 
and another picture from each category was selected for 10 repetitions. In total, 
therefore, 21 pictures were presented either once, five or ten times making a total of 
60 presentations. A 5-point rating scale was again used to record the intensity of the 
feelings experienced. This closely matched the SAM arousal rating scale used at the 
CSEA-NIMH, in that it allowed participants to register how strongly they felt on a 
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low to high scale but, not being a continuous pictorial scale depicting facial 
expressions, did not allow between category responses such as 1.5,2.5,3.5 and 4.5. 
The design for picture presentation was simple. Five sets of pictures were 
constructed by placing the pictures into repetition categories and then randomly 
selecting one from each category to be assigned to the 5 sets. The sets were then 
shuffled, the order randomised and the sequence of pictures determined by selecting 
one picture from each set as follows: 
Si S2 S3 S4 S5 
S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 
S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 
S4 
............................. 
Superlab was again used to present the pictures only this time participants were 
required to register only the strength of the feeling experienced. 
Results: A set of neutral and sad pictures that could reliably generate these 
responses more than 90% of the time was clearly identifiable. However, the number 
of pictures in each set was small: thirteen pictures labelled neutral and nine pictures 
labelled sad. Fear and disgust generating pictures were not so clearly identifiable. 
Only 4 fear generating pictures could be identified if the 90% fear response was 
accepted and only 3 disgust pictures: although all the disgust pictures attracted a 
100% disgust response result. 
Comments from participants indicated that the pictures often generated more 
than one response and a decision had to be made regarding which one to choose. 
Examples of simultaneous emotional responses were: excitement and fear in 
response to an ice-climber on a steep ice slope, anger and fear in response to a 
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victim of violence, and sadness and fear in response to an accident or disease victim. 
Participants were also aware of dual responses involving a felt emotion and a 
politically correct choice of response. 
Analysis of mean emotion ratings for all the pictures presented produced 
62.6% with a mean of 3 or above (see Appendix 3). On a 5-point rating scale, 3 was 
judged to indicate a strong response. Within this strong response category, 16.4% of 
the pictures also clearly identified agreement on a single feeling i. e. 90% or more of 
participants identified the same feeling for the picture. Pictures generating fear, 
happy, sad, disgust and neutral responses were identified in this way. From the 
pictures showing high agreement for feeling generated and a strong response, 7 fear, 
7 happy and 7 neutral pictures were selected to test habituation in the next study (see 
Appendix 1). 
Analysis of the data from the habituation study suggested that participants 
were responding differently to the three picture categories but the orienting 
response, though indicating a tendency to fall with repeated picture presentations 
also showed inconsistencies (see Table 1). Mean intensity ratings for the three 
feelings were: fear 3.88, happy 2.91 and neutral 1.71. 
Table 1 Mean intensity ratings for pictures and repetitions (Study 1) 
Fear Happy Neutral 
x1 3.81 2.93 1.46 
x5 3.85 2.92 2.29* 
X10 3.97 2.87 1.38 
*rounded to 2 decimal places 
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Discussion: Comparison of the mean intensity ratings and percentages for the 
emotion labels indicated that a set of IAPS pictures could be identified and used to 
generate emotional responses described by participants as fear, happy and neutral. 
However, analysis of the habituation data indicated that all pictures within 
categories were not equivalent. A high valence rating for the pictures selected for the 
x5 repetition in the neutral category indicated that it was closer to the happy rather 
than neutral category and was replaced. 
Although, the preliminary study identified those IAPS pictures that would 
reliably generate emotions assigned the same labels by British participants, the 
number of pictures involved was small and although initial experimental designs 
used only a small number of pictures this was later found to be inadequate. Initially, 
early pilot studies used the small number of pictures with 90% or more agreement, 
but then lowered the percentage. to 80%+ and then finally resorted to collapsing 
categories into positive, negative and neutral affect. 
Both age and gender were found to influence perceptions of particularly 
positive pictures and these were later omitted from experiments. Culture too 
influenced both perceptions and physiological responses to both negative and neutral 
pictures. South East Asian students, for example, hardly responded to pictures 
depicting mutilated bodies whilst European students found such pictures the most 
shocking. On the other hand, European students found pictures of beds made up 
with white sheets and pillow cases very neutral, whilst South East Asian students 
often rated them as highly positive. Since self reported arousal ratings were taken as 
a measure of the experiential component of emotion, collapsing the categories from 
feelings to affect was essential. However, initially the focus was on feelings as 
outlined below. 
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1.3.3. Habituation and Emotion Regulation 
Habituation is defined as, `a decrease in responsiveness to a stimulus when that 
stimulus is presented repeatedly or for a prolonged time' (McSweeney, 2002). Initial 
presentation of a stimulus produces a shift of attention as the brain adjusts to the 
new and unexpected stimulus. This response is called an `orienting response' 
(Sokolov, 1963). At first the response is quite strong and produces changes in 
sensory, somatic, EEG and autonomic processing which interrupt on-going 
behaviour and increase attentional focus to incoming sensory information (Davidson 
et al, 2003). With repeated presentations of the stimulus, however, the orienting 
response gradually decreases and eventually stops. This is called habituation and is a 
simple example of learning in the nervous system. 
Habituation occurs in a number of neurological and physiological structures. 
Research by Fischer et al (2000), for example, has demonstrated neural habituation 
in the visual cortex and the right medial temporal cortex including the amygdala and 
hippocampus. Wright et al (2001) has also found differences in habituation in the 
prefrontal cortices depending on whether the stimulus is pleasant or unpleasant i. e. 
repeated happy stimuli produce greater habituation effects than fearful stimuli. 
Differences in the valence of stimuli has also been found by Bradley et al (1993) in 
sub-cortical structures. They found that whilst the primary reflex circuit showed 
habituation effects, the secondary modulatory circuit did not. Thus, it was 
demonstrated that the amygdala does not habituate over time but remains responsive 
to unpleasant stimuli, an activation pattern believed to function as a warning system 
to potential threat. In the same study, they also found that heart rate and skin 
conductance responses habituate to both pleasant and unpleasant pictures but 
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corrugator muscle responses habituate to unpleasant pictures only. Skin conductance 
was also found to be highly sensitive to novelty. 
Since habituation responses eventually decrease, control would appear to be 
via repetition of stimuli. Number of repetitions and the duration of stimulus 
presentation are both used to produce decreases in the orienting response, but 
researchers do not appear to utilise a standardised procedure. Habituation appears to 
be achieved by increasing the number of repetitions or duration of stimuli until 
asymptotes are reached: at least ten to fifteen repetitions would appear necessary. 
Since cognitive and physiological measures would be used to measure emotion 
regulation, the potential for habituation processes to confound the results is clear. It 
was decided, therefore to conduct a preliminary study to see if picture repetition 
could be manipulated to produce habituation asymptotes that would form a baseline 
from which to measure the effects of emotional regulation. The following 
preliminary study was therefore conducted to assess the possibility. 
Preliminary Study 2 
The aim of this study was to use the IAPS pictures identified in study one to 
repeat the test for habituation with an improved design and to test it for internal 
reliability and potential gender effects. Inconclusive evidence exists for gender 
effects in emotion generation. Although de Wied et al (1997) reported gender 
differences in an experiment investigating the effects of forewarning participants of 
impending violence and suspenseful drama, Phillipot (1993) investigating the 
induction and assessment of feeling states in the laboratory, and Lang et al (1993) 
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investigating behavioural reactions to emotion inducing picture stimuli found no 
gender differences. 
Twenty one experimental pictures and 60 mixed set pictures to be used as 
`fillers' were selected from the first study to use as emotion generating stimuli. As 
before, 5 sets of pictures were constructed and used to sequence the pictures. Seven 
fear, seven happy and seven neutral pictures were selected for the experimental 
conditions. Twenty fear, twenty happy and twenty neutral pictures were interleaved 
with the experimental stimuli to encourage spontaneous responses and discourage 
the use of memory. As before, each of the 5 sets of pictures included 1 fear, 1 happy 
and 1 neutral picture to be presented once, 1 picture from each category to be 
presented 5 times and 2 examples of a fear, a happy and a neutral picture to be 
presented 10 times in total (2 x5 sets). Pictures from the 7 selected for each 
category were then randomly selected for 1,5 or 10 repetitions. Also as before the 
pictures were randomly allocated to the sets, the sets shuffled and randomly 
allocated to one of 5 set positions. One picture from each set was then taken in 
sequence, as before, until all the pictures formed a single set. Two versions of this 
design were constructed to test for internal reliability and order effects. Thirty two 
participants, 16 men and 16 women, all teachers at a known sixth form college and 
with an average age of 40.73 years completed the study. 
Results: Mean intensity ratings were compared for habituation effects but again 
showed inconsistencies (see Table 2). Repetitions for happy pictures increased 
intensity ratings i. e. no habituation appeared to be demonstrated. 
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Table 2 Mean intensity ratings for pictures and repetitions (Study 2) 
Fear Happy Neutral 
x1 4.01 3.22 1.25 
x5 3.76 3.35 1.31 
X10 3.58 3.39 1.16 
However, analysis of the differences between intensity ratings for first picture 
presentation and the mean intensity rating for subsequent repetitions (a measure that 
allowed comparisons between pictures and across categories) showed some 
increases in intensity ratings. 
Table 3 Mean differences between intensity ratings for first presentations and 
repetitions 
Increase Decrease 
Fear x5 0.01 - 
Fear x 10 0.05 - 
Happy x5 - 0.21 
Happy x 10 - 0.21 
Neutral x5 - 0.07 
Neutral x10 - 0.07 
Overall mean ratings for fear, happy and neutral feelings continued to show 
differences in response to each category (see Tables 3 and 4). 
Table 4 Overall mean intensity ratings for pictures in the fear, happy and neutral 
categories 
Fear Happy Neutral 
3.79 3.32 1.24 
A between subjects ANOVA showed no differences between versions tested 
(F1,30 = 0.04p>0.05) and no gender differences (F1,30 = 0.01 p>0.05). 
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Discussion: Although the two repetition conditions showed falling trends in 
arousal ratings for happy and neutral pictures and hence provided evidence of 
required habituation, responses to negative pictures tended to rise and it was clear 
that the attempt to create asymptotes to form baselines from which to measure the 
effects of emotion regulation was not going to be successful. A search through the 
emotion literature confirmed the results. Although habituation to repeated negative 
pictures should produce habituation, responses to blocked negative pictures often 
tend to increase the intensity of responses(Smith et al., 2005), possibly making it 
difficult to control habituation in this way. It was decided, therefore, to abandon the 
attempt and rely on counterbalancing of conditions to offset the problem. 
1.3.4. Measures of Emotion 
Decisions regarding selected methodology were largely pragmatic. fMRI, PET 
scan and EEG equipment was not available and therefore rejected. A 
psychophysiological approach was adopted, therefore, and a Biopac System 
purchased for the recording and measurement of heart rate, galvanic skin response 
and facial EMG. Since the focus of interest had narrowed to affect generation, again 
for pragmatic reasons, self-report ratings of arousal were selected for accessing the 
experiential components. It was not thought that behavioural responses would be 
particularly relevant to a passive picture viewing activity, but a camera did provide 
evidence that participants followed instructions and viewed the pictures for the full 
duration of picture presentation. Responses and response times were also recorded in 
order to provide measures of task accuracy. 
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Measuring physiological responses to the generation of affect, however, is not 
unproblematic. Both increases (Lazarus et al., 1962, Palomba et al., 2000) and 
decreases (Bradley et al., 1993a, Lang et al., 1993, Palomba et al., 2000) in heart 
rates have been reported for pictures that induce feelings of fear. Increases (Vrana, 
1993) and decreases (Bradley et al., 1993a, Sarlo et al., 2005)in heart rates have also 
been reported to feelings of disgust. Induced feelings of sadness and disgust, 
however, have been found to be equivalent (Lang et al., 1993). The potential for 
confounding responses to fear, disgust and sadness inducing pictures by collapsing 
them into a single negative category is, therefore, a risk and is acknowledged. 
However, it was decided to address the problem with. the use of statistical tests to 
identify any significant differences in responses. To do this, negative pictures would 
be divided into three discrete subsets i. e. fear, disgust and sad according to agreed 
emotion labels. A fourth `mixed' category would be comprised of pictures to which 
feelings of fear, disgust and sadness had been attributed but for which there was less 
than 50% agreement on a single feeling. Any significant differences in HR, GSR 
and EMG responses to these subsets would then be identified using standard 
statistical tests. 
Before analysis, all raw data would be screened for outliers and those found 
adjusted by changing extreme scores to one unit larger (or smaller) than the next 
most extreme score in the distribution. Extreme scores would be those found to be 
more than 3 standard deviations from the mean (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
1.3.5 Recognition Memory 
Research by Kevin Ochsner (2000) into the awareness that accompanies 
recognition of affective images and the processes of recollection and familiarity that 
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may underlie them has produced some interesting findings. For example, recognition 
accuracy (signal detection d') was found to be greater for negative stimuli than 
neutral, and negative stimuli tended to be recollected significantly more frequently 
via Remembering than by feelings of Knowing. Neither positive nor neutral stimuli 
showed this enhancement pattern. Furthermore, how deeply stimuli were encoded at 
study (i. e. whether or not people were judging the intensity of the content or the 
brightness of the image at the time of encoding) did not influence the pattern of 
results found. Ochsner suggests that enhanced remembering and recollection of 
negative stimuli is probably due to the mechanisms and processes that bias attention 
to processing their distinctiveness (Ochsner, 2000). 
In the light of these findings, and as a purely secondary and exploratory 
activity, therefore, it was decided to include a surprise recognition memory task at 
the end of each experiment and collect recognition memory data using the 
remember/know (R/K) paradigm. It was thought that it might provide future 
directions for further research. Participants would be required to mark pictures that 
were recognised as. having been in the programme with an R for remember, aK for 
know or an F for familiar, depending on the state of recognition awareness 
experienced. Effects of valence and arousal could then be analysed using attributed 
valence labels and arousal ratings from preliminary studies, together with similar 
valence and arousal ratings from IAPS. For recognition accuracy data, signal 
detection d' would be calculated. using the Snodgrass and Corwin adjustment 
(Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988). Simple proportions of Remember(R), Know(K) and 
Familiar(F) responses would be calculated for comparisons across conditions as 
measures of experienced awareness. In his 2002 research, Ochsner also showed, 
however, that experienced states of awareness and the processes of recollection and 
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familiarity that underlie them are not the same. It was decided to take measures of 
familiarity controlling for the recollection/familiarity overlap identified by Jacoby 
(1991) and tested by Ochsner (2000) by using the formula ((k/n)/(1-(r/n)) (where k 
= know responses, r= remember responses and n= the total number of possible 
responses). Potential response confidence, identified by Yonelinas (1994), would 
also be controlled via instructions (i. e. remember and know responses would both 
emphasise a degree of certainty). A lack of confidence would be more directly 
measured via the frequency of familiarity responses (see instructions in Appendix 
1). Recognition would be measured via proportions of old pictures (hits) to new 
pictures incorrectly identified (false alarms) (Ochsner, 2000). Using the formula 
above for the familiarity measure, recollection would be calculated as 1- 
familiarity. The results '-would then be discussed in the final chapter where any 
potentially interesting lines of research would be highlighted and noted for potential 
future research. 
1.3.6. Final Decisions: Summary 
From the results of the preliminary studies run, it was decided to use the slides 
rated for arousal and valence levels in the preliminary studies but to use them to 
generate and measure affect rather than feelings due to the small number of pictures 
that produced 80%+ agreement on feeling label. An added advantage was the 
potential for concurrent validity checks. Collapsing feelings into affect categories 
would provide enough stimuli to create the designs required without repeating any 
picture. It was also decided to control habituation via counterbalancing. Heart rate, 
GSR, facial EMG and self reported arousal ratings, together with a recognition 
memory test, were the selected measures of emotional responses. 
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Chapter 3 
Self Regulation 
Freud's theories of suppression and repression that still appear to underpin 
common sense discourses on emotion, were based on a historically specific 
hydraulic model of emotion that conceptualised anxiety in terms of the inability to 
`let off steam', i. e. an inability to express distressing and disturbing feelings. Only 
through psychoanalytic therapy could abreaction (i. e. the expression and emotional 
discharge of unconscious material (as a repressed idea or emotion) by verbalization 
especially in the presence of a therapist) produce catharsis (i. e. a purification or 
purgation that brings about spiritual renewal or release from tension or elimination 
of a complex by bringing it to consciousness and affording it expression). However, 
such concepts as suppression, repression, abreaction and catharsis could not be 
tested scientifically and were only validated by introspection. Though ubiquitous 
concepts in common sense discourses, many psychologists were very skeptical of 
their value in understanding emotion regulation. 
Today, with fMRI, PET scans and EEG, emotion regulation has become 
scientifically testable. James Gross, for example, has extensively researched the 
suppression of the expression of emotion, and cognitive reappraisal as methods of 
emotion regulation (Gross, 1998b, Gross, 1998a, Gross, 1999b, Gross, 1999a, Gross, 
2002, Gross and Levenson, 1993, Gross and Levenson, 1997b). Initially, 
suppression of feelings themselves were not thought possible since emotions were 
believed to be automatically generated response tendencies. However, many 
researchers do not accept this definition of emotion, believing emotions to be 
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cognitively generated as a result of conscious evaluations of the relevance of events 
to the self. Psychologists who do not believe that emotions are automatically 
generated have been supported by new research by Kevin Ochsner that has 
identified connections between the PFC and the amygdala and demonstrated the 
ability of the cortex to up and down-regulate amygdala activation (Ochsner et al., ' 
2002, Ochsner and Gross, 2005, Ochsner et al., 2004). This has opened up the 
possibility of testing self regulation of the emotion itself. 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, it is important for psychologists to 
test common sense knowledge and particularly understanding of emotion and 
emotion regulation since it has very real effects on the lives of individuals, groups 
and societies. The following experiments, therefore, were designed to test direct 
regulation of affective responses to valenced pictures. This approach is slightly 
different from that of Gross, therefore, since it accepts the premise that emotion 
generation may not be entirely automatic and that conscious and intentional control 
may modulate the emotion itself. The focus, therefore, is on the cognitive control of 
emotions and not behavioural responses such as facial expressions, which for Gross 
and other researchers with an evolutionary perspective, may influence the 
experience of the emotion. It was hypothesised that if affective responses are under 
intentional control, instructing participants to `Feel' and `Not Feel' emotional 
responses to pictures, would produce a measurable difference in physiological as 
well as experiential responses. More specifically, it was predicted that arousal 
ratings would be lower when participants tried to control their feelings and higher 
when they did not. In addition, heart rate responses to negative pictures would be 
higher in the `No Feel' condition than the `Feel' condition and galvanic skin 
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responses and facial EMG would be higher in the `Feel' than the `No Feel' 
condition. 
1.1. Experiment 1 
1.1.1. Participants 
Sixty participants (51 female: 9male) (Mean age: 19.63 S. D. 3.96), all first year 
undergraduates took part in the study for course credits. All completed 
Spielberger's Trait Anxiety Questionnaire (Spielberger, 1983) before participating 
in the study and. were allocated to a low average, average or high average trait 
anxiety group based on their anxiety scores. Trait anxiety mean and standard 
deviation for the whole group was 40.6 (12.26). All 60 participants were then 
divided into two groups of 30 for the between subjects condition and matched as far 
as possible for gender (26 females, 4 males; 25 females, 4 males), age in years (19.1 
(2.37); 20.2 (5.07) and trait anxiety level (36.8 (6.00), 39.9 (10.43)). All gave 
written informed consent before participating. 
1.1.2. Stimuli and Design 
Sixty experimental pictures (20 negative, 20 positive, 20 neutral) selected from 
the earlier survey of pictures taken from the International Affective Picture Set 
(IAPS), and 79 neutral inter-stimulus images from previous pilot studies provided 
the experimental stimuli designed to manipulate valence and generate emotional 
responses. All 20 negative pictures had a 97%+ agreement on negative valence and 
a strong valence rating (mean: 3.85) measured on a 5-point rating scale. No purely 
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fear inducing pictures were included in the negative category in this study. All 20 
neutral pictures had 87%+ agreement on neutral valence and a strong neutral valence 
rating' (mean: 3.47) on the same 5-point rating scale. Positive pictures consisted of a 
combined set of IAPS and Google images selected for age relevance. The 79 neutral 
inter-stimulus images consisted of an assortment of geometric line drawings and 
colour blocks. All 20 negative pictures and neutral pictures were randomly assigned 
to 3 conditions designed to manipulate repetition: 5 randomised, single 
presentations: 5 blocked affect presentations: and 10 blocked affect presentations. 
The mean ratings for strength of valence for affect in each condition were computed 
to ensure comparability (see Table 5). 
Table 5 Strength of Valence Ratings for negative, positive and neutral pictures in 
the three repetition conditions 
Negative Neutral Positive 
X1 3.81 3.53 3.32 
x5 3.86 3.51 3.41 
X10 3.85 3.48 3.45 
Five blocks of trials were constructed in order to limit presentation time to 5 minutes 
maximum per block (see Table 6). 
Table 6 Blocked Experimental Design 
Block 1 x5 randomised negative, positive & neutral 
pictures 
Block 2 x5 blocked negative, positive & neutral pictures 
Block 3 x10 blocked negative pictures 
Block 4 x10 blocked positive pictures 
Block 5 x10 blocked neutral pictures 
I Ratings are Valence Ratings not Arousal Ratings 
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Figure 5 Trial Structures 
Two versions of the design and three different picture sequences were 
constructed to enable full counterbalancing of blocks 3,4 and 5 and valence in block 
two. All blank screens and fixation crosses were presented for 500ms and all 
experimental pictures for 6 seconds. The number and duration of inter-stimulus 
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geometric shapes and colour blocks varied in number from 2-4 and in duration from 
4000-8000ms in order to ensure a 10-16 second inter-stimulus interval to allow 
galvanic skin responses to fall to baseline, and to control for temporal expectations 
(see Figure 5). 
1.1.2.1. Recognition Memory 
One hundred and twenty pictures, 60 old (20 negative, 20 positive and 20 
neutral) and 60 new (20 negative, 20 positive and 20 neutral) were randomly 
selected for the recognition memory task and were presented as rows (5 pictures per 
row) of coloured 2cm x 2.5cm thumbnails on laminated sheets of paper. Both old 
and new pictures were randomly positioned and formed a total of 2V2 pages of 
pictures. Acetates placed over the laminated pages enabled pictures to be marked as 
seen, if recognised. Foils were matched by category (see Appendix 2) and, as nearly 
as possible, by intensity but t-tests showed that negative and neutral foils were 
significantly less intense than the experimental pictures (t = 4.27 df = 38 p<. 05; t= 
3.58 df = 38 p<. 05). Results for the recognition memory task are interpreted in the 
light of this limitation. 
1.1.3. Physiological Data Collection and Reduction 
Superlab Software (Version 2.02) was used to programme and display the 
IAPS pictures on a standard IBM computer with a 17" colour monitor situated 
approximately 1. Om from the participant. A second IBM compatible computer 
running AcqKnowledge 3.7 Acquisition, Analysis and Archive Software controlled 
physiological data acquisition. Physiological signals were continuously sampled at 
1000Hz and began at least 3 seconds before each series of pictures in each block. 
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Raw electromyography (EMG) was recorded from the corrugator supercilii 
muscle (above the left eye) and zygomaticus major muscle (left cheek) using four 
EL504 1" cloth disposable electrodes. Placement followed guidelines by Fridlund 
and Cacioppo (2000). The electromyographic activity was routed through a Biopac 
150 system. The raw EMG signals were amplified (Gain: 5000) and filtered (low 
pass filter: 500Hz; high pass filter 10Hz) using a Biopac EMG1000 
Electromyogram Amplifier Module. The raw signals were rectified and integrated 
off-line following Biopac recommended procedures and averaged over 50 samples. 
Digital pulses marked the onset and offset of picture presentations. The magnitude 
of electromyographic activity was measured 1 second prior to picture onset and for 
the 6 second duration of picture presentation using the Biopac peak-to-peak(P-P) 
function. 
Galvanic skin responses were recorded using 2 EL507 pre-gelled (Isotonic 
Gel) disposable electrodermal activity electrodes placed on the volar (palmar) 
surface of the distill phalanges (the fingerprint region) of the non-dominant hand. 
Electrodermal signals were routed through a Biopac GSR1000 Electrodermal 
Activity Amplifier module. The raw signal was amplified (Gain: 5µS/v) and filtered 
(low pass: 1.0Hz; high pass: 0.5Hz) following Biopac Application note AH187 and 
calculated offline in microsiemens (µS) smoothed over 200 samples. 
The electrocardiogram was recorded from the left and right side of the chest 
using 2 EL503 vinyl 1%" pre-gelled disposable general purpose electrodes. The 
signal was filtered using a Biopac ECG 100 Electrocardiogram Amplifier. The signal 
was amplified (Gain: 500Hz) and filtered (low pass: Norm; High Pass 0.5Hz) 
following Biopac application note AH109. Offline calculation converted the raw 
signal to beats per minute (BPM). 
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1.1.4. Procedure 
Prior to running the study, emails and fliers were circulated to advertise it and 
volunteers contacted and interviewed. In order to screen out unsuitable participants 
on ethical or experimental grounds, the nature of the study was explained during the 
interview and checks made regarding phobias, past experiences, potentially 
distressing memories that may be triggered by the pictures viewed, and pacemakers. 
Suitable participants then completed the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Questionnaire 
(Spielberger, 1983) which was later scored and used to assign participants from low 
average, average and high average anxiety groups to one of the two matched 
between subject groups. 
On arriving at the laboratory, participants read the participant information 
sheet outlining the purpose of the study, were reminded of the procedure and then 
gave written informed consent to participate. Once seated approximately 1.0m from 
the computer screen, electrodes were attached, the equipment tested and waveforms 
checked. Participants were then talked through the instructions (see Appendix 1) and 
practice session. Approximately 20 minutes after the GSR electrodes were attached, 
the experiment began. 
All participants completed block 1 followed by block 2 of the picture series 
and then blocks 3,4 and 5 in the sequence required by counterbalancing procedures. 
All blocks required participants in the `Feel' condition to look at each experimental 
picture and rate how strongly they responded to each one on a 5-point rating scale 
ranging from 1 Very Weak to 5 Very Strong, by pressing the apppropriate key on a 
response pad resting on the knees to minimise hand movements. They were 
instructed to register their first response as quickly but as accurately as possible but 
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to continue looking at the screen for the full 6 seconds of picture presentation. They 
were also instructed to concentrate on the strength of the feeling and ignore the 
valence. Participants in the `No Feel' condition followed the same procedure except 
that they were instructed to look at each picture, `Stop' the emotional response and 
then rate the strength of any remaining response. 
At the end of the experimental tasks, a short block of `Feel Good' pictures (all 
positive pictures) was presented to create a positive mind set in which to complete 
the computer tasks. Participants completed the Spielberger State Anxiety 
Questionnaire (Spielberger, 1983) and then the recognition memory task. The 
recognition memory task required participants to look at the set of printed pictures 
placed on a table in front of them to see if they recognised any of the pictures as 
having been displayed in the experimental tasks they had just taken part in. They 
were instructed to leave blank any picture that they didn't recognise but to write the 
letter R in the centre of a picture they remembered having seen (i. e. a picture they 
could remember coming up on the screen, or a particular part of the picture they 
remembered, or something they had thought about at the time), aK if they knew 
they had seen the picture but had no mental `evidence' to support the knowledge, 
and an F if a picture was accompanied only by a feeling of familiarity. Once 
completed, the electrodes were then removed and a few short post-experimental 
questions asked to record the participants experience of the study. In particular, 
participants in the No Feel condition were asked whether or not they felt that they 
had managed to Stop their emotional responses to the pictures and, if so, how. 
VF 
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1.1.5. Results 
A mixed Analysis of Variance (multivariate) (ANOVA) statistical test was 
used to analyse the results for each dependent variable. The Feel/No Feel instruction 
formed the between subjects variable. All other variables were within subject 
variables. The results were analysed in three categories: physiological responses i. e. 
heart rate (HR), galvanic skin responses (GSR) and electromyographic activity 
(EMG), experiential responses i. e. self-reported arousal ratings, and cognitive 
responses i. e. the recognition memory test. 
Change scores were calculated for all physiological responses. A change score 
is a response to an experimental stimulus minus a1 second pre-picture onset 
baseline measure. The response score so calculated equals the response brought 
about by the experimental stimulus. HR change scores were calculated in beats per 
minute (BPM), GSR in microsiemens and EMG in microvolts. A Greenhouse 
Geisser correction for sphericity was used in all experiments where Mauchly's Test 
of Sphericity indicated sphericity violations. A mixed ANOVA was used to test HR 
and GSR differences between the negative category subsets of disgust, sadness and 
mixed negativity (see Chapter 2 p39). Using the independent variable `Emotion' and 
three levels of analysis (i. e. disgust, sadness and mixed negativity), no main effect of 
emotion was found for HR (F<1), no main effect of group (F1,58 = 1.4 p >. 05) and no 
Emotion x Group interaction (F<1). However, a main effect of emotion was found 
for GSR (F 1.66,96.32711.65 p <. 001), but there was no main effect of group (F<1) 
and no Emotion by Group interaction (F<1). An analysis of simple effects revealed 
significant differences between galvanic skin responses to feelings of disgust and 
sadness (F1,58 = 14.51 p <. 001 d =. 20) and disgust and mixed negativity (F1,58 = 
15.94 p <. 001 d=. 22) but no significant difference between feelings of sadness and 
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mixed negativity (F1,58 = 3.08 p >. 05). However, though differences in responses 
may have attenuated the habituation trend seen in Figure 7, and may have reduced 
the effect size of the differences between responses to negative and neutral pictures, 
the lack of a main effect for group and no Emotion x Group interaction meant that 
the Feel and No Feel conditions were unaffected. Therefore, it was judged 
acceptable to compare differences between negative and neutral stimuli using the 
collapsed negative category. 
1.1.5.1. Physiological Responses 
In line with existing research, there was a main effect of valence for HR (F2,114 
= 3.92 p<0.03 d= . 06) and GSR (F1.06,62.9 = 7.28 p<0.01 d= . 11) but changes in 
heart rates were greatest for neutral pictures and lowest for positive pictures (see 
Table 7). For GSR, changes were greatest for negative pictures and smallest for 
neutral pictures (see Table 7). 
Table 7. Means and Standard Errors for HR and GSR responses to negative 
and neutral pictures (change scores) 
Negative Positive Neutral 
Mean S. E. Means S. E. Mean S. E. 
HR -. 41 . 22 . 06 . 16 -. 59 . 16 
GSR . 03 . 01 . 02 . 00 . 01 . 00 
There was also a main effect of repetition (HR: F2,114 = 12.59 p<0.001 d =. 18 and 
GSR: Fla, 72.34 = 8.62 p<0.001 d= . 13) with the largest 
fall in heart rate in the x5 
condition and the smallest rise in GSR in'the x10 condition (see Table 7). There 
was also an interaction effect of Valence x Repetition for both HR and GSR (HR: F 
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4-128 =2.49 p<0.05; GSR: F 1.18.69.72 = 3.68 p <. 05 d= . 
06) with heart rate changes to 
negative and neutral pictures steadily rising with increases in same valence 
repetitions and GSR steadily falling (see Figures 6 and 7). Table 8 reports the exact 
mean change responses. 
Table 8 Heart Rate and Galvanic Skin Response Means and Standard Errors 
for negative and neutral pictures in all three repetition conditions 
HR GSR 
Repetitions Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral 
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
X1 -. 96 . 37 . 18 . 35 -. 77 . 32 . 
05 . 01 . 02 . 00 . 01 . 00 
x5 -. 72 . 
31 -. 78 . 
25 -. 64 . 
26 
. 
03 
. 
00 
. 
02 
. 
00 
. 
01 
. 
00 
X10 . 
46 
. 
27 -. 77 . 
20 -. 37 . 
23 
. 
01 
. 
01 
. 
01 
. 
00 
. 
01 
. 
00 
However, there was no main effect of instruction for either HR (F<1) or GSR 
(F<1) and no additional interaction effects (Valence x Instruction: HR: F 2,114 = 1.21 
p>. 05; GSR: F 2.116 =1.99 p>. 05), (Repetitions x Instruction: HR: F 2.114 =2.80 
p>. 05; GSR: F 2.116 =1.67 p>. 05), and (Valence x Repetition x Instruction: HR: F 
3.28.187.28 = 1.52 p>. 05; GSR: F1.18,68.21=1.08 p>. 05). 
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Figure 6: Heart rate responses to repeated negative, positive and neutral pictures 
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Figure 7: Galvanic skin responses to repeated negative, positive and neutral pictures 
1.1.5.2. Arousal Ratings 
For self-reported arousal ratings, there was a main effect of valence, as 
expected, (F148 84.3s = 298.62 p<0.001 d= . 83) with significantly higher arousal 
ratings for negative than neutral pictures (Means and SEs = 4.05, . 081; 1.95, . 
077 
respectively) and a main effect of repetition (Fi. 75,99.7 = 5.87 p<0.01 d= . 09) with 
arousal ratings significantly lower in the xlO condition than in the x1 condition 
(Means and SEs = (xl) 3.10,0.73, (x10) 2.95,0.73). There was also a main effect 
of instruction (F, 57 = 69.88 p<0.001 d= . 55) with significantly higher ratings in the 
Feel than the No Feel condition (Means and SEs = (Feel) 3.53, . 09; (No Feel) 2.56, 
. 09) (see 
Figures 8 and 9). 
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Figure 8: Self reported arousal ratings for repeated negative, positive and neutral 
pictures in the Feel Condition 
ö4 
c 3.5 
3 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
1 is 
0.5 
00 
Repetitions 
  negative 
  positive 
Q neutral 
Figure 9: Self reported arousal ratings for repeated negative, positive and neutral 
pictures in the No Feel Condition 
1.1.5.3. Recognition Memory 
In this experiment, valence was assigned to pictures according to the affect 
labels identified in preliminary studies and IAPS valence ratings. Arousal refers to 
high. medium and low arousal ratings given to negative, positive and neutral 
pictures (i. e. negative = high, positive = medium, neutral = low). 
X1 x5 x10 
x1 x5 x10 
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Recognition Accuracy 
Analysis of the recognition accuracy data showed a high percentage of 
correctly recognised pictures (Hits) in all three categories and a relatively small 
percentage of false alarms (FAs). The signal detection (d') value was also high (see 
Table 9). 
Table 9 Measures of recognition performance as a function of valence 
Valence Hits FAs d' 
negative 
positive 
. 91 
. 88 
. 04 
. 01 
3.11 
3.23 
neutral . 85 . 02 3.55 
Statistical analysis of recognition accuracy using a mixed ANOVA with 
valence as the independent variable showed no significant d' differences for valence 
(F1,58 = 2.44 p <. 05) but significant differences for arousal. For low arousal pictures, 
d' was significantly greater than for either medium (F 1,58 = 16.06 p <. 001 d= . 22) or 
low arousal pictures (F1,58 = 31.48 p <. 001 d =. 35). 
An analysis of correctly recognised pictures using a mixed ANOVA statistical 
test showed a main effect of valence (F2,116 = 5.76 p<0.01 d= . 09) with 
significantly more negative pictures being correctly recognised than positive (F1,58 = 
14.90 p<0.001 d =. 20) (Means and S. E. s = negative. 304 (. 00), positive. 295 (. 01), 
neutral . 284 (. 01). There was no significant difference between the proportions of 
negative and neutral pictures correctly recognised (F1,58 = 2.33 p>0.05 d= . 04), 
however, nor between the proportions of positive and neutral pictures recognised 
(F1,58 = 2.85 p> . 05 d= . 05) (see Figure 10). There was no main effect of group 
(F<1), and no Valence x Group interaction (F2,116 = 1.05 p> . 05 d= . 02). 
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Remember, Know and Familiar responses 
Comparisons of simple proportions for the three picture types and R/K/F 
responses in the Feel and No Feel conditions (see Table 10) showed a higher 
proportion of correctly remembered negative pictures than either remembered 
positive or neutral pictures. 
Table 10 Simple proportions of R/K/F recognition responses to negative, 
positive and neutral pictures in the Feel and No Feel conditions. 
Feel No Feel 
Valence Remember Know Familiar Remember Know Familiar 
Negative . 78 . 07 .. 04 . 
79 . 12 . 03 
Positive . 53 . 22 . 10 . 56 . 17 . 13 
Neutral . 38 . 39 . 12 . 56 . 25 . 09 
Analysis of the data by R/K responses showed a main effect of recognition 
(F2,116 = 86.98 p <. 001 d =. 35, a Valence x Recognition interaction (F1.88, log = 31.49 
p< . 001 d =. 35 (see Figure 10), and a Valence x Recognition x Group interaction 
(FI. 9, log = 2.97 p <. 05 d= . 05). For negative and positive pictures, all R, K and F 
comparisons were significantly different. For neutral pictures, however, the R/K 
comparison was not significantly different (F1,58 = 2.98 p >. 05). Analysis of the 
three-way interaction showed a significant difference in group R/K responses to all 
picture types. For negative pictures, there was a significant difference in R/K 
responses in the Feel (F1,29 = 137.63 p <. 001 d =. 83) and No Feel (F1,29 = 58.84 p 
<. 001 d =. 66) conditions as there was also for positive pictures (Feel F1,29 = 16.48 p 
<. 001 d= . 36; No Feel F1,29 = 21.18 p <. 001 
d= . 42). Neutral pictures showed a 
significant difference in R/K responses in the Feel condition (F1,29= 5.99 p <. 01) but 
not in the No Feel condition (F<1). A comparison of correctly recognised negative 
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and neutral pictures in the Feel and No Feel conditions showed that although 
significantly more negative than neutral pictures were remembered in both the Feel 
(F 1,29 = 42.13 p <. 001 d= . 59) and No Feel (F 1,29 = 13.70 p <. 01 d= . 32) conditions, 
the size of the difference between them in the No Feel condition (d=. 32) was almost 
half that found in the Feel condition (d=. 59) i. e. the negativity bias was much 
smaller than would normally be expected (see Figure 11). 
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Recollection and Familiarity 
An analysis of recollection and familiarity data showed that recollection was 
higher than familiarity for negative pictures in the Feel condition compared with 
positive and neutral pictures (see Table 11). However, in the No Feel condition 
Table 11 Recollection and familiarity as a function of valence 
Recollection Familiarity 
Valence Feel No Feel Feel No Feel 
Negative . 69 . 44 . 
31 . 56 
Positive . 53 . 62 . 
47 . 38 
Neutral . 37 . 46 . 
63 . 54 
The pattern was reversed. Recollection was higher for positive and neutral pictures 
than for negative. 
Analysis of familiarity measures using a mixed ANOVA showed a main effect 
of valence (F 2,116 = 6.01 p <. 01 d= . 09) (Means and SEs = negative . 24 (. 
04); 
positive . 37 (. 04) and neutral . 36 (. 05)), a Valence x 
Group interaction (F 2,116 = 3.59 
p <. 05 d= . 06) but no main effect of Group 
(F<1). An analysis of simple effects for 
valence showed significantly greater recollection (and hence less familiarity) for 
negative pictures compared with neutral pictures (F 1,58 = 6.59 p <. 05) but only in the 
Feel condition (F 1,29 =7.44 p <. 02; F<1) Comparison of negative and positive 
pictures found a similar pattern with greater recollection (and hence less familiarity) 
for negative than positive pictures (F 1,58=11.10 p <. 01 d=. 16) in the Feel condition 
(F 1,28 = 16.12 p <. 001 d= . 36) but not the No Feel condition (F<1). There were no 
significant differences between neutral and positive pictures (F<1). 
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1.1.6. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate the potential of participants to regulate 
their emotional responses in line with Feel or No Feel instructions whilst viewing 
external emotion generating stimuli (i. e. negative and neutral pictures). The results 
showed no evdence that conscious self instruction could modulate HR and GSR 
physiological responses despite a significant main effect of instruction on self- 
reported arousal ratings. What was interesting, however, was an effect of instruction 
on recognition memory. The fact that there was no valence x instruction interaction 
in performance data shows that instructions had no effect on overall proportions of 
negative and neutral pictures correctly recognised, but a valence x recognition x 
instruction interaction in recognition memory suggested that it did have an effect on 
how pictures were remembered. The proportion of negative to neutral pictures 
remembered in the No Feel condition, for example, was significantly less than in the 
Feel condition. This suggests that an important effect of the instruction to 
consciously and intentionally control emotional responses to negative pictures was 
to produce a dampening of emotion in recognition memory, and this may indicate 
that some degree of top-down control may influence how strongly or how detailed a 
negative picture may be encoded in recognition. Exactly how this occurs, however, 
is still unclear, but one possibility is via increased activation from executive 
mechanisms. Research suggests that paying attention to a stimulus improves 
memory (Cowan, 1993) and that attention is modulated by top-down biases from the 
PFC (Maia and Cleeremans, 2005). If this is so, then conscious instructions may bias 
attentional resources, either to increase or decrease processing resources and thereby 
memory. However, it must be re-emphasised that recognition memory data was 
collected for exploratory use only and no definitive conclusions can be drawn from 
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this data. What it does do is offer potential lines of investigation for future research 
and this will be discussed in the final chapter. 
Although the overall line of inquiry appeared interesting, there was some 
concern that the untested originality of the present experimental design might not 
stand up to a rigorous peer review and would therefore throw doubt on the validity 
of any results produced. The decision was taken, therefore, to run a second 
experiment with a more rigorous within subjects design to test the same hypothesis 
(i. e. that a conscious instruction to Feel or Not Feel emotional responses to external 
stimuli would produce a significant difference in emotional response) before 
continuing. 
In the new design, inter-stimulus geometric shapes and colour blocks, 
included to avert boredom and prevent temporal expectations of experimental 
picture presentation, would be replaced by a simple fixation cross that varied in 
temporal duration. Boredom would be controlled by the division of tasks into blocks 
of picture presentations lasting a maximum of approximately 3 minutes. The 
relatively untested positive images selected for age appropriacy would also be 
excluded, limiting the study to a comparison of just negative and neutral pictures, 
and the blocked 5 consecutive single affect picture presentation condition would 
also be omitted since it offered no additional insights that the 10 consecutive 
presentation condition didn't provide. Second year undergraduates would also be 
recruited rather than the first years to help offset possible demand effects and, 
finally, a video camera would be introduced to confirm participant focus on 
experimental pictures for the full 6 second duration of picture presentation. With 
design improvements, the experiment was then re-run. 
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1.2. Experiment 2 
1.2.1 Participants 
Thirty two participants (25 females: 7 males)(Mean age: 20.31yrs SD 1.66), all 
Leeds University second year undergraduates, took part as paid volunteers. All 
completed Spielberger's Trait Anxiety Questionnaire (Mean: 39.78 SD 7.4) before 
participating in the study to exclude any abnormally highly anxious individuals and 
to ensure matched samples in version groups. All participants gave informed written 
consent to participate. 
1.2.2. Stimuli and Design 
Eighty experimental IAPS pictures (40 negative: 40 neutral) selected from the 
previous preliminary studies were randomly assigned to two sets of pictures (20 
negative: 20 neutral) to construct the Feel and No Feel conditions. Each set was 
then divided again to form the 2 repetition conditions (x10 randomised negative and 
neutral presentations: x10 blocked single valence). Ten blocks of trials were then 
constructed as follows so that no block lasted longer than approximately 3 minutes 
(see Table 12). 
63 
Table 12 Experimental Design 
FEEL Block 1 Practice TRIAL STRUCTURES NO FEEL Block 1 Practice 
Block 2 Randomised + 
IAPS 
Block 2 Randomised 
X1 xl 
Block 3 Randomised Randomised x10 Block 3 Randomised 
xl 12-16s 6 secs xl 
Block 4 Blocked Block 4 Blocked 
x10 Negative x10 Negative 
Block 5 Blocked Blocked x10 Block 5 Blocked 
x10 Neutral 12-16s 6 secs x10 Neutral 
The 12-16 second inter-stimulus fixation cross was maintained to disrupt 
temporal expectations. Four versions of the design were then constructed to ensure 
that all pictures appeared in both conditions and were counterbalanced. 
1.2.2.1. Recognition Memory 
One hundred and sixty pictures: 80 old (40 negative: 40 neutral) and 80 new 
(40 negative: 40 neutral) were selected for the recognition memory task and were 
presented on laminated sheets of paper as coloured 2cm x 2.5cm thumbnails 
arranged on three pages in 8 rows with 6 pictures per row and a fifth page of the 
remaining 16 pictures. Acetates placed over the laminated sheets enabled recognised 
pictures to be identified with the letters R (remember), K (know) and F (familiar). 
All foils and experimental pictures selected were matched by category (see 
Appendix 2). IAPs ratings were used to match arousal levels although arousal 
ratings for negative foils were significantly lower than for the negative experimental 
pictures (t = 2.5 df = 78 p<. 05), as were the neutral foils (t = 3.62 df = 68.88 p<. 05). 
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1.2.3. Physiological Data Collection and Reduction 
As in experiment 1, Superlab Software (Version 2.02) was used to programme 
and display the IAPS pictures on a standard IBM computer with a 17" colour 
monitor situated approximately 1. Om from the participant. A second compatible 
computer controlled physiological signals sampled at 1,000Hz.. Heart rate (HR), 
galvanic skin responses (GSR) and electromyography (EMG) for the corrugator 
supercilli (above left eye) were recorded using the same Biopac hardware, gain 
settings and filters except for the EMG electrodes. Four EL 507 254S shielded silver 
chloride electrodes with disposible collars replaced the EL504 1" disposable cloth 
electrodes. 
A Panasonic Colour CCTV camera (model WV-CL350B) and a Panasonic 
DVD recorder (model DMR-ES 15), positioned behind but above the monitor 
displaying the IAPS pictures, projected an image of the participant's face in the 
centre of a second monitor placed outside the participant's field of vision and 
provided a continuous recording of facial behaviour. 
1.2.4. Procedure 
Prior to arriving at the laboratory, participants had been interviewed, fully 
informed of the experimental requirements and had completed checks for potential 
ethical and experimental suitablility (Appendix 7). All selected participants then 
completed Spielberger's Trait Anxiety Questionnaire (Spielberger, 1983). 
On arriving at the laboratory, participants read the information sheet that again 
described the study, were reminded of the procedure and then gave written informed 
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consent to participate. Once seated in front of the computer, electrodes were 
attached and equipment and waveforms checked. The first practice session then 
began and was followed by experimental blocks 2-5 (or 7-10 depending on the 
sequence of conditions). The second practice session was then followed by Blocks 
7-10 (or 2-5) and then a set of positive `Feel Good' pictures to create a positive mind 
set with which to end the computer session. 
Before removing the electrodes, Spielberger's State Anxiety Questionnaire and 
the recognition memory task were completed as in experiment 1. The electrodes 
were then removed and post-experimental questions asked to record participants 
experience of the study (particularly whether or not they believed that they were 
able to stop their emotional responses to the pictures). 
As in experiment 1, the recognition memory task required participants to look 
at the set of printed pictures placed in front of them to see if they recognised any 
picture as having been in the experimental study they had just completed. They were 
instructed to leave blank any picture that they. didn't recognise and to write the letter 
R in the centre of a picture they remembered (i. e. a picture they could remember 
coming up on the screen, or a picture they remembered focusing on a particular part 
of , or a thought they remembered having when viewing a particular picture), aK 
if 
they knew they had seen the picture but for which they could find no mental 
`evidence' to support the feeling, and an F if a picture was accompanied only by a 
feeling of familiarity. 
Uc 
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1.2.5. Results 
A 2x2x2 within subjects ANOVA statistical test was used to analyse the 
results. As in experiment 1, results were analysed in three categories: physiological 
responses (HR, EMG), experiential responses (self-reported arousal ratings), and 
cognitive responses (the recognition memory task). Change scores were computed 
from raw physiological data, converted to z scores and then analysed. HR and EMG 
responses to fear, disgust, sad and mixed category pictures were tested using a 
repeated measures 2x4 ANOVA with two levels of Instruction (i. e. Feel and No 
Feel) and four levels of Emotion (i. e. fear, disgust, sadness and mixed). For HR, 
there was no main effect of emotion (F3,93 = 1.6 p >. 05). For EMG corrugator 
activity, however, there was a main effect of emotion (F 3,93 = 6.33 p <. 05 d= . 17) 
with a significant difference between responses to pictures inducing fear and disgust 
(F1,31 = 12.47p <. 01 d= . 29). More facial EMG activity accompanied pictures that 
induced feelings of disgust than fear (Means and SEs = -. 084 (. 06); . 221 (. 05) 
respectively). Comparisons of simple effects between fear and sadness, disgust and 
sadness, disgust and mixed feelings, and sadness and mixed feelings found no 
significant differences (F 1,31= 3.86 p >. 05; F<1; F1,31= 1.07 p >. 05; F1,31 = 2.48 p 
>. 05). Since all pictures were fully counterbalanced and there was no main effect of 
instruction (F<1) and no Instruction x Emotion interaction (F<1), there was no 
evidence that collapsing all negative pictures into a single negative category was 
masking different results. 
ý ý[t; 
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1.2.5.1. Physiological Responses 
A main effect of valence for HR responses (F1,31 = 4.50 p<0.03 d =. 127) as 
expected, showed change scores with a fall in mean HR for negative pictures but a 
rise for neutral pictures. Mean changes and standard errors were -. 06 (. 03). for 
negative pictures and 06 (. 03) for neutral pictures. However, there was no main 
effect of repetition (F<1) and no main effect of instruction (F<1). A t-test to see if 
the valence effect may have been confounded by fear and disgust responses analysed 
together in the negative category, showed no significant difference between the two 
emotions (t=. 379 df3l p>. 05). Electromyographic corrugator supercilii responses 
showed a main effect of valence (F1331 = 41.75 p<0.001 d =. 57) with a significant 
increase in activity during negative picture presentations and a fall during neutral 
picture displays. Mean change responses and SEs were . 18 (. 03) and -. 18 (. 03) 
respectively. 
Table 13: Mean Change Scores (µV) and Standard Errors for EMG corrugator 
supercilii activity to negative and neutral pictures in the Feel and No Feel conditions 
Neutral Negative 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Feel -. 129 . 037 . 398 . 067 
No Feel -. 229 . 043 -. 042 . 046 
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Figurel2: EMG corrugator supercilii activity during Negative and Neutral picture 
displays in the Feel and No Feel conditions 
A main effect of repetition (F1,31 = 17.54 p<0.001 d =. 36) showed a fall in 
activity in the randomised single presentations but a rise for the x 10 blocked single 
valence condition. Mean changes and standard errors (in parentheses) were -. 10 
(. 02) and . 09 (. 02). There was also a main effect of instruction (F1 31 = 20.83 p< 
0.001 d =. 40) with higher levels of activity in the Feel condition than the No Feel 
condition. Mean changes and standard errors were . 14 (. 03) and -. 14 (. 03). A 
significant Valence x Instruction interaction (F1,31 = 9.14 p<0.01 d =. 23), indicated 
lower levels of corrugator activity for neutral pictures in both the Feel and NoFeel 
conditions but higher levels for negative pictures in the Feel condition (see Figure 
12). Table 13 reports the exact means for the Valence x Instruction interaction. 
Observation of the video recordings confirmed that participants maintained 
attention on all experimental pictures for the full 6 second presentation time and 
continued to focus on the inter-stimulus fixation cross throughout the study. 
1.2.5.2. Arousal Ratings 
As in experiment 1, there was a main effect of valence (F1,31 = 487.82 p< 
0.001 d =. 94), instruction (Fi, 31 = 126.63 p<0.001 d =. 80) and repetition (F131 = 
69 
46.93 p<0.001 d =. 60), with higher arousal ratings for negative than neutral 
pictures (Means and SDs = 3.42 (. 60); 1.47 (. 38)), higher ratings for Feel than No 
Feel instructions (Means and SDs = 2.79, . 47; 2.1, . 50), and higher ratings for x10 
blocked pictures than randomised single presentations (Means and SDs = 2.55, . 
48; 
2.34, 
. 50). A valence x repetition 
interaction (F1,31 = 9.81 p<0.01 d =. 24) also 
showed significantly higher ratings for x10 blocked negative pictures than xl 
randomised negative pictures (Means and SEs = 3.58, . 
09; 3.26, 
. 
09) and no 
significant difference for neutral pictures (Means and SEs = 1.42, . 05; 1.52, . 06) as 
would be expected (see Figure 13). 
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Figurel3: Arousal ratings in the single randomised and blocked series conditions. 
A significant Valence x Instruction interaction (F1 31 = 44 . 57 p<0.001 
d =. 59) 
for self reported arousal ratings also showed significantly higher ratings for negative 
pictures in the Feel than the No Feel condition (Means and SEs = 3.97,. 08; 2.87, . 12) 
and no significant difference for neutral pictures in the two conditions (Means and 
SEs =1.61,. 07: 1.33,. 05) (see Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Arousal ratings for Negative and Neutral pictures in the Feel and 
No Feel conditions 
1.2.5.3. Recognition Memory 
An analysis of correctly recognised high and low arousal pictures, (though 
without proportional comparisons due to human error), highlighted the usual pattern 
of more high arousal than low arousal pictures correctly recognised overall. 
Remember, Know and Familiar responses 
Analysis of simple proportions by arousal, instruction and recognition 
responses showed the tendency for more high arousal than low arousal pictures to be 
Remembered than recognised with reported Know or Familiar responses (see Table 
14). 
Table 14 Mean proportions for R/K/F responses to negative and neutral 
pictures in the Feel and No Feel conditions 
Feel No Feel 
Arousal Remember Know Familiar 
High 
. 
58 . 
14 
. 
09 
Low 
. 
41 
. 
27 
. 
09 
Remember Know Familiar 
. 
59 
. 
12 
. 
08 
. 
37 
. 
27 
. 
12 
71 
Statistical analysis of simple R/K/F proportions using a repeated measures 
2x2x3 ANOVA, however, showed no main effect of arousal (F<l ), no main effect 
of instruction (F<1) and no Arousal x Instruction interaction (F<1). There was, 
however, a main effect of recognition (F 1.2,37.1= 37.73 p <. 001 d =. 55), an Arousal x 
Recognition interaction (F 1.2.37.7 = 18.05 p <. 001 d= . 
37) and an Arousal x 
Instruction x Recognition interaction (F 1.6,50.6= 3.20 p =. 05). Once again, more high 
arousal than low arousal pictures were remembered (Means and S. E. s = . 
59 (. 04); 
. 
39 (. 05) and more Know responses were produced to neutral than negative pictures 
(Means and S. E. s: =. 27 (9.04); . 12 (. 02); ) (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Recognition responses for high and low arousal pictures in the Feel and 
No Feel conditions 
Comparison of both picture types, however, shows a smaller overall significant 
difference between remembered high arousal and low arousal pictures in the Feel 
condition (F1.11 = 13.59 p<0.01 d =. 31) than in the No Feel condition (F,,; i = 23.94 
p<0.001 d =. 44), a smaller difference again for pictures producing Know responses 
in the Feel condition (Fi. 31 = 8.39 p<0.01 d =. 21) than the No Feel condition (Fi. 31 
= 20.91p < 0.001 d =. 40), and a non-significant difference in the Feel condition 
Remember Know Familiar Remember Know Familiar 
Feel No Feel 
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(F<1) but a significant difference in the No Feel condition (F1,31 = 5.53 p< . 05 
d 
=. 15) for pictures producing Familiar responses. 
Recollection and Familiarity 
Computed recollection and familiarity measures again showed greater 
recollection for high arousal than low arousal pictures (see Table 15) and hence, 
conversely, greater familiarity for low arousal than high arousal pictures. 
Table 15 Recollection and Familiarity as a function of arousal 
Recollection Familiarity 
Arousal Feel No Feel Feel No Feel 
High . 66 . 71 . 34 . 29 
Low . 55 . 57 . 45 . 43 
Analysis of familiarity measures using a 2x2 ANOVA, with arousal and 
instruction as the independent variables, showed no main effect of arousal (F 1,31= 
2.92 p >. 05), no main effect of instruction F 1,31 = 2.03 p >. 05 and no Arousal x 
Instruction interaction (F 1,31 = 1.25 p >. 05). Thus, there was no indication of 
significant differences in recollection and familiarity processes that may underlie 
correct recognition of high and low arousal pictures and no indication of any effect 
of instruction on such processes. 
1.2.6. Discussion 
As found in experiment 1, there was no evidence that conscious and intentional 
instruction modulated HR responses despite a similar main effect of instruction on 
self reported arousal ratings. Conscious and intentional control of facial EMG 
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appeared likely, however, since the pattern of corrugator supercilli activity mirrors a 
similar pattern of consciously experienced decreases in arousal ratings for negative 
pictures in the No Feel condition. This could suggest that participants attempted to 
control their emotional responses by controlling facial expressions. This tends to 
support facial expression studies that demonstrate changes in facial muscle activity 
resulting in changed experiences of emotion (Strack et al., 1988). The same result 
would also be true, however, if controlling emotions resulted in changes in facial 
expressions. Gross found that suppressing the expression of emotion (Gross, 2002, 
Gross and Levenson, 1997b, Richards and Gross, 2000) actually increased 
physiological responses such as HR and GSR and produced a cognitive cost in the 
form of impaired memory. In this study, there was no effect on HR or GSR and no 
apparent cost in recognition memory. In fact, the significant increase in the number 
of negative pictures recognised in the remember category in the No Feel condition 
compared with the Feel condition, was the exact opposite result to that predicted 
from the Gross experiments and the results in experiment 1. Perhaps, therefore, 
changes in corrugator supercilli activity was the result of attempts at controlling 
emotions rather than the result of controlling facial expressions. 
Analysis of the memory performance data shows that the proportion of 
correctly recognised high arousal pictures was greater than the proportion of 
correctly recognised low arousal pictures but no difference in the proportions of 
correctly recognised high and low arousal pictures were found in the Feel and No 
Feel conditions. However, there was a difference in the recognition data. This time 
the proportion of high to low arousal pictures remembered in the No Feel condition 
was larger than in the Feel condition suggesting an enhanced effect of emotional 
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responses in recognition memory. In addition, this effect occurred despite a 
dampening of corrugator supercilli activity in the No Feel condition. 
One concern is that none of the measures of emotion used so far has tapped 
into amygdala activity. As outlined in chapter 1, the amygdala is a key mechanism 
in the generation of affect and will be responding differently to negative and neutral 
pictures. However, corrugator supercilli activity is the only physiological measure 
that has produced significant differences in activity. It seems logical, therefore, to 
measure orbicularis oculi activity (i. e. the eyeblink response), a similar facial EMG 
measure but one that is also known to covary with amygadala activity. Since 
orbicularis oculi activity is automatically and unconsciously generated, this would 
provide a more sophisticated measure of affective responses and help disentangle 
responses due to conscious experience from responses that are the result of 
unconscious emotion generation. 
However, there is still the problem of the differing effects of instruction in the 
two experiments. If executive functioning might be a factor, as previously 
suggested, then it may not be totally under conscious and intentional control. 
However the most plausible explanation for the two different effects lies in the 
nature of the experimental design. Whilst experiment 1 used a between subjects 
design, experiment 2 used a within subjects design. The fact that design was the 
major difference in the two experiments and that participants in experiment 2 were 
far less certain than were participants in experiment 1 that they had managed to 
control their emotional responses in the No Feel condition, suggests possible 
support for this explanation. In fact, experimental design, with an effect of 
instruction sequence, coupled with strategies employed to control emotional 
responses may offer a useful and coherent direction for further investigation. 
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In both experiments participants attempted to control their emotional responses 
in the No Feel condition by using a variety of strategies. The most frequently 
reported were, attempting to blur their vision, trying not to think, and viewing the 
pictures as film sets and therefore as unreal. A comparison of these strategies with 
those reported in the emotion literature, suggests that participants may have been 
attempting detachment, distraction and cognitive re-appraisal. The conflicting 
evidence found in the two experiments, however, suggests that distraction may have 
been the most influential since successful detachment and cognitive appraisal would 
be more likely to produce consistent results. For distraction, inconsistent results may 
be produced by the type of distractor items used. For example, since negative 
pictures in the Feel and No Feel conditions were taken from similar categories (e. g. 
dead bodies, accidents, mutilation, assaults) it is possible that the instruction not to 
feel responses in experiment 2 actually produced a response similar to the well 
documented `white bear' effect (Wegner et al., 1987) which results in participants 
who are told not to think of a white bear finding it difficult to think of anything else. 
Participants in experiment 2 who undertook the Feel condition before the No Feel 
condition may well have been particularly vulnerable to this effect. If this was so, 
then participants in the No Feel condition in experiment 1, the between subjects 
design, may have found it easier to increase or decrease executive functioning by 
using distraction since they had no comparison condition which they were required 
to ignore. Participants who undertook the No Feel condition first in experiment 2, 
however, would be required to ignore the first Feel instruction in order to 
successfully apply the No Feel instruction, and this may have been difficult. 
Kahneman maintains that attention can be `grabbed' by interesting or particularly 
self relevant stimuli (Kahneman, 1970). Thus, attention and executive functioning 
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maybe `hijacked' by stimuli irrespective of conscious control. However activated, it 
would seem that increasing or decreasing cognitive resources may be a factor 
worthy of further investigation. 
1.2.7. Summary 
Attenuated EMG corrugator supercilli activity in the No Feel condition, was 
interpreted as the result of a conscious attempt to control emotions, suggesting that 
conscious and intentional emotional control may change some physiological 
responses. In both experiments 1 and 2 the instruction to Feel and Not Feel 
emotional responses to negative and neutral pictures also had an effect in 
recognition memory. However, whilst the No Feel instruction appeared to dampen 
emotional responses in recognition memory in experiment 1, it appeared to enhance 
them in experiment 2. The results were very tentatively interpreted as a possible 
effect of attempts to modulate emotional responses by distraction as, depending on 
the type of distractor, the effect may be to enhance or attenuate emotional responses 
by increasing or decreasing attention to the attended stimulus. It was decided, 
therefore, to concentrate on distraction as a means of modulating emotional 
responses, even if indirectly via the manipulation of cognitive resources rather than 
via conscious control. Recognition memory data would continue to be taken but 
purely as a subsidiary activity for potential future research (see chapter 8). 
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Part II 
Attenuated Emotion and Cognitive Resources 
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Chapter 4 
Distraction 
1.1. The Eyeblink Startle Reflex 
1.1.1. Definition and Functions 
The eyeblink startle reflex is a defensive reflex that functions primarily to 
protect the eye (Lane and Nadel, 2000). It is triggered in response to perception of a 
possibly harmful stimulus and is part of a much larger, whole body reflex that may 
be fully expressed if the aversive stimulus is sufficiently strong. In addition to the 
protective function of the blink itself, the reflex also serves to startle the individual, 
interrupt on-going behaviour and hence clear the mind of current information 
processing in order to leave mechanisms free to process information relevant to the 
aversive stimulus (Graham, 1979). 
1.1.2. Elicitation and Measure of Affective Arousal 
The eyeblink startle is believed to be the outcome of activation of a simple 
acoustic startle pathway involving three synapses: the cochlear root neurons, 
neurons in the reticular pontis caudalis, and facial motor neurons. Auditory input 
from the spiral ganglion cells in the retina is transmitted to the cochlear root 
neurons, embedded in the cochlear nerve. Lesions to the cochlear root neurons are 
known to attenuate the startle reflex in proportion to the number of neurons 
damaged and are, therefore, crucial to elicitation of the startle reflex (Lee et al., 
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1996). However, from the cochlear neurons, axons pass through the trapezoid body 
to the superior colliculus and, in addition, produce thick axon collaterals that 
terminate directly in the reticularis pontis caudalis (Davis, 1998). 
The reticularis pontis caudalis is part of the reticular formation situated in the 
pons. More specifically, it is a medial column reticular nucleus located next to the 
reticularis tegmenti pontis and superior to the gigantocellular nucleus. It is a 
particularly important structure because axons from the cochlear root neurons 
terminate here at exactly the level that is critical for the continuation of the startle 
reflex onto cells that then project to motor neurons in the spinal cord (Davis, 1998). 
It is also crucial for its role in the affective modulation of the startle reflex (Davis, 
1998, Davis et al., 1982, Miserendino and Davis, 1993, Lang et al., 1990). 
As outlined in chapter 1, the amygdala is a major structure in the generation of 
emotional responses to external stimuli and in fear conditioning. It is also a major 
structure in the affective modulation of the acoustic startle reflex. Whilst sensory 
information passes from the sensory thalamus to the central and basolateral nuclei of 
the amygdala, projections from the central nucleus of the amygdala pass directly to 
the nucleus reticularis pontis caudalis (Rosen et al., 1991) forming a potential 
modulatory pathway (see Figure 16). 
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Figure 16: A schematic diagram of the fear and acoustic startle pathways 
Evidence of the modulation of the startle by the amygdala is provided by 
Rosen and Davis (1988. p195) who state that the startle is an "extremely sensitive 
index of anm-, dala stimulation" because "low-level electrical stimulation of the 
amygdala (e. g. 40-400 µA, 25ms trains of 0. lms square wave cathodal pulses) 
markedly increases acoustic startle amplitude"". Supporting evidence is also provided 
by Koch and Ebert (1993) who demonstrated that electrical simulation of the central 
nucleus of the amygdala in rats increases the firing rate of the cells in the reticularis 
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pontis caudalis that are driven by the auditory stimulus. Furthermore, lesions of the 
central nucleus of the amygdala eliminate the expression of the fear-potentiated 
startle (Davis, 1998). 
The amygdala-reticularis pontis caudalis connections are particularly important 
to psychologists because of their role in fear conditioning. When a stimulus that has 
been conditioned to an aversive stimulus that produces a fear response (i. e. a picture 
of a table fear conditioned with an electric shock) is viewed with a loud noise that 
produces the startle reflex, the magnitude of the startle reflex produced matches the 
intensity of the fear response to the picture. By manipulating the intensity of the fear 
response, it is also possible to manipulate the magnitude of the startle because the 
magnitude and speed of the startle reflex covaries with changing levels of amygdala 
activation. For psychologists, the value of the covariation lies in the provision of an 
easily accessible and measurable motor response (i. e. the eyeblink) that can be used 
to infer rather less accessible amygdaloid activity. Since the orbicularis oculi muscle 
is closest to the innervated pathway, facial electromyography (EMG) is usually 
selected to measure startle speeds and magnitudes (Bradley et al., 1999). 
1.1.3. The Startle Reflex Paradigm 
Development of the eyeblink startle programme is due largely to the work of 
Peter Lang and Margaret Bradley at the University of Florida. Within their 
perspective, emotions are defined as "atavars of primitive actions that evolved to 
ensure the survival of organisms" and developed from "tactical reactions to the 
context of aversive or appetitive stimulation" (Bradley et al, 1999 p. 248). They 
maintain that, via the process of natural selection, appetitive and aversive behaviours 
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that ensured an animal's survival, became hard-wired into the neural system and 
gradually developed plasticity via subsequent associative learning. The 
accompanying motivational responses became the foundations of all modem 
emotions and can still be classified today along two fundamental dimensions: 
valence (pleasant - unpleasant) and arousal (low - high intensity). Valence is 
defined as a reference to the organism's "disposition to assume either an appetitive 
or defensive behavioural set" and arousal to the organism's disposition to "react 
with varying degrees of energy and force" (Bradley et al, 1999 p. 264). 
In order to study emotion, Lang and Bradley collected and tested pictures to 
form a picture bank of visual stimuli that would reliably evoke psychological and 
physiological reactions that would vary systematically over a range of expressed 
emotions (the International Affective Picture System: IAPs; Centre for the Study of 
Emotion and Attention, 1999). Pictures were viewed under laboratory conditions 
and physiological responses such as heart rate and skin conductance were compared 
with self assessment ratings of valence and arousal registered with the self- 
assessment manikin (SAM: Lang, 1980). 
The self-assessment manikin provided a 9-point scale for judgements of 
valence with low scores denoting unpleasant pictures, and a similar scale for arousal 
with high scores denoting high levels of arousal (see Figure 17). Thus, unpleasant 
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Figure 17: The self-assessment manikin (SAM: Lang, 1980) 
pictures were identified as having low valence and high arousal scores, pleasant 
pictures with high valence and high arousal scores and neutral pictures with 
moderate levels of valence and low levels of arousal. 
When self-assessment ratings of valence and arousal were compared with 
physiological responses, it was found that arousal responses varied with valence. 
Heart rate responses decelerated in response to unpleasant pictures and the 
magnitude of skin conductance responses increased. Pleasant pictures produced 
accelerated heart rate and decreases in skin conductance responses. In fact, a 
decreasing trend was established for heart rate from pleasant > neutral > unpleasant 
pictures together with a corresponding increasing trend for skin conductance 
(Bradley et al., 1988). 
With a set of valenced pictures validated by self-reported ratings and 
systematically varying physiological responses, the Lang laboratory could add the 
acoustic startle reflex, measure changes in orbicularis oculi activity, and thence infer 
changes in amygdala activity as a function of picture valence. The affective 
modulation of the startle reflex was demonstrated by the differences in response 
when an aversive startle probe initiated a reflex whilst participants viewed pleasant, 
unpleasant and neutral pictures. When viewing unpleasant pictures, the startle 
response was enhanced compared with neutral pictures and when viewing pleasant 
pictures it was attenuated (Bradley et al., 1990, Cuthbert et al., 1996). These 
987654321 
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responses were also checked against known physiological responses that showed 
decelerated heart rate and increased skin conductance during presentations of 
unpleasant pictures: responses that were not, therefore, due to a picture avoidance 
strategy (Bradley et al., 1988, Cuthbert et al., 1996). 
Subsequent research that tested the validity of the paradigm established 
changes in arousal due to picture valence rather than the general arousal level of the 
individual (Bradley et al., 1988, Bradley et al., 1990), ruled out arousal changes to 
attentional demands such as focus of attention and interest (Vrana and Lang, 1988) 
and decreases in arousal due to the withdrawal of cognitive resources to the startle 
pathway when startle probe and picture modalities mismatched (Bradley et al., 1988, 
Bradley et al., 1999b, Bradley et al., 1990). Current studies of emotion regulation 
using fMRI, have also validated use of the paradigm to infer amygdala activity 
(Jackson et al., 2000, Ochsner et al., 2002, Ochsner et al., 2004) but have since 
raised questions about the primacy of the valence dimension over arousal (Dillon 
and LaBar, 2005), and the believed automatic and unconscious nature of amygdala 
activation (Jackson et al., 2000, Ochsner et al., 2002, Ochsner et al., 2004). 
1.1.3.1. Automaticity 
The automatic nature of the startle reflex is a particularly important debate 
because the startle is used as an indirect measure of automatic and unconscious 
emotion generation. fMRI studies by Ochsner and Jackson that have modulated 
amygdala activation with conscious emotion regulation instructions to enhance, 
maintain and suppress responses to valenced pictures, challenge traditional beliefs in 
automatically generated emotional responses. If amygdala activation is not 
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automatic, then neither is the acoustic startle as a measure of automaticity. Though 
the orbicularis oculi muscle responds automatically to a loud noise producing the 
startle reflex, the startle response is modulated by the amygdala and the amygdala 
can be modulated by cortical processes. Thus, the startle response can be indirectly 
regulated and may be more useful as a measure of emotion regulation, therefore, 
than a measure of emotion generation. 
Another form of indirect control is also possible via associative conditioning. 
Since the context and the stimulus to which the eyeblink is associated may be 
consciously selected by an individual, as in an experiment, or by society through 
learning and culture, the motor response may be automatic but the conditions that 
elicit it may not be. In fact, it suggests that automatically generated emotions may be 
limited to a few reflexes generated by the thalamo-amygdala pathway, and that the 
majority may be responses to cognitively learned associations and on-going 
cognitive re-appraisals. Of course, when learned associations generate emotional 
responses, the activation of the association may well be automatic and the attached 
valence may then be said to be automatically generated. However, it is still the 
automatic generation of a learned response that is made available for cognitive re- 
appraisal. 
In an effort to be scientifically precise, definitions of emotion and automatic 
processing have become theory dependent. The result is a self-constructed problem 
in which the main difficulty becomes largely a question of temporal focus and 
semantics i. e. the difference between the generation of an early automatic and 
biologically determined reflex, and a later automatically elicited socially learned 
association. Ultimately, it is possible to view all affective responses as the products 
of original reflexes. However, what appears to be more important in the literature, is 
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not what is being generated but where and when. If emotion is perceived as a 
process of which affect modulation is a part, then most of the difficulties are 
resolved. The initial stage may be a pre-attentive, automatic biologically determined 
process involving the thalamo-amygdala pathway. The next, though possibly 
occuring in parallel, may be a pre-conscious cognitive template matching process 
that activates affective responses via association and the cortico-amygdala pathway. 
The final stage may be higher order cognitive appraisals that interpret and evaluate 
stimuli for self relevance and desired goals. As the process unfolds, so early affect 
may initiate positive or negative appraisals that may finally give rise to more 
sophisticated discrete feelings. A similar though more detailed argument is made by 
Kappas in his article that seeks to reconcile differences in the work of Magda Arnold 
and Robert Zajonc (Kappas, 2006). 
1.1.3.2. Consciousness 
Linked to the debate on automaticity is also the problem of consciousness. 
Primary, biologically determined automatic reflexes generated via the thalamo- 
amygdala pathway may be evoked with pre-attentive perceptual processing 
(Cuthbert et al., 1996). However, secondary or conditioned reflexes may require 
conscious attention to match mental representations of external stimuli and trigger 
recall of associated affective responses. Cognitive re-appraisals of external stimuli 
certainly do require conscious attention and have been shown to respond to 
consciously attended instructions (Jackson et al., 2000, Ochsner et al., 2002, 
Ochsner et al., 2004). Perhaps, once again, the debate should not pose a dichotomy 
between conscious and unconscious processing, but concentrate on where, when and 
why consciousness is required. As previously stated (see Chapterl), pre-pulse 
87 
inhibition may be the process by which the amygdala primes sensory processing and 
it may be that consciousness is required when complex processing of a stimulus is 
required. Baars (Baars and Franklin, 2003) suggests that consciousness is necessary 
to recruit higher order cognitive processing to interpret and evaluate stimuli. It is 
also interesting that during reward-punishment learning, (the basis of instrumental 
learning), monkeys require visual sightings of rewarded stimuli to make the correct 
behavioural choices. It has been found, for example, that amygdalalectomised 
monkeys are impaired on discrimination tasks for rewards that cannot be seen 
(Bayliss & Gaff, 1991; Gaff 1992). It might be that visual processing is also required 
during recall of associated visual stimuli. 
1.1.3.3. Reliability 
Since the magnitude of the eyeblink startle covaries with amygdala activation, 
the reliability of the startle as a measure of amygdaloid activity is high. However, 
the resistance of the affective modulation property to habituation is another 
advantage. Although the eyeblink itself habituates to repeated presentations of the 
same stimulus, as evidenced by the decreasing startle magnitudes, the affect 
modulation pathway is unaffected i. e. the magnitudes of the eyeblinks decrease 
overall but continue to vary systematically with affective valence (Bradley et al., 
1993b). This is a highly desirable property since the effects of habituation cannot be 
confounded with the effects of affect modualtion. In addition, when the startle does 
habituate, it dishabituates extremely quickly making it an attractive measure for 
experimental designs with repeated trials. Finally, the independent nature of the 
eyeblink startle is another advantage because although the eyeblink is a clearly 
defined and measurable response, it produces little, if any, interference with on- 
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going tasks. As summarised by Bradley "the startle reflex is modulated by the 
valence of on-going affective responses, independent of probe modality and 
regardless of whether the foreground content is perceptual or imaginal" (Bradley et 
al., 1999b). 
1.1.3.4. Summary 
The eyeblink startle reflex is an unconsious and automatic response to aversive 
stimuli processed via the thalamo-amygdala pathway. It may also be a response to 
less automatic and more consciously constructed cognitions processed via the 
cortico-amygdala pathway and acquired via learning and culture. Such cognitions 
may be activated during cognitive appraisals of external stimuli in order to match 
associated mental representations in long term memory and generate associated 
affect. In addition, it may be indirectly influenced by the regulation of attention 
controlled by the amygdala via sensory priming, and by the conscious selection of 
competing appraisals. It is particularly important to psychologists because it is 
believed to offer a measure of affective arousal via inferred measures of amygdala 
activation and can be used relatively easily in experiments designed to investigate 
affective responses to valenced visual stimuli. 
1.1.4. The Eyeblink Startle Reflex and Distraction 
Under normal conditions, the startle reflex is a part of an automatic emotional 
response and functions to orient attention to a highly relevant, important possibly 
life-threatening stimulus that requires a large input of processing resources. In the 
experimental situation, however, it is used as a measure of the intensity of the 
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affective response to an attended stimulus. It can be used in this way because, as 
outlined above, the magnitude of the eyeblink reflex varies with the nature of the 
attended stimulus and covaries with the generated affective response. Thus, when an 
acoustic trigger is paired with a neutral picture, the magnitude of the resulting 
eyeblink is relatively small, indicating low level amygdala activity. When paired 
with a negative picture, however, the eyeblink is much larger, indicating higher 
levels of amygdala activity. As a result, the startle magnitude, can be used as a 
measure of the intensity of an affective response to an attended stimulus. 
The purpose of the following experiments is to investigate the ability of 
distraction (as defined on page 88) to regulate emotional responses to negative 
stimuli by dampening responses at encoding and in recognition memory. Ochsner's 
evidence that demonstrates the ability of the MPFC to modulate amygdala in 
response to the outcomes of cortical appraisals (Ochsner et al., 2002), opens up the 
possibilities of cortical influences more generally on emotion processing. It is 
possible, for example, that if cognitive appraisal can modulate affective responses to 
stimuli, it may also be involved in generating them, as cognitive appraisal theorists 
have always maintained. Manipulating cognitive resources, therefore, and measuring 
potential effects on the eyeblink startle reflex, should provide evidence of whether 
or not distraction can modulate affect. More specifically, it is hypothesised that if 
cognitive appraisal is required to generate affective responses to external stimuli, 
and cognitive resources are necessary for constructing appraisals, then reducing 
cognitive resources available for appraisals by introducing a concomitant distractor 
task will result in reduced amygdala activation and attenuated affective responses. 
Reductions in amygdala activity will be evidenced by reduced eyeblink startle 
90 
magnitudes. Thus, it can be predicted that the magnitude of the eyeblink startle for 
negative pictures will be larger when no distractor items are present. 
91 
Chapter 5 
Distraction and Cognitive Resources 
Experiments I and 2 manipulated conscious and intentional control of feelings 
with the instructions `Feel' and `Don't Feel' emotional responses to negative and 
neutral pictures. The results showed an effect of instruction on both the experience 
of responses to pictures and the effects in recognition memory but the exact 
processes involved were unclear. The results, together with participant comments 
and a review of emotion regulation studies, suggested that the effects were most 
likely due to attempts at effortful distraction. It was decided, therefore, to 
investigate the effects of effortful distraction on the on-going process of emotion 
generation. A review of the eyeblink startle paradigm, summarised in the preceding 
chapter, suggested that emotion generation may involve a number of different 
processes including cognitive appraisals. Since the instructions manipulated in 
experiments 1 and 2 had an effect on the modulation of affect in recognition 
memory, however, it was decided to investigate the potential effect of effortful 
distraction on cognitive processing of attended stimuli. 
Research investigating the effect of effortful distraction on antecedent and 
response focused emotion regulation strategies has demonstrated that it can attenuate 
emotional responses (Erk et al., 2006, Van Dillen and Koole, 2007) and is thought to 
do so by withdrawing cognitive resources, and hence cognitive processing, from the 
attended stimulus. Cognitive attentional resources are known to be necessary for 
amygdala activation during on-going emotion generation. Current debate, however, 
92 
is focused on whether attentional resources can be pre-attentive or of necessity 
require conscious attention. Whilst Vuilleumier's results support traditional theories 
of unconscious and automatic emotion generation and hence pre-attentive 
processing (Vuilleumier, 2005, Vuilleumier et al., 2001 a, Vuilleumier et al., 2001b), 
Pessoa's recent evidence suggests that conscious attention is obligatory (Pessoa et 
al., 2005a, Pessoa et al., 2002a, Pessoa et al., 2002b). In his studies, Pessoa 
maintains that the more difficult unattended tasks he uses take conscious attention 
away from the attended stimulus and reduce amygdala activation. 
Another possible explanation for these results, however, which may also 
resolve the conflicting evidence produced by Vuilleumier and Pessoa, is that by 
utilizing difficult unattended tasks, Pessoa not only reduced conscious attention but 
attentional resources per se, and that it is the reduction in attentional resources per 
se that is crucial. If the unattended stimuli operate in a similar way as items in a 
distractor task, increasing the difficulty of the unattended stimuli would increase the 
reduction of attentional resources (Van Dillen and Koole, 2007) and attenuate 
emotional responses. 
One way of testing this hypothesis is to run experiments in which participants 
are required to view negative and neutral pictures (as in Experiments 1 and 2) and 
hold in mind a distractor item whilst picture viewing in order to successfully 
complete a subsequent test to sample matching task. Occupying working memory in 
this way would reduce cognitive resources available for processing the pictures and 
attenuate emotional responses. Attenuation of emotional responses could be 
measured via the eyeblink startle reflex (see chapter 4). 
Distraction tasks in these experiments would be slightly different from 
classical distraction tasks in that distractor items would be presented whilst the 
93 
attended stimulus was still visually present. Maintaining visual attention with an 
instruction to view the pictures for the full presentation time, then enables the 
manipulation of cognitive resources rather than more specific attentional resources 
as in most classical distraction studies. 
The specific research question that the following chapter attempts to address, 
therefore, is: Does distraction reduce cognitive resources during an on-going 
emotion generation process and attenuate emotional responses? 
1.1. Experiment 3 
1.1.1 Introduction 
Studies of effortful distraction have concentrated on antecedent and response 
focused strategies of emotion regulation and have demonstrated that the withdrawal 
of cognitive resources from anticipation of a negative event can down-regulate 
negative emotion. In a recent fMRI study (Erk et al., 2006), graded distraction tasks 
were used during anticipation of subsequent negative emotions to investigate the 
effect of effortful distraction on emotional responses. During an anticipatory period 
that preceded presentation of negative and neutral IAPs pictures, participants were 
required to complete either an easy 0-back task requiring recognition of the number 
3 or a more difficult 2-back matching test to sample task (i. e. a task requiring the 
matching of a current digit with a figure presented 2 slides previously and 
registering a same/different decision). Anticipation of the negative or neutral 
pictures was manipulated with either a `frowny' or `smiley' face. Results from the 
study showed that during picture presentation, there was a main effect of valence but 
not during the anticipatory period. During picture presentation, activation was 
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observed in the right DLPFC, the left ventrolateral PFC, lateral amygdala and 
occipital, fusiform and superior parietal cortex. However, during the anticipatory 
period, a valence x cognitive load interaction showed greater activation in the 
anterior rostral part of the MPFC and right amygdala during the 0-back than the 2- 
back task preceding both picture types, but even greater activation during 
anticipation of negative than neutral pictures. The reduction in activation in the 2- 
back condition was interpreted as the result of a reduction in cognitive processing of 
the anticipated emotion due to the withdrawal of cognitive resources for the 
distractor tasks. 
In a similar study, Van Dillen et al (Van Dillen and Koole, 2007), also 
manipulated cognitive load but did so after presentation of neutral and negative 
pictures and then investigated the effects of cognitive load on mood. In a series of 3 
experiments, pictures that varied in affective intensity were first followed by a task 
no task manipulation, then a more or less demanding task, and finally by more or 
less demanding tasks that were expected or unexpected. The distractor tasks used 
were graded arithmetic equations involving simple addition or subtraction, or more 
complex multiplication or division. All tasks required a test to sample 
correct/incorrect decision judgement. Mood was manipulated by the negative and 
neutral pictures and was measured via self-reported mood ratings taken after the 
distractor task. Results from the study showed that negative moods were reduced by 
distractor tasks, and that more complex tasks produced greater reductions in 
negative mood than simple tasks. In addition, unexpected tasks (thought to place a 
higher cognitive load on working memory since no reliance could be placed on 
already active knowledge structures in long term memory) demonstrated yet further 
reductions. Taken together, the results from the three experiments suggest that the 
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more cognitive resources withdrawn from negative mood maintenance, the less 
intense the mood becomes. 
Both the Erk et al and the Van Dillen et al studies manipulated cognitive load 
with distractor tasks and concluded that a reduction in cognitive resources available 
for emotion processing results in modulated emotion. However, since both studies 
manipulated distraction as either an antecedent or response focused strategy, both 
manipulated `thought' distraction before or after the negative event. In experiments 
1 and 2 described in chapter 3, however, participants were believed to have 
attempted effortful distraction during an on-going emotion generating task i. e. to 
regulate their affective responses whilst continuing to view the affect generating 
stimuli: in effect, to stop processing. The aim of the following experiment, therefore, 
was to manipulate distraction during on-going emotion generation and look for 
evidence of affect modulation as a result of reduced cognitive processing of the 
concurrent task. It was hypothesised that when participants are engaged in a 
distractor task requiring maintenance of items in working memory in order to 
successfully complete a subsequent test to sample matching task, affect modulation 
will be down-regulated. 
Much evidence now exists to show that significant differences in blink 
magnitudes occur when attention is focused on negative rather than neutral stimuli 
and that startle magnitudes are larger for negative than neutral stimuli (Lang et al, 
1990; Bradley et al, 1993; Yartz et al, 2000; Carson et al, 2004) indicating greater 
amygadala activation. This known effect was used to measure an hypothesized 
effect of working memory by manipulating cognitive load, measuring startle 
magnitudes to valenced stimuli in no load and load conditions and comparing the 
results. Smaller startle magnitudes in the cognitive load condition would indicate 
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attenuated emotional responses due to a loss of cognitive resources and cognitive 
processing. 
Self-report arousal ratings are a commonly used measure of the experiential 
component of an emotion (Gross & Levenson, 1993; Lang et al, 1993; Scott, 1993). 
It was hypothesized that if working memory requires conscious attention, then 
manipulating the degree of conscious awareness of picture valences via the 
manipulation of cognitive load, and hence available attentional resources for picture 
processing, would produce main effects of both valence and cognitive load. 
1.1.2. Participants 
Twenty two participants (18 female: 4 male; Mean age = 20.59, SD = 3.39), all 
Leeds University undergraduates, took part in the study for course credits. Prior to 
selection, all participants completed the Centre for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale (CES D): a self-report depression scale for research in the general 
population (Radloff, L. S., 1977), and a demographic questionnaire, and all gave 
written informed consent. 
1.1.3. Stimuli and Design 
One hundred and twenty eight pictures (64 negative: 64 neutral) were selected 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS)(Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 
1999) to generate emotional responses and arousal levels. Negative pictures were 
selected with low valence and high arousal ratings (Means: 2.52,6.34): neutral 
pictures with average valence and low arousal ratings (5.17,2.98). To form 2 blocks 
of pictures for the experimental conditions, equal numbers of each valence type 
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were randomly assigned to each block, making 64 pictures per condition (32 
negative: 32 neutral). Forty two of these (21 negative: 21 neutral) were randomly 
assigned to probed trials and 22 (11 negative: 11 neutral) to non-probed trials. Each 
picture was displayed on a computer screen for 5 seconds and was preceded by a 
white screen with a black fixation cross centered and displayed for 1000ms. 
On probed trials, the startle reflex was triggered by a 50ms 100Db burst of 
white noise generated at intervals of 2.5,3.5 and 4.5 seconds from picture onset. A 
seven-point rating scale was displayed following each picture to prompt participants 
to register self-reported arousal ratings. A standard 7-key response pad with keys 
labeled 0-6 registered responses ranging from 0, "I feel absolutely nothing at all" 
to 6, "I feel extremely strong emotions". The rating scale was displayed until a 
response was registered or to a maximum time of 2 seconds. No more than four 
pictures of the same valence were displayed consecutively. Both pictures and 
conditions were fully counterbalanced. 
Four hundred and eighty faces were selected from 10 face databases and were 
made least verbalizable (i. e. constructed to eradicate distinguishing features in order 
make differences in the images difficult to identify and remember using language 
such as verbal descriptions and thereby encourage visual processing). Least 
verbalizable faces have been constructed and used by the Jha laboratory, University 
of Pennsylvania, and permission was given to use their faces. To supplement this 
resource, and with permission, faces from 9 other face databases were also 
appropriately cropped and airbrushed using Adobe software to make them least 
verbalizable (see Appendix 4). All images used, therefore, were full face, black and 
white photographs cropped to exclude all but facial features. 
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Size was controlled via the use of a plain white oval picture frame which 
became invisible on the computer screen. All faces, therefore, were exactly the same 
size and presented in the centre of the monitor. Faces were also matched for gender, 
race (e. g. Caucasian, Asian), physical features and image tones in the load condition 
to encourage visual processing. To ensure that working memory and not long term 
memory was activated, two separate face sets were constructed so that no image was 
used more than once in either condition and occurred in one condition only. 
Cognitive load and no load were manipulated via a gender decision task in the no 
load condition and a test to sample matching task in the cognitive load condition. 
Fifty percent of trials in the load condition contained matching faces and fifty 
percent non-matching faces. 
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Figure 18: Presentation sequences for the load and no load conditions (see text for 
specifications) 
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Each trial consisted of 5 screens including a face, a picture and a rating scale 
and a screen with a fixation cross that preceded the faces and pictures (not shown in 
Figure 18). In the cognitive load condition the first face in the following trial was 
used for the matching task making the design a traditional 1-back (see Figure 18). 
Faces were centred, preceded by a 1000ms fixation cross and remained on the 
screen for 2 seconds. Pictures were presented as full screen images. The 64 trials in 
each condition (32 negative: 32 neutral) were divided into 3 blocks so that no block 
lasted longer than approximately 5 minutes. SuperlabPro software was used to create 
and run the computer programme and interfaced with a second computer that 
displayed a digital pulse alongside the orbicularis oculi waveform each time a 
picture was presented. 
The recognition memory task consisted of one hundred and forty four pictures 
(96 old: 48 new; 72 negative: 72 neutral) were presented as coloured thumbnails 
(height: 2.62cm; width: 3.18cm) on 5 pages of laminated card. The pictures were 
presented in 8 rows of 5 pictures per row per page, and a final page of the remaining 
24 pictures. As in previous experiments, acetates were provided on which to record 
recognition responses: the letter R for remember, K for know and F for familiar. All 
pictures and foils were matched by category (see Appendix 2). Percentages of 
correctly recognised pictures together with missed images and false positives were 
recorded and analysed for recognition accuracy. 
1.1.4. Physiological Data Collection and Reduction 
Raw electromyography (EMG) was recorded from the orbicularis oculi muscle 
beneath the left eye using 2 EL254S shielded electrodes and disposable adhesive 
collars following guidelines proposed by Fridlund and Cacioppo (2000). The skin 
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was prepared and abraded following Blumenthal et al (2005). Electrodes were 
attached and the electromyographic activity routed through a Biopac MP ISO system. 
The raw signal was amplified (Gain: 5000) and filtered (low pass filter: 500Hz; high 
pass filter: 10Hz) using a Biopac EMG 1000 Electromyogram Amplifier Module 
and digitized using Acqknowledge Software. Eyeblink activity was rectified and 
integrated on-line following Biopac's own recommended procedures (Application 
Note AS214), sampled at 1000Hz and averaged over 50 samples. Sampling started 
just before the experimental block began and continued to the end (continuous 
recording). A digital pulse generated by the Superlab software marked a point on the 
waveform immediately prior to each startle probe onset. The eyeblink reflex was 
then measured for 350ms from this point. 
The magnitude of the startle eyeblink reflex was measured using the Biopac 
peak-to-peak (P-P) function. This function computes the difference in microvolts 
between the highest and lowest peak in the selected time window and pastes the 
outcome in the system's journal. The raw data was then converted to z scores and 
entered into an SPSS database for analysis using a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA. 
1.1.5. Procedure 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants read background information to the 
study, received detailed instructions of the experimental requirements and then gave 
written informed consent. Participants sat facing a computer screen approximately 1 
metre away with a response pad resting on the knee to minimize hand movements. 
After attaching the electrodes, a short equipment test was followed by a practice 
session of the first task to ensure familiarity with task instructions and timing. 
When viewing the pictures, participants were instructed to look at the screen for the 
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full 5 seconds and only register their response when the rating scale appeared on the 
screen. They were also instructed to register their first spontaneous response and 
think only of its strength not the valence (see Appendix 1). 
In the cognitive load condition, participants were required to hold in mind a 
preceding face ready for the post-stimulus sample to test matching task. This was in 
order to activate and maintain working memory activity in order to reduce available 
resources for processing the pictures. They were also told to hold the picture in mind 
by visualizing the image in their heads and re-activating it when required to match it 
with the test face. This was done to avoid matching via familiarity rather than 
working memory. Responses to the face matching tasks were recorded using 
coloured keys on the response pad whilst the faces were on the screen. The first 
experimental condition was then completed, followed by the second practice session 
and the second experimental condition. The order of experimental conditions 
depended on counterbalanced sequences. A final set of `Feel Good' pictures, as 
before, concluded the computer session. 
Participants were then required to complete the recognition memory task. Five 
laminated sheets of coloured thumbnail sized pictures were placed one at a time on a 
table in front of the participant. The task was to look at the pictures to see if any 
were recognised as having been in the previous computer presented experimental 
conditions. Recognised pictures were labelled R for remember (i. e. if the participant 
actively remembered a picture appearing on the computer screen, or remembered 
focusing on a particular part of a picture, or remembered something they had 
thought about at the time), K if they knew thay had seen the picture but had only a 
feeling of knowing with no mental `evidence' to support it, and F if they had just a 
feeling of familiarity so it probably was in the study. Unrecognised pictures were 
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left blank. After the recognition memory task, the electrodes were removed and 
participants were asked about their experience of the study and strategies used to 
remember pictures in the in the cognitive load (i. e. the sample to test matching) 
condition. 
1.1.6. Results 
Analyses and results were limited to orbicularis oculi activity, arousal ratings 
and recognition memory data since these measures are the most salient for testing 
distractor effects. 
1.1.6.1. Startle Magnitudes 
Analysis of the results showed that there was no main effect of cognitive load 
(F<1), no significant main effect of valence (FI, 20=1.64 p=. 215 d=. 08) but a 
significant interaction between valence and cognitive load (F1,20=4.26 p=0.05 
d=. 18). The interaction reflected that the effect of valence was significant only in the 
no load condition (F1,20 = 5.04 p< . 05 d=. 20), showing considerably higher startle 
magnitudes to negative than neutral pictures (Means and SEs (µV) = (neutral) - 
. 0068, . 513; (negative) . 1319, . 486). Valence was not significant in the cognitive 
load condition (F<1) (see Figure 19). 
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Figure 19: Startle responses to Negative and Neutral pictures in the No Load and 
Load conditions. 
1.1.6.2. Arousal Ratings 
As in experiment 1, for self-reported arousal ratings, there was a significant 
main effect of valence (171.21 =218.66 p<0.001 d=. 91) and no main effect of 
cognitive load (F<1) and no Valence x Cognitive load interaction (F<1) (see Figure 
20). Once more, there was no indication of a loss of conscious attention or a 
dampening of emotional awareness. 
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Figure 20: Self Report Arousal Ratings for Negatively and Neutrally valenced 
pictures in the two cognitive conditions. 
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1.1.6.3. Recognition Memory 
Recognition Accuracy 
Analysis of recognition accuracy data again showed high proportions of 
correctly recognised high and low arousal pictures and d' values of above 2.0 
suggesting high levels of accuracy (see Table 16). Statistical analysis of recognition 
Table 16. Recognition Accuracy as a function of Arousal 
Arousal Hits FAs d' 
High . 77 . 06 2.37 
Low . 76 . 02 2.59 
accuracy showed that d' was significantly greater for low arousal than high arousal 
pictures (t = 1.83 df = 20 *p <. 05). 
Remember, Know and Familiar responses 
Analyses of R/K/F responses showed that in both conditions, the proportion of 
high arousal pictures remembered was higher than that for low arousal pictures (see 
Table 17). 
Table 17. Proportions of R/K/F recognition responses in the cognitive no load and 
load conditions 
No Load Load 
Arousal Remember Know Familiar Remember Know Familiar 
High . 53 . 16 . 08 . 49 . 17 . 14 
Low . 51 . 14 . 13 . 48 . 11 . 11 
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All simple proportions were analysed using a 2x2x3 ANOVA with arousal, 
cognitive load and recognition as the independent variables. The results showed no 
main effect of arousal (F<I), no main effect of cognitive load (F 1,20 ý 1.58 p >. 05) 
and no Arousal x Cognitive load interaction (F<I). There was, however, a main 
effect of recognition (F 1.4,28.8 = 32.92 p <. 00 Id= . 62) but no Arousal x Recognition 
interaction (F<]), no Cognitive load x Recognition (F 1.6,31.5) ý 1.62 p>. 05) and no 
Arousal x Cognitive load x Recognition interaction (F<I). Analysis of the main 
effect of recognition showed a significantly higher proportion of Remember 
responses than either Know (F 1,20 = 30.90 p <. 001 d =. 61) (Means and SEs =. 50 
(. 05); . 15 (. 
03) or Familiar (F 1.20 = 45.92 p <. 001 d =. 70) (Means and SEs = . 50 
(. 05); . 12 (. 02). There were no significant differences between proportions of Know 
and Familiar responses (F 1.20 = 1.32 p >. 05) (see Figure 21). 
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Figure 21: Proportions of remember, know and familiar responses for 
correctly recognised pictures 
Recollection andFamiliarity 
Analysis of recollection and familiarity showed lower levels of recollection for 
high arousal pictures and hence higher levels of recollection for low arousal pictures 
(see Table 18). 
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Table 18. Recollection and Familiarity as a function of arousal 
Recollection Familiarity 
Arousal No Load Load No Load Load 
High . 67 . 67 . 33 . 33 
Low . 72 . 79 . 28 . 21 
A statistical analysis of the familiarity measures using aW ANOVA with 
arousal and cognitive load as the independent variables showed no main effect of 
arousal (F<I) but a main effect of cognitive load (F 1,2o = 5.05 p <. 05 d =. 2). 
Recollection was lower in the no load than the load condition (Means and SEs = . 32 
(. 05); . 22 (. 04) showing that fwniliarity was higher in the no load condition. There 
was no significant Arousal x Cognitive load interaction (F 1,2o = 1.36 p >. 05). These 
results are discussed in chapter 8. 
1.1.7. Discussion 
Since the pattern of arousal ratings did not covary with the pattern of startle 
magnitudes in the same way as it appeared to do for corrugator supercilli activity, it 
would seem unlikely that the dampening of fascial muscle activity in experiment 2 
resulted in a dampening of generated emotional responses. It could, however, have 
influenced the conscious experience of emotion. The fact that arousal ratings and 
startle magnitudes in this experiment did not show the same pattern of activity 
supports research evidence that suggests that the conscious experience of emotion 
and unconscious affect generation are products of separate systems. As Kappas 
(Kappas, 2006) and LeDoux (1996) maintain, therefore, self report may be a good 
measure of the experience of emotion but not the generation of emotion. However, 
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the fact that distraction is a conscious process and did affect emotional responses in 
this experiment suggests that indirect conscious and intentional control may still 
regulate emotional responses with some success, by reducing cognitive resources 
available for processing attended stimuli. 
Of particular importance in the results obtained was the significant reduction in 
eyeblink startle magnitudes in the cognitive load compared with the no cognitive 
load condition. In line with evidence from previous effortful distraction studies (Erk 
et aL, 2006, Van Dillen and Koole, 2007), this was interpreted as a significant 
dampening of emotion when cognitive resources for processing the experimental 
pictures were reduced by the demands of the distractor task i. e. the instruction to 
'hold in mind' the preceding face. This evidence is in line with that of Lieberman 
who maintains that cognitive processing generally draws attention away from, or is 
wired up to disrupt emotion processing (Lieberman, 2003). It also appears to be 
contrary to that of Ochsner, however, who maintains that effortful cognitive 
processing is engaged when up-regulating negative emotion and increases amygdala 
activity. However, in the latter case, cognitive processing adds resources to the 
attended task whereas in the above experiment cognitive resources were being 
withdrawn by the distractors. 
The dramatic loss of a main effect of valence for startle magnitudes and the 
significant Valence x Cognitive load interaction that showed the loss of negative but 
not neutral affect in the load condition were interpreted, therefore, as significant 
evidence to support the claim that the use of a concurrent distraction task would tap 
into the same cognitive resources necessary to view the negative pictures and 
attenuate emotional responses. Furthennore, the effect was also apparent in explicit 
recognition memory where there was no Valence x Recognition interaction and 
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hence no evidence of any nonnal negativity bias. Withdrawing cognitive resources 
appears to have resulted in the loss of stronger or more detailed memories for 
negative pictures. 
Although the evidence supports an effect of reduced cognitive resources on 
affect modulation during on-going emotion generation and in recognition memory, it 
does not, as yet, resolve the problem of Vuilleumier's and Pessoa's conflicting 
evidence over the necessity of conscious attention for emotion generation (Pessoa et 
al., 2005a, Pessoa et al., 2002b, Pessoa et al., 2005b, Vuilleumier, 2005, Vuilleumier 
ct al., 2001a, Vuillcumier ct al., 2001b). Though the above evidence may support 
Pessoa's claims that conscious attention is required to generate affect (Pessoa et al., 
2002a, Pessoa ct al., 2002b, Pessoa et al., 2005b) it is still possible that cognitive 
resources Per se and not specifically conscious attention is the mediating factor. 
In order to specifically address the question of the need for conscious attention 
to generate emotion, it was decided to repeat the above experiment but tap into 
cognitive resources of a different modality (i. e. verbal resources rather than 
resources required for visual imagery) and observe the results. If visual attention is 
the primary factor, then an effect of cognitive load would be unlikely with verbal 
distractors as they would be unlikely to reduce visual resources. If startle 
magnitudes were smaller in the cognitive load than the no load condition, however, 
as in the above expenment, then the effect could be modality independent and 
perhaps due to underlying cognitive processes such as executive functioning (i. e. 
working memory). The next experiment, therefore, addressed the question of 
whether or not the cognitive resources involved are essentially attentional or more 
generally cognitive. 
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Chapter 6 
Perception, Attention and Working Memory: 
Competition for Cognitive Resources 
The terms cognitive and cognition date back to the 10h century and have been 
variously defined but generally refer to mental processes such as thinking, 
reasoning, perception, attention and memory. Cognitive is usually restricted to 
descriptions of the processes themselves so that the phrase cognitive resources 
generally refers to the limited mental means available to carry out cognitive 
processes such as perception, memory and attention, and more complex processes 
such as planning, problem solving and task switching. 
Competition for cognitive resources was believed to have caused the fall in the 
magnitude of the acoustic startle in the cognitive load condition in experiment 3. In 
order to understand exactly what happened and why, it is necessary to know what 
cognitive resources are involved in processing visual stimuli, how they are organised 
and where in the procedure competition arises. Much research has investigated the 
perceptual, aftentional and working memory processes involved in processing visual 
stimuli. The following chapter draws on research that appears particularly relevant 
to the knowledge required here. 
1.1. Perception 
According to Goodale and Milner (Goodale and Milner, 2006), the human 
visual system actually consists of two visual streams. The dorsal stream operates on- 
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line in real time and registers spatial information that prepares and guides muscles 
for action e. g. arm, thumb and finger movements required to pick up a cup. The 
ventral stream, however, operates off-line and encodes visual information (e. g. 
physical features), necessary to identify objects. It is the ventral stream, therefore, 
that holds the information that can be used to construct meaning. The information 
held in the ventral stream, however, is very crude and requires further processing 
before interpretation is possible. Basically, individual physical features of the 
stimulus have to be recognised and then 'read' into working memory (Cowan, 1998) 
where they are combined into a visual image that represents the external 
stimulus. Visual working memory capacity is limited to a maximum of about 4 items 
for non-verbal stimuli when mnemonics and rehearsal are excluded (Luck and 
Vogel, 1997). Competition between items may thus involve competition for 
mechansims as well as resources. 
1.1.2. Perception and Working Memory 
When a visual stimulus has to be held in mind whilst a second visual stimulus 
is processed, there may well be competition for both mechanisms and resources. It 
is known, for example, that if the first stimulus is complex, processing may not be 
complete by the time the second stimulus is ready for registration. Normally, after 
the first stimulus has been processed, there is a period of approximately several 
hundred milliseconds, called the attentional blink, which clears the system for 
perceptual processing but during which the processing of subsequent stimuli is 
impaired (Awh et aL, 2006). Startle modification studies investigating the pre-pulse 
inhibition function of the amygdala, however, have shown that the amygdala can 
inhibit and delay the blink to allow complex processing of stimuli to be completed 
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(Bradley et al., 1993a). This competition for ventral stream access and delay in 
registration of the second stimulus results in the failure of the perceptual 
representation to gain access to working memory (Awh et al., 2006); an outcome 
that is consistent with research that indicates that the amygdala can bias the content 
of explicit memory (Cahill and Alkire, 2003). If the perceptual representations of 
both items enter working memory, then, although there is no competition for storage 
structures as stated above, there is competition for processing resources. Cognitive 
resources are required to maintain the first perceptual representation whilst 
interpretative and evaluative processing occurs in the PFC and also to maintain the 
second representation which may await the same processes. Evidence now suggests 
that whilst working memory may be required to recruit higher order cognitive 
processes in the PFC for stimulus interpretation and evaluation, attentional. resources 
may be required to maintain the relevant perceptual representations in working 
memory that allow the prefrontal structures to proceed. Thus the perceptual 
resprescntations of both stimuli need to be maintained and processed. Competition 
for attentional resources, therefore, may be part of the competition for cognitive 
resources generally. 
1.1.3. Perception and Attention 
Perception is largely automatic in the sense that what is seen is processed until 
capacity is exhausted (Lavie, 1995). Some voluntary control can be exerted, 
however, via the control of attention. Attention is described as, "a mental resource 
that is essential for information processing, exists in a limited amount, and can be 
allocated flexibly to various sources of information" (Gopher, 1992). Pre-attentive 
processing is the processing of objects prior to attentional selection (i. e. unattended 
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objects), and post-aftentive processing is the processing of objects within the focus 
of attention (i. e. attended objects) (Smilek et aL, 2007). Pre-attentive processing is 
fast, unconscious and automatic. Post-attentive processing is conscious and more 
detailed. Studies using event-related potentials (ERPs) have shown that ERPs for 
post-aftentive stimuli are amplified within the visual cortex and that amplification 
can occur within the first I OOms of stimulus onset (Awh et al., 2006), indicating that 
attention has increased neural activation and hence perceptual processing efficiency. 
This has particular relevance for affective modulation of visual stimuli since a good 
quality visual percept has been shown to be necessary to activate the amygdala 
(GIdscher et aL, 2007). An important implication of this is that failure to activate 
the amygdala means a failure to attach affective valence to a stimulus. Hence a 
negative stimulus may acquire neutral -valence, and if stored in memory, may be 
stored as a neutral memory. 
Evidence of late post-attentive processing is also important since it can affect 
later stages of perceptual analysis i. e. during the construction of meaning (Fenske 
and Raymond, 2006). For example, Fenske and colleagues state that "aftentional 
enhancement of perception may allow the meaning of a stimulus (e. g. an expressive 
face) to be more easily discerned" (Fenske and Raymond, 2006). In an ERP study, 
Codispoti ct al. maintain that their data suggests that an early ERP primarily reflects 
'obligatory perceptual processing' and that a late ERP is due to 'increased resource 
allocation due to the motivational relevance of the affective cues' (Codispoti et al., 
2007). Thus, attentional resources are vital for both early and late stages of 
perceptual processing. 
When two or more stimuli both require processing, therefore, there is not only 
competition for perceptual resources but also attentional resources. Allport et al, 
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(Allport et aL, 1972) demonstrated that two or more stimuli can be processed 
simultaneously if requiring different processing modalities (e. g. driving (visual) and 
talking (auditory & motor), and (Shiffiin and Schneider, 1977) demonstrated that 
both could also be processed simultaneously via divided attention if one was 
automatic (e. g. knitting and watching t. v. ). However, when two stimuli both require 
full attentional resources, the problem has to be resolved via attention switching. 
The result, however, may be a degraded representation for the second object 
(Duncan, 1984, Luck and Vogel, 1997). Dividing attention temporarily, removes 
resources from the unattended object with inevitable perceptual costs. It also has 
important implications for both working and long term memories. 
1.1.4. Perception, Attention and Working Memory 
Working memory refers to processes that maintain an active representation of 
information over a brief period so that it is available for recall or further processing 
(Baddeley, 1986). Interactions between perception and attention are well researched 
as indicated in the previous section. Interactions between attention and working 
memory, however, are equally important. Research into spatial working memory 
and attention, in particular, demonstrates this. Studies have shown, for example, that 
when to-be-remembered objects are perceived, stored and recalled in the same 
locations, memory for these objects is enhanced, and impaired when locations differ 
(Awh and Jonides, 2001). Though research involving object identification appears 
less prolific, the effects of attention on memory may be equally important. For 
example, it has been demonstrated that objects in working memory can prime 
perception and capture attention for matching objects in the external environment 
(Awh et al., 2006). Cowan also maintains that subtle shifts in attention toward 
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particular stimuli can "markedly improve memory for these stimuli" (Cowan, 1993). 
This interaction of perception, attention and working memory may indicate a 
functional role for attention-based rehearsal of objects in working memory. If this is 
so, it suggests that the same attentional resources may be involved in maintaining an 
image in working memory and in perceptually processing a new image, and this 
suggests yet more potential for resource competition. 
Voluntary control of attention, however, introduces another factor. 'Executive' 
processes that guide voluntary action are believed to be localised. in the LPFC and 
are usually thought to be the function of working memory (Ochsner et al., 2002). 
Selective attention, either directly via dispositional preferences or conscious 
regulation (Ochsner and Gross, 2005), for example, can increase activation to the 
attended stimulus via executive activation, and thereby bias perceptual processing. 
Thus, in addition to recruiting higher order processes of interpretation and 
evaluation by activating the MPFC, working memory may also control what is 
attended and for how long. In fact, it is recognised that the availability of working 
memory to actively maintain processing priorities is crucial for focusing attention 
(de Fokert el aL, 2001). 
Working memory, however, would appear to have its own resources separate 
from attentional resources. Smith and Jonides describe 'executive processes' as 
"metaprocesses that regulate the processing of working-memory contents" (Smith 
and Jonides, 1998) and include controlling such functions as inhibition, attention 
switching and monitoring of information. When these resources are stretched by the 
processing demands of a task, resource competition could involve the competition 
for working memory resources as well as attentional resources. 
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1.1.5. Summary 
The human cognitive system has limited capacity and resources. When two or 
more stimuli are processed simultaneously, competition for cognitive mechanisms 
and resources is almost inevitable. Due to capacity restrictions, competition for 
perceptual resources may primarily involve access to the ventral stream where 
complex visual stimuli may require time to process and thus shorten time available 
for processing incoming stimuli with impaired results. Attentional resources are 
known to increase neural activation of visual stimuli and hence also perceptual 
processing. When two or more stimuli require attention, attentional resources have 
to be divided with the unattended stimulus losing resources. Maintenance of 
attentional. resources are required whilst higher order interpretations and evaluations 
of stimuli are in progress. Executive functioning resources (i. e. working memory 
resources) are required to control attention and are particularly relevant for 
successful attention switching in tasks requiring the maintenance and processing of 
more than one item. Executive functioning resources are believed to recruit higher 
order cognitive processes by activating relevant neural networks, and select stimuli 
for processing by increasing activation to attended stimuli, and thus biasing 
attentional resources, whilst higher order cognitive processes such as interpretation 
and evaluation occur. Competition for cognitive resources can occur in all cognitive 
systems therefore. 
1.2. Distraction and the competition for Cognitive Resources 
The relevance of limited cognitive resources for processing both experimental 
and distractor stimuli in studies of emotion is very clear. Since the distractor is 
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presented first, and in the studies for this thesis, are viewed for 20OOms, there should 
be no decrement in perceptual processing since fully attended. In addition, the 
explicit instruction to hold the image in mind, will tend to bias attentional. and 
working memory resources towards maintenance of the distractor item. However, 
reduced attentional and working memory resources may impair processing of the 
experimental image. Both perceptual processing (reduced attentional resources) and 
the construction of meaning (reduced attentional and/or working memory resources) 
may be impaired. 
Traditionally, the generation of affective responses to visual stimuli was 
thought to be pre-attentive i. e. fast, unconscious and automatic. However, since 
recent research has found evidence for amygdala/PFC interactions and modulations 
of affective responses (Ochsner et al., 2002) cognitive theories of emotion 
generation that maintain the need for cognitive appraisal to generate affect have 
more validity. It is now considered more likely, therefore, that the generation of 
affective responses to external stimuli may require attention. There is a possibility, 
for exwnple, that attention is required to generate a good quality percept capable of 
activating the amygdala (GISscher et al., 2007), and that failure due to the 
competition for attentional resources could cause reduced startle magnitudes as in 
experiment 3. Alternatively, it is also possible that reduced attentional and/or 
working memory resources failed to facilitate the construction of meaning and hence 
affective responses and startle magnitudes. 
Luiz Pessoa has recently re-opened the debate concerning conscious versus 
automatic attention and affective response generation by demonstrating that 
conscious attention is required and by claiming that previous evidence suggesting 
that it was an unconscious and automatic process could be flawed. (Pessoa et al., 
i 
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2002b, Pessoa et al., 2005b). In the light of this evidence, it was decided that the 
next experiment in this study should test the hypothesis that the reduced startle 
magnitudes in the cognitive load condition in experiment 3, were due to reduced 
cognitive resources, as evidence from the distraction paradigm suggests, rather than 
more specifically, to reduced attentional resources. 
1.3. Experiment 4: Reduced cognitive (executive function) resources or 
reduced attentional resources? 
1.3.1. Introduction 
Conflicting evidence over the need for pre-attentive (Killgore and Yurgelun- 
Todd, 2004,6hman et al., 2001, Vuilleumier et al., 2001a, Vuilleumier et al., 
2001b) and post-attentive processing (Pessoa et al., 2005a, Pessoa et al., 2002a, 
Pessoa et al., 2002b, Pessoa et al., 2005b) to activate the amygdala in response to 
fearful stimuli has been attributed to design flaws such as incomplete masking 
procedures or a failure to maximise the use of attentional resources in the pre- 
attentive studies (Pessoa et al., 2002a, Pessoa et al., 2002b, Pessoa et al., 2005b, 
Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004). A possible reason for required post-attentive 
processing is suggested to be the need to inhibit and hence deactivate limbic regions 
during demanding cognitive tasks. Current research, however, suggests that the two 
systems are interactive (Ochsner et al., 2002, Ochsner and Gross, 2005), and a 
review of the literature suggests that post-attentive resources are required to 
construct and maintain good quality perceptual representations of external stimuli 
for affective processing. Using the acoustic startle as an indicator of amygdala 
activation, this study would manipulate conscious or post-attentive resources with 
verbal distractor items (e. g. words) and measure startle magnitudes when 
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participants were viewing negative and neutral pictures. If smaller startle 
magnitudes again occurred in the cognitive load condition for negative pictures but 
not in the no load condition, it could be inferred that the reduction in resources could 
be modality independent and therefore likely to be due to increased executive 
functioning. 
Supported by Joseph LeDoux's dual route model of emotion processing 
(LeDoux, 1996) traditional theories of emotion maintain that affective responses are 
triggered by the amygdala via an automatic and unconscious process that is 
independent of conscious cognitive processing. fMRI studies using backward 
masking of fearful stimuli such as angry faces, snakes and spiders (6hman et al., 
1995, Ohman and Mineka, 2001), neglect and visual extinction studies investigating 
activation of the visual cortex and ventral temporal cortex with and without 
conscious awareness (Vuilleumier et al., 2001b), and attention studies testing 
amygdala activation to fearful and neutral faces with and without conscious 
attention (Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2004, Vuilleumier et al., 2001a), for 
example, have shown that conscious attention of a visual stimulus such as an angry 
face is not required in order to trigger the arnygdala. 
Evidence from studies by Luiz Pessoa, however, disputes this claim. In a 
backward masking study in which fearful faces were backward masked by neutral 
faces (Pessoa et al., 2005b), and in attention tasks in which participants were 
required to focus attention on faces with negative and neutral expressions in the 
centre of their visual field and make same/different orientation judgements about 
rectangular bars at various degrees of orientation in their peripheral visual field 
(Pessoa et al., 2002a, Pcssoa ct al., 2002b, Pcssoa ct al., 2005b, Pcssoa and 
F 
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Ungerleider, 2004), Pessoa et al demonstrated that conscious attention is required to 
trigger the amygdala. 
To understand the differences between these results and those of previous 
experiments, Pessoa et al suggested that incomplete masking procedures (Pessoa et 
al., 2005a) and attention tasks that failed to utilize all available conscious attentional 
(post-attentive) resources could be responsible for evidence of unconscious and 
automatic activation of the amygdala (Pessoa et al., 2002b). They argued, that 
deactivation of emotion systems during cognitive processing would be "consistent 
with the idea that limbic regions would be inhibited during the performance of 
demanding cognitive tasks, which would constitute a form of emotional blunting 
during cognitive conditions" (Pessoa et al., 2005b). As they themselves 
acknowledge, however, this explanation assumes independent cognitive and emotion 
systems, and current research now suggests that the two interact. 
Following evidence from effortful. distraction studies that demonstrate reduced 
affective responses to anticipated negative events when participants engage in 
effortful distraction (Erk et al., 2006), and reduced negative mood following 
effortful distraction (Van Dillen and Koole, 2007), it was believed that reduced 
cognitive resources could be the reason for dampening of emotion. Having tested 
this in an on-going affect generation experiment (experiment 3) with similar results, 
it seems possible that reduced cognitive resources and hence reduced cognitive 
processing rather than direct inhibition of the limbic region, may explain the Pessoa 
et al results. 
Using words as distractor items and hence verbal rather than visual processing, 
and the same basic design as before, the following experiment tested the hypothesis 
that reducing cognitive resources rather than specific attentional resources would 
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reduce acoustic startle magnitudes. The rationale was that if the effect of startle 
reduction and hence affect modulation was shown to be modality independent, then 
increased executive functioning rather than a lack of conscious attentional resources 
would be a more likelY cause. 
1.3.2. Participants 
Fifty participants, mainly postgraduates of mixed nationalities (25 male: 25 
female: Mean Age = 24.98 SD = 5.93), from the University of Leeds, took part in 
the study as paid volunteers. As before, all participants completed the Centre for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) (Radloff, L. S., 1977), prior to 
selection and, a short demographic questionnaire to fulfill ethical and experimental 
requirements and to ensure the selection of normal, healthy volunteers. Checks were 
also made for dyslexia and potential second language difficulties. Participants gave 
written informed consent before participating. 
1.3.3. Stimuli and Design 
As in experiment 3, one hundred and twenty eight pictures (64 negative: 64 
neutral) were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS)(Lang, 
Bradley & Cuthbert, 1999) to generate emotional responses and arousal levels. 
When possible, negative pictures were selected with low valence and high arousal 
ratings (Means: 2.52,6.34): neutral pictures with average valence and low arousal 
ratings (5.17,2.98). To form 2 blocks of pictures for the experimental conditions, 
equal numbers of each valence type were randomly assigned to each block, making 
64 pictures per condition (32 negative: 32 neutral). Forty two of these (21 negative: 
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21 neutral) were randomly assigned to probed trials and 22 (11 negative: II neutral) 
to non-probed trials. Each picture was displayed on a computer screen for 5 seconds 
and was preceded by a white screen with a black fixation cross centered and 
displayed for SOOms. 
On probed trials, the startle reflex was triggered by a 50ms l00Db burst of 
white noise generated at intervals of 2.5,3.5 and 4.5 seconds from picture onset. A 
seven-point rating scale was displayed following each picture to prompt participants 
to register self-reported arousal ratings. A standard 7-key response pad with keys 
labeled 0-6 registered responses ranging from 0,1 feel absolutely nothing at all" 
to 6,1 feel extremely strong emotions". The rating scale was displayed until a 
response was registered or to a maximum time of 2 seconds. No more than four 
pictures of the same valence were displayed consecutively. Both pictures and 
conditions were fully counterbalanced. 
The distractor task consisted of two conditions. In the no load condition words 
and non words formed a lexical decision task to be undertaken before and after 
viewing and rating experimental pictures and did not require working memory. In 
the load condition, words were used in a sample to test matching task with the 
sample word presented before the experimental picture and the test word 
immediately after, thus making working memory obligatory (see Figure 25). Fifty 
percent of trials in the load condition contained matching words and fifty percent 
non-matching words. All words used were selected from the MRC Psycholinguistic 
Database (2006) on the basis of similar word length, concreteness, imageability and 
familiarity ratings (see Appendix 5). To increase task difficulty and to reduce the 
risk of familiarity judgements in the cognitive load condition, 42% of words were 
repeated. 
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Each trial consisted of 5 screens including a word, a picture and a rating scale. 
In the cognitive load condition the first word of the following trial was used for the 
matching task making the design a traditional I -back. Words were centred, 
preceded by aI OOOms fixation cross (not shown in Figure 22) and remained on the 
screen for 2 seconds. Pictures were presented as full screen images. The 64 tnals in 
each condition (32 negative: 32 neutral) were divided into 3 blocks so that no block 
lasted longer than approximately 5 minutes. SuperlabPro software was used to create 
and run the computer programme and interfaced with a second computer that 
displayed a digital pulse alongside the orbicularis oculi waveform each time a 
picture was presented. 
I No Load Condition 
5000ms 
20OOms 
Figure 22: Presentation sequences for the No Cognitive Load and Cognitive Load 
conditions (see text for presentation details). 
The recognition memory task consisted of one hundred and forty four pictures 
(96 old: 48 new. 72 negative: 72 neutral) presented as coloured thumbnails (height: 
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2.62cm; width: 3.18cm) on 5 pages of laminated card. The pictures were presented 
in 8 rows of 5 pictures per row per page, and a final page of the remaining 24 
pictures. As in previous experiments, acetates were provided on which to record 
recognition responses: the letter R for remember, K for know and F for familiar. 
Percentages and of correctly recognised pictures together with missed images and 
false positives were recorded and analysed for recognition accuracy. 
1.3.4. Physiological data collection and reduction 
As before, raw electromyography (EMG) was recorded from the orbicularis 
oculi muscle beneath the left eye using 2 EL254S shielded electrodes and disposable 
adhesive collars following guidelines proposed by Fridlund and Cacioppo (2000). 
The skin was prepared and abraded following Blumenthal et al (2005). Electrodes 
were attached and the electromyographic -activity routed through a Biopac MP150 
system. The raw signal was amplified (Gain: 5000) and filtered (low pass filter: 
SOOHz; high pass filter: IOHz) using a Biopac EMG IOOC Electromyogram 
Amplifier Module and digitized using Acqknowledge Software. Eyeblink activity 
was rectified and integrated on-line following Biopac's own recommended 
procedures (Application Note H102), sampled at IOOOHz and averaged over 50 
samples. Sampling started just before the experimental block began and continued 
to the end (continuous recording). A digital pulse generated by the Superlab 
software marked a point on the waveform immediately prior to each startle probe 
onset. The eyeblink reflex was then measured for 350ms from this point. 
The magnitude of the startle eyeblink reflex was measured using the Biopac 
peak-to-peak (P-P) function. This function computes the difference in microvolts 
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between the higbest and lowest peak in the selected -time window and pastes the 
outcome in the system's journal. The raw data was then converted to z scores and 
entered into an SPSS database for analysis using aW repeated measures ANOVA. 
1.3.5. Procedure 
Prior to the experiment, one hundred and forty six words were selected for the 
lexical tasks from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (2006) on the basis of similar 
word length, concreteness, imageability and familiarity ratings. Twenty people 
rated the words on a 10-point analogue scale for degree of emotionality from 'Not at 
all emotional' to 'Extremely emotional' and labelled them for valence (i. e. positive, 
neutral or negative). Seventy one low arousal words labelled neutral were selected 
for the study. Five-letter non-words were constructed from the selected words (e. g. 
GLOVE ........ VELOG, PEDAL ....... ELDAP) for the no cognitive load condition. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants read background information to the 
study, received detailed instructions of the experimental requirements and then gave 
written informed consent. Participants sat facing a computer screen approximately I 
metre away with a response pad resting on the knee to minimize hand movements. 
After attaching the electrodes, a short equipment test was followed by a practice 
session of the first task to ensure familiarity with task instructions and timing. 
When viewing the pictures, participants were instructed to look at the screen for the 
full 5 seconds and only register their response when the rating scale appeared on the 
screen. They were also instructed to register their first spontaneous response and 
think only of its strength not the valence. 
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In the cognitive load condition, participants were required to hold in mind a 
preceding word ready for the post-stimulus sample to test matching task. This was in 
order to activate and maintain working memory activity in order to reduce available 
resources for processing the pictures. Responses to the lexical decision tasks were 
recorded using coloured keys on the response pad whilst the words were on. the 
screen. The first experimental condition was then completed, followed by the second 
practice session and the second experimental condition. As before, the sequence of 
tasks undertaken was determined by counterbalancing requirements. 
Participants were then required to complete the recognition memory task. Five 
laminated sheets of coloured thumbnail sized pictures were placed one at a time on a 
table in front of the participant. The task was to look at the pictures to see if any 
were recognised as having been in the previous computer presented experimental 
conditions. Recognised pictures were labelled R for remember (i. e. if the participant 
actively remembered a picture appearing on the computer screen, or remembered 
focusing on a particular part of a picture, or remembered something they had 
thought about at the time), K if they knew thay had seen the picture but had only a 
feeling of knowing with no mental 'evidence' to support it, and F if they had just a 
feeling of fwniliarity so it probably was in the study. Unrecognised pictures were 
left blank. After the recognition memory task, the electrodes were removed and 
participants were asked about their experience of the study and strategies used to 
remember pictures in the cognitive load (i. e. the sample to test matching) condition. 
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1.3.6. Results 
I. Startle Magnitudes 
In line with existing research, there was a main effect of valence (FI, 50=10.54 
p<0.01 d=. 17) with the magnitude of startle responses significantly larger for 
negative than neutral stimuli (Means and SE: negative: 0.20,04; neutral: -. 10, . 03). 
However, there was no main effect of cognitive load (FI, 50= 1.0 p >0.05 d=. 02) but, 
consistent with the hypothesis, a significant Valence x Cognitive load interaction 
(F 1.50ý 11.43 p<0.0 I d=. 19). Significantly higher startle magnitudes were found for 
negative than neutral stimuli in the no load condition (FI. 50= 19.48 p=0.001 d=. 28) 
and no significant differences in startle magnitudes in the load condition (F<I) (see 
Figure 23). 
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Figure 23: Startle responses to Negative and Neutral pictures in the No Load and 
Load conditions. 
1.3.6.2. Arousal Ratings 
As expected. there was a main effect of valence (FI. 50= 312.10 p<0.001 d=. 86) 
with significantly higher arousal ratings for negative than neutral stimuli (Means and 
SE = (negative) 4.31. . 12; (neutral) 
2.39, 
. 92) (see Figure 24). However, there was 
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no main effect of cognitive load (F<I) and no Valence x Cognitive load interaction 
(F< I) (see Figure 24). 
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Figure24: Self Report Arousal Ratings for Negatively and Neutrally valenced 
pictures in the two conditions 
1.3.6.3. Recognition Memory 
Recognition Accuracy 
Levels of recognition accuracy were high. There were high proportions of 
correctly recognised high and low arousal pictures and low proportions of false 
alann data (see Table 19). Two outliers were adjusted following Tabachnick and 
Fidell (1997). 
Table 19. Recognition accuracy as a function of arousal 
Arousal Hits FAs d' 
Negative 
. 
82 
. 
03 2.67 
Neutral 
. 
62 . 
01 2.74 
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Statistical analysis of the recognition accuracy measures showed that d' was 
not significantly different for high and low arousal pictures (t = . 79 df =49 p> . 05). 
Remember, Know and Familiar responses 
A comparison of simple proportions again showed more high arousal pictures 
correctly remembered compared with low arousal pictures (see Table 20). 
Table 20. Proportions of R/K/F responses in the cognitive no load and load 
conditions 
No Ioad Load 
Arousal Remember Know Familiar Remember Know Familiar 
High . 60 . 19 . 10 . 57 . 16 . 11 
Low . 53 . 20 . 16 . 46 . 21 . 10 
Statistical analysis of simple proportions using a 2x2x3 ANOVA with arousal, 
cognitive load and recognition as independent variables showed a main effect of 
arousal (F 1,50 = 13.84 p< . 01 d= . 22) and a main effect of cognitive load (F 1,50 
= 
4.04 p= . 05 d= . 08). More high arousal pictures were correctly recognised than low 
arousal pictures (Means and SEs =. 289 (. 006); . 267 (. 007) ) and the proportion was 
higher in the cognitive no load than the load condition (Means and SEs = . 283 
(. 006); . 273 (. 006) ). There was no Arousal x Cognitive load interaction (F<I). 
There was, however, a main effect of recognition (F 2,100 -= 108.19 p <. 001 d =. 68) 
with significantly more Remember than Know responses (FI, 50 = 95.10 p <. 001 d 
=. 66) (Means and SEs = . 58 (. 03); . 15 (. 02) ) and more Remember than Familiar 
responses (FI, 50 = 175.41 p< . 00 1d= . 78) (Means and SEs = . 58 (. 03); A1(. 0 1) ). 
There was no significant difference between Know and Familiar resPonses (FI, 5o = 
2.0 p >. 05). There was an Arousal x Recognition interaction (F2,100 ý 3.74 p< . 05 d 
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= . 07) with significantly more 
high than low arousal pictures remembered (F 1,50 = 
8.33 p <. Ol d= . 14). There were no significant 
differences in the proportions of 
Know responses (F 1,50 ý 1.04 p >. 05) and Familiar responses to high and low 
arousal pictures (F 1.50 ý 1.76 p >. 05) (see Figure 25). There was also no three-way 
Arousal x Cognitive load x Recognition interaction (F 1.5,73.7) = 1.16 p >. 05). 
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Figure 25. Proportions of remember, know and familiar responses to high and 
low arousal pictures 
Recollection and Familiarity 
Familiarity measures showed a mixed pattem with less familiarity for low 
arousal than high arousal pictures in the cognitive no load condition but more 
familiarity in the load condition. (see Table 21). Recollection, therefore, was higher 
for low arousal than high arousal pictures in the no load condition making 
familiarity reater for high arousal than low arousal pictures in the load condition. L 
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Table 21. Recollection and Familiarity as a function of arousal 
Recollection Familiarity 
Arousal No Load Load No Load Load 
High . 52 . 63 . 48 . 37 
Low . 57 . 61 . 43 . 39 
Analysis of familiarity measures using aW ANOVA with arousal and 
cognitive load the independent variables showed no main effect of arousal (F<I) but 
a main effect of cognitive load (F 1,5o = 9.53 p <. Ol d= . 16). Recollection was 
significantly lower in the no load than the load condition (Means and SEs = . 37 
(. 04); . 28 (. 04) ). There was no Valence x Cognitive load interaction (F 1,50 = 2.35 p 
>. 05). The results will be discussed in the final chapter. 
1.3.7. Discussion 
As predicted, startle magnitudes in the cognitive load condition were smaller 
than in the no load condition suggesting that the distractor task had again reduced 
cognitive resources and impaired affect modulation. Since the effect of the distractor 
task using a verbal processing modality reduced startle magnitudes in the cognitive 
load condition in the same way as a task using a visual processing modality 
(experiment 3), at least some of the effect could have been modality independent 
and better explained via a reduction in cognitive resources per se rather than a 
reduction in conscious attention. However, it is also possible that though verbal 
distractor items are processed automatically and may be phonologically rehearsed to 
maintain in working memory, it is possible that they were also processed visually. 
There was some evidence to support the hypothesis that the cognitive resources 
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reduced could have been withdrawn from underlying processes such as executive 
functioning (i. e. working memory), but it is also acknowledged that visual 
attentional resources may also have been reduced. 
To summarise, it is believed that increasing executive functioning reduces 
resources available for processing attended stimuli and may either involve, or result 
in, a reduction in visual attentional resources. What is certain is that increasing 
executive functions that use the same processing modality as visual attentional 
resources produces the greatest reduction in emotional processing of visual stimuli. 
The modulation of affective responses indicated by the reduced startle 
magnitudes in the cognitive load condition, however, was expected to show a 
significant dampening of emotion in recognition memory as had been seen in 
experiment 3. The fact that it didn't was disappointing. As noted in chapter 1, 
research shows that the amygdala can modulate the consolidation of explicit 
memories by releasing stress hormones such as adrenalin (Cahill and Alkire, 2003, 
Phelps, 2004) so that in this study it could be expected that there would be a 
significant valence by cognitive load interaction with a reduced number of correctly 
recognised negative pictures in the cognitive load condition. One possible 
explanation for no such effect could have been the small effect size that may have 
been due to the use of words as distractor items. Awh and Jonides (2006) state that 
semantic processing of words is automatic and unconscious. Semantic processing 
could, therefore, have aided memory leaving working memory resources only 
slightly depleted for stimulus processing and therefore not impairing memory. 
Instead, there would have been slightly less affective intensity in recognition 
memory but enough to leave the negativity bias intact. 
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Though the need for cognitive resources to generate affect appears clear, what 
is still unclear is whether resources are required for early or late stages of cognitive 
processing. Phan (2002) maintains that amygdala activation is associated primarily 
with the sensory/perceptual level and is therefore more likely to be required for 
obligatory perceptual processing. Awh et al (2006) maintain that post-attentive 
ERPs can occur within the first 100ms of stimulus onset which suggests that 
conscious attention may be required for early perceptual processing. However, there 
is no apparent competition for resources at this level. Only two items require 
processing so neither competes for ventral stream or working memory space. What 
they do compete for is working memory resources to construct meaning. Codispoti 
et al (2007) maintain that meaning may be processed between 300-600ms post- 
stimulus onset when self relevance evaluations occur. (Gard et aL, 2007) also 
showed that scenes directly threatening to the viewer showed an enhanced startle 
response at 300ms; a result that suggests self relevance evaluations occurred before 
300ms post-stimulus onset. Ochsner (2004) also maintains that conscious attention 
could be needed within the 300-600ms interval to enable interpretations of meaning 
and evaluations of self relevance. Since startle magnitudes in experiments 3 and 4 
were measured at 2.5,3.5 and 4.5 seconds post-stimulus onset, it is possible that 
cognitive resources were required for the construction of meaning. Evidence doesn't 
yet exist for the generation of affect via meaning, only for up or down-regulated 
affect that has already been generated (Ochsner et al., 2004). 
However, consideration of an cffect of meaning raises a further explanatory 
possibility for the results above, namely that that cognitive outcomes rather than 
cognitive processes could produce the effect. This explanation suggests that 
responses to negative pictures could have been attenuated by a 'dilution' of negative 
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affect due to the simultaneous holding in mind of neutral distractor items i. e. that 
holding in mind a neutral word or pleasant face whilst viewing negative pictures 
would have generated neutral or even positive affect that could have down-regulated 
normal affective responses to the negative pictures. If the processing of meaning 
was not delayed or impaired by reduced cognitive resources, then an effect of 
congruence (or incongruence) could explain the resultS. In order to rule out a 
possible effect of simultaneous but incongruent responses, a fifth experiment was 
designed to test for this effect. 
13.8. Summary 
The results from experiment 3 suggested that the processing of experimental 
stimuli was impaired due to reduced cognitive resources required by an obligatory 
concurrent distraction task, and that the reductions caused startle magnitudes during 
picture presentations to fall and emotional responses in recognition memory to be 
attenuated. This was interpreted as indicating a loss of affect modulation due to 
reduced amygdala activity. However, it was unclear as to exactly what cognitive 
resources were involved or how. The results from experiment 3 suggested that 
cognitive resources could have been lost from visual attention. HoWever, experiment 
4 repeated the experimental design using a different processing modality. (i. e. with 
words as distractor items and hence verbal rather than visual processing) and found 
that cognitive resources were still reduced and emotion attenuated during emotion 
generation though not in recognition memory. This was interpreted as possible 
evidence for affect modulation effects due to the loss of cognitive resources per se 
rather than a specific loss of conscious, visual attention as seemed likely in 
experiment 3. However, since executive functioning resources are known to control 
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attentional resources and attention switching behaviour (Christoff, 1999), it is 
conceivable that a possible loss of cognitive resources resulted in the loss of 
conscious attention. In either event, the evidence appears to support Pessoa's claim 
that emotion generation is not entirely automatic and unconscious. 
Although it is believed that the above experiments demonstrate that cognitive 
resources are required for ernotion generation, it is still unclear as to whether the 
cognitive resources lost in the above experiments were required for early, low level 
cognitive appraisals or later, higher level meaning construction. It is also possible 
that cognitive outcomes rather than processes were responsible for the results and 
that stimuli producing conflicting affective responses could have confounded 
responses. In order to disentangle the potential effects of meaning construction 
(processes) versus constructed meanings (outcomes) on affective responses, a fifth 
experiment was designed to address the problem. 
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Chapter 7 
Congruence versus Cognitive resources 
The results from experiments 3 and 4 indicated that reduced cognitive 
resources, perhaps required for working memory functions, modulated affect during 
the generation of emotion and at times modulated emotional responses in 
recognition memory. However, there was also the possibility that cognitive 
outcomes rather than processes could have produced the same results. If cognitive 
resources were not reduced, meanings could have been constructed and incongruent 
distractor items (i. e. neutral or pleasant distractor items paired with negative 
pictures), for example, could have modulated 'affective responses to negative 
pictures by 'diluting' negative responses. If resources were reduced, then the 
construction of meaning may have been impaired resulting in a failure to generate a 
fully intensive affective response. 
Human cognitive resources are known to be limited as previously discussed. 
Both perceptual and attentional capacities have been extensively researched and 
have been shown to be incapable of processing all in-coming information in the 
external environment. The limitations of working memory have also been 
highlighted in research investigating such proposed modules as the visual spatial 
scratchpad, the acoustic store, and the phonological loop (Baddeley, 1992). Less 
well researched, however, is the network that constructs meaning. Ochsner and 
colleagues have shown that meaning construction is carried out in various parts of 
the PFC (Ochsner et al., 2002, Ochsner et al., 2004), but exactly how these networks 
are activated and whether or not they have capacity restrictions is still largely 
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unknown. One computer model that offers a description of potential processes, 
however, is the Intelligent Distribution Agent (IDA) (Baars and Franklin, 2003). 
Substantiated by the IDA model that has successfully demonstrated human 
abilities like temporal deliberation, voluntary action selection and negotiating in 
natural language (Baars and Franklin, 2003), Baars suggests that the human brain is 
constantly cycling information through parallel and unconscious networks that 
compete for conscious attention. Consciousness, he maintains, is necessary to recruit 
networks and processes that construct meaning. Consciousness can broadcast 
information to widely distributed unconscious specialized networks in the human 
brain and in so doing recruit long term memory and networks such as problem 
solving and evaluation networks to help construct meaning. However, consciousness 
has limited capacity and enforces serial rather than parallel processing. Global 
constraint satisfaction, Baars suggests, is the method by which one and only one set 
of information becomes conscious. Basically, information that is most strongly 
activated wins the competition and settles into a stable network that becomes 
conscious. Consciousness, therefore is the outcome of global constraint satisfaction 
and is necessary to construct meaning. 
However, by consciousness, Baars appears to be rdening to what Frijda terms 
second order consciousness. In his article on emotion experience (2005 p476), Frijda 
makes the distinction between 'first order perceptual experience' and 'second order 
awareness'. The first is awareness without focal attention as when engaged in two 
concurrent tasks of which one is automatic and therefore requires little attention (e. g. 
driving and holding a conversation). The second involves full conscious awareness 
of events and a meaningful perception of the world (e. g. when attempting to avoid 
an accident on the road ahead). Not all cognitive psychologists believe that affect 
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generation requires full conscious attention and the construction of sophisticated 
meaning, however. For example, Magda Arnold suggested that cognitive appraisals 
were likely to be 'direct and intuitive' and may not be 'the result of reflection' 
(Arnold, 1960) suggesting, perhaps, that they need only first order perceptual 
experience. The level of meaning required for the generation of affect, therefore, is 
still controversial and a failure of a congruency effect may not demonstrate a failure 
of reduced cognitive resources to construct meaning from higher order interpretative 
and evaluative processes. 
Nevertheless, the aim of the fifth experiment was to manipulate meaning by 
manipulating congruence and see if cognitive resources and processing, or cognitive 
outcomes and congruence could best explain the modulated affect in experiments 3 
and 4. If congruence was the ma or factor, then startle magnitudes generated by i 
negative experimental pictures paired with neutral distractor pictures would be 
higher in the no load than the load condition. Negative pictures paired with negative 
distractor pictures would be likelY to be higher in the load condition. If reduced 
cognitive resources was the major factor, then startle magnitudes for negative 
pictures would be higher in the no load condition regardless of congruence. 
1.1. Experiment 5 
1.1.1 Introduction 
In a series of experiments, Ochsner has demonstrated the ability of meaning to 
modulate affective responses to external stimuli (Ochsner et al., 2002, Ochsner and 
Gross, 2005, Ochsner et al., 2004). Quoting Shakespeare's Hamlet, "there is 
nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so" (Shakespeare, 1998/1623), 
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Ochsner (2002) makes the point that the way reality is interpreted determines the 
way we feel about it. Building on work done primarily by James Gross (Gross, 
1998b, Gross, 2002, Gross and Levenson, 1993, Gross and Levenson, 1997b), 
Ochsner used fMRI technology to identify the regions controlling cognitive re- 
appraisal. In experiments in which he manipulated behaviour with "Attend" and 
"Re-appraise" instructions, he discovered that two major areas of the PFC are 
involved in re-appraisal, namely the LPFC and the MPFC, and that activation of the 
ventral LPFC was inversely correlated with activation of the mnygdala and MOFC 
(Ochsner et al., 2002). From these results, he maintained that whilst the amygdala is 
important for detecting and recognising affectively salient stimuli and modulating 
implicit memory, it is the MOFC that is important for representing the pleasant or 
unpleasant affective value of a stimulus "in a flexible format that is sensitive to 
momentary changes in social or motivational context" (Ochsner et al., 2002). 
In later experiments, Ochsner also manipulated meaning construction with a 
self-focused and situation focused instruction. In these experiments, participants 
either took a subjective, self-focused perspective, and increased or decreased 
emotional responses by worsening the interpretation of an event or improving the 
likely consequences for themselves, or took an objective, situation focused 
perspective, and manipulated emotional responses in the same way but for a 
strangg. The results showed that mnygdala activation either increased or decreased 
according to the improve or worsen conditions. Regions in the PFC shown to 
modulate amygdala activity were identified as the left rostromedial PFC, the right 
lateral and orbital PFC in down-regulation, medial prefrontal regions in the self- 
focused condition and lateral prefrontal regions in the situation focused condition. 
The left rostromedial PFC was believed to increase the emotional experience by 
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drawing upon additional emotion knowledge, the right lateral and orbital PFC was 
believed to decrease the emotional response via behavioural inhibition. Thus, once 
again, the PFC was seen as a major region involved in modulating the amygdala 
with specific regions functioning to produce required outcomes for different 
regulatory goals and with different perspectives. 
Since the acoustic startle reflex had been used in experiments 3 and 4, reported 
earlier, to indicate amygdala activity, it is possible that the reduced startle 
magnitudes in the cognitive load condition (i. e. the condition in which distractor 
items had to be held in mind for a sample to test matching exercise), might have 
been reduced by a failure of cognitive resources to allow meaning construction. If 
meaning is an important process in the generation of affect, then a failure to provide 
enough resources to either complete detailed feature analysis for accurate 
interpretation of the stimulus, or a failure to produce enough activation to broadcast 
the contents of working memory in order to recruit higher order interpretative and 
evaluative processes (Baars and Franklin, 2003) could have impaired processing in 
the prefrontal regions identified by Ochsner as important in the construction of 
meaning. 
Although results from all experiments run so far have indicated a separation of 
conscious experience and unconscious processing, it is possible that meaning 
construction may have been impaired for affect generation but not for conscious 
experience. It is possible, for example, that resources were reduced for unconscious 
processing but not conscious processing and that, as a result, the two systems have 
become 'de-synchronised. 
The following experiment, therefore, was designed to test the hypothesis that 
conflicting affect generated by incongruent distractor and experimental pictures 
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modulates unconscious affective responses. It was decided to use the same basic 
design as in experiments 3 and 4, but present negative and neutral pictures as 
distractor items as well as experimental stimuli, and manipulate congruency (i. e. 
negative distractor followed by a negative experimental stimulus (congruent 
condition); neutral distractor followed by a negative experimental stimulus 
(incongruent condition), and vice versa for neutral pictures). It was predicted that if 
congruency (or meaning) modulates affective responses, then there would be a 
significant main effect of congruence. Startle magnitudes for congruent negative 
stimuli would be significantly larger than startle magnitudes for incongruent 
negative stimuli. However, if reduced cognitive resources modulates affective 
responses, then there would be a valence x cognitive load interaction as seen in 
experiments 3 and 4, with attenuated affective responses to negative stimuli in the 
cognitive load condition. 
1.1.2. Participants 
Thirty six participants (30 female: 6 male), all undergraduates and post- 
graduates at the University of Leeds (Mean age: 20.61 SD 3.01) took part in the 
study for course credits or flO. 00. All completed the Centre for Epidemiological 
Studies Depression Scale (ces-d) (Radloff, 1997), a short questionnaire designed to 
identify depression in the general population, and a short demographic questionnaire 
designed to exclude volunteers with phobias, pacemakers, traumatic memories, and 
cultural backgrounds or dispositions that would make viewing the negative pictures 
used in the study unacceptable. Participants with ces-d scores above 16 (i. e. scores 
that indicated possible depression) were excluded. All participants gave written 
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informed consent to participate and were randomly assigned to one of three groups 
for version manipulations. 
1.1.3. Stimuli and Design 
Three hundred and fifty two pictures (176 negative: 176 neutral) were selected 
from the IAPS picture set, medical libraries and Google images to generate 
emotional responses and arousal levels. Mean arousal ratings were 5.96 for negative 
pictures and 2.74 for neutral pictures. To form 2 sets of pictures for the cognitive 
load and no load conditions, 192 pictures (96 negative: 96 neutral) were quasi- 
randomly assigned to the no load condition (some picture selection was controlled 
to match mean arousal ratings in the two conditions) and the remaining 160 pictures 
(80 negative: 80 neutral) were assigned to the load condition. 
Each condition consisted of 64 trials (32 negative: 32 neutral) of which 42 
were probed and 22 non-probed. On probed trials, the startle reflex was triggered by 
a 50ms MOM burst of white noise generated quasi-randomly at 2.5,3.5 and 4.5 
seconds after picture onset. All trials constructed consisted of 10 screens consisting 
of prompt screens, pictures and a rating scale as shown in Figure 26 and fixation 
crosses (not shown). Fifty percent of the trials were congruent and 50% incongruent. 
Trials were congruent when the valence of the preceding picture in the distractor 
task matched the valence of the experimental picture (i. e. both were negative or 
neutral), and incongruent when they did not match (i. e. one neutral and one 
negative). 
Cognitive load was manipulated in the load condition with a distracting visual 
matching task requiring working memory to maintain whilst viewing and rating the 
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experimental picture. Of the 64 experimental trials, thirty two (16 negative: 16 
neutral) consisted of matching test to sample pictures and thirty two (16 negative: 16 
neutral) consisted of non-matching test to sample pictures. The no load task required 
an indoors/outdoors decision, registered at the time of picture presentation, 
regarding the most typical location of the distractor picture content. A blank screen 
and fixation cross, each displayed for 500ms, preceded each screen. Two versions of 
the study were constructed to fully counterbalance the pictures. In each version, all 
pictures appeared only once (apart from the 50% of matched pictures in the load 
condition), and in one condition only. 
In order to control for boredom and to give participants rest periods in which 
they could move, trials in both conditions were divided into 3 blocks and no block 
lasted for more than approximately 5 minutes. 
Indoors Hold in 
I sec Outdoors 
I sec Mind 
2sec 2sec 
Watch Watch 
2sec 2sec 
ý,, -ec 5sec Rating Rating 
Scale Scale 
2sec 2sec 
Indoors/ Match 
Isec Outdoor,, Isec 
2sec 2sec 
No Load Condition Load Condition 
Figure 26: Trial Structures for the No Load and Load Conditions (see text for 
image specifications) 
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The recognition memory test consisted of one hundred and ninety six pictures 
(96 old: 96 new; 48 negative: 48 neutral from each set) presented as coloured 
thumbnails (height: 2.62cm; width: 3.18cm) on 4 pages of laminated card. The 
pictures were presented in 8 rows of 5 pictures per row per page, and a final page of 
the remaining 36 pictures. Foils and experimental pictures were matched by 
category (see Appendix 2) and arousal levels. Arousal levels were once again 
significantly higher for negative experimental pictures than foils (t = 9.13 df = 94 p 
<. 05), however, as they were for neutral pictures (t = 9.89 df = 94 p <. 05). As in 
previous experiments, acetates were provided on which to record recognition 
responses: the letter R for remember, K for know and F for familiar. Mean arousal 
ratings for negative and neutral pictures were 5.84 and 2.48 respectively. 
Percentages of correctly recognised pictures together with missed images and false 
positives were recorded. 
1.1.4. Physiological data collection and reduction 
Raw electromyography (EMG) was recorded from the orbicularis oculi muscle 
beneath the left eye using 2 EL254S shielded electrodes and disposable adhesive 
collars following guidelines proposed by Fridlund and Cacioppo (2000). The skin 
was prepared and abraded following Blumenthal et al (2005). Electrodes were 
attached and the electromyographic activity routed through a Biopac MP ISO system. 
The raw signal was amplified (Gain: 5000) and filtered (low pass filter: SOOHz; high 
pass filter: IOHz) using a Biopac EMG IOOC Electromyogram. Amplifier Module 
and digitized using Acqknowledge Software. Eyeblink activity was rectified and 
integrated on-line following Biopac's own recommended procedures (Application 
Note H102, sampled at IOOOHz and averaged over 50 samples. Sampling started 
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just before the experimental block began and continued to the end (continuous 
recording). A digital pulse generated by the Superlab software marked a point on the 
waveform immediatelY prior to each startle probe onset. The eyeblink reflex was 
then measured for 350ms from this point. 
The magnitude of the startle eyeblink reflex was measured using the Biopac 
peak-to-peak (P-P) function. This function computes the difference in microvolts 
between the highest and lowest peak in the selected time window and pastes the 
outcome in the system's journal. The raw data was then converted to z scores and 
entered into an SPSS database for analysis using aW repeated measures ANOVA. 
1.1.5. Procedure 
Prior to the experiment, three hundred and ninety six negative and neutral 
pictures were selected from medical libraries and Google images for the distractor 
task. All images were then divided into blocks of approximately 100 pictures and 
surveyed by 20 University of Leeds students and rated for valence and arousal 
levels. Two hundred and twenty images were then selected from the total surveyed 
(see Appendix 6) and together with 132 IAPS pictures fonned a picture database. 
Before the experiment, participants received information regarding the study 
and completed the ces-d (Radloff, 1977) and the demographic questionaires. On 
arriving at the laboratory, they read an information sheet reminding them of the 
nature and purpose of the study and then received a detailed description of the 
proposed procedure in order to give infonned consent. Once consent had been given, 
electrodes were attached, the equipment tested, waveforms inspected and the first 
practice session begun. Participants practised each task immediately before the 
recorded experimental condition was undertaken and were allowed to practise until 
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familiar with the instructions and timing of the study. The first experimental 
condition then followed . The second practice session enabled participants to 
become familiar with the second task and was then followed by the second 
experimental condition. The order of experimental conditions was determined by 
counterbalancing requirements. A set of 'Feel Good' pictures (i. e. positive pictures 
designed to create a positive mind set) concluded the computer session. 
Participants were then required to complete the recognition memory task. Five 
laminated sheets of coloured thumbnail sized pictures were placed one at a time on a 
table in front of the participant. The task was to look at the pictures to see if any 
were recognised as having been in the previous computer presented experimental 
conditions. Recognised pictures were labelled R for remember (i. e. if the participant 
actively remembered a picture appearing on the computer screen, or remembered 
focusing on a particular part of a picture, or remembered something they had 
thought about at the time), K if they knew thay had seen the picture but had only a 
feeling of knowing with no mental 'evidence' to support it, and F if they had just a 
feeling of familiarity so it probably was in the study. Unrecognised pictures were 
left blank. After the recognition memory task, the electrodes were removed and 
participants were asked about their experience of the study and strategies used to 
remember pictures in the in the cognitive load (i. e. the sample to test matching) 
condition. 
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1.1.6. Results 
1.1.6.1. The Eyeblink Startle Reflex (orbicularis oculi) 
Consistent with previous results, there was a main effect of valence (FI, 35 ý 
19.38 p<0.001 d= . 36) 
but no main effect of cognitive load (F<I). There was also 
no main effect of congruence (F<I) and no interaction of Valence x Congruence 
(F<I), Congruence x Cognitive Load (F<I), or Valence x Congruence x Cognitive 
load (F<I). However, as before, there was a significant interaction between valence 
and cognitive load (F1,35 = 4.45 p<0.05 d= . 11). Startle magnitudes were higher for 
negative than neutral pictures in both the no load and the load conditions (see Figure 
27). However, the effect size in the no load condition (F = 16.88 p<. 001 d =. 33) was 
nearly twice the size of that in the load condition (F = 7.40 p< . 02 d= . 18). 
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Figure 27: Startle responses to Negative and Neutral pictures in the No Load and 
Load conditions. 
No Load Load 
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1.1.6.2. Arousal Ratings 
There was a main effect of valence (171,35 = 203.54 p<0.001 = . 85) with 
higher 
arousal ratings for negative than neutral pictures (Means and SEs = 4.57, . 12; 
2.46 
. 
14) and no main effect of cognitive load (F<I) or congruence (F<I) (see Figures 28 
and 29). 
Figure 28: Self Reported Arousal Ratings for Negative and Neutral pictures in the 
No Load and Load conditions 
There was, however, a significant Cognitive load x Congruence interaction 
(F1,35 = 6.75 p<0.02 d= . 16) with ratings for congruent pictures lower in the no 
load condition than the load condition (Means and SEs: 3.46,11; 3.58,12) and 
incongruent pictures higher in the no load than the load condition (Means and SEs: 
3.53, . 11; 3.50, . 121). A 
Valence x Cognitive load x Congruence interaction (FI. 35 ý 
4.57 p<0.04 d= . 12), however, showed that whilst ratings for both neutral 
congruent and incongruent pictures were higher in the cognitive load condition than 
the no load condition (Means and SEs = (Congruent) (load) 2.47, . 16 (no 
load) 2.41, 
. 14. (Incongruent) (load) 
2.51, . 16; (no load) 2.47, . 13; ), there was a difference in 
ratings for congruent and incongruent negative pictures in the no load 
condition. Ratings were higher for congruent negative pictures in the no load 
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condition but lower for incongruent negative pictures in the no load condition, 
(Means and SEs = (Congruent) (load) 4.50, . 14; (no load) 4.68, . 13; (Incongruent) 
(load) 4.60,14; (no load) 4.49,14) (see Figure 29). 
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Figure 29: Self Reported Arousal Ratings for valenced. congruent and incongruent 
pictures in the no load and load conditions. 
1.1.6.3. Recognition Memory 
Recognition Accuracy 
Levels of recognition accuracy were again high. More high arousal than low 
arousal pictures were correctly recognised and there were few false alarm responses 
(see Table 22). One case was omitted from the analysis due to extreme scores and 
two outliers were adjusted following Tabachnick and Fidell (1997). 
Table 22. Recognition accuracy data for negative and neutral pictures 
Arousal Hits FAs d' 
High 
Low 
. 71 
. 65 
. 04 
. 04 
2.13 
2.23 
congruent incongruent congruent incongruent 
No Load Load 
149 
Statistical analysis of the d' measure showed no significant difference in d' for 
high and low arousal pictures (t = 1.14 df =35 *p >. 05). 
Remember, Know and Familiar responses 
Analysis of simple proportions of R/K/F responses showed higher proportions 
of Remember responses than either Know or Familiar and higher proportions of 
these for high arousal pictures (see Table 23). 
Table 23. Proportions of remember, know and familiar responses to high and 
low arousal pictures in the cognitive no load and load conditions 
Remember Know Familiar 
Arousal Hits FAs Hits FAs Hits FAs Recollection Familiarity & 
High . 49 . 02 . 08 . 02 . 14 . 09 . 83 . 17 2.13 
Low . 28 . 03 . 08 . 02 . 13 . 06 . 97 . 03 2.23 
A statistical analysis of simple proportions using a WO ANOVA with 
arousal, cognitive load and recognition as the independent variables showed a main 
effect of arousal ( F1,34 = 5.96 p <. 05 d =. 15) but no main effect of cognitive load (F 
1,34 ý-- 1.17 p >. 05). Again, more high arousal pictures than low arousal pictures were 
correctly recognised (Means and SEs = . 24 (. 0 1); . 21 (. 04) ). There was also a main 
effect of recognition (F 1,34 -= 81.62 p <. 001 d= . 71) and an Arousal x Recognition 
interaction (F 1.58,53.8 -= 3.21 p =. 05 d =. 09). Remember responses were significantly 
higher than Know (F 1,34 -= 92.08 p <. 001 d= . 73) and Familiar responses (F1,34 = 
84.95 p <. 001 d= . 72). Proportions of Know and Familiar responses were also 
significantly different from each other (F 1,34'ý 10.05 p< . 01 d= . 32) (see Figure 
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30). There was no Cognitive load x Recognition interaction (F<I) and no Arousal x 
Cognitive load x Recognition interaction (F<I). 
to 0.6 Ev 
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Figure 30. Proportions of remember, know and familiar responses for high and 
low arousal pictures 
Recollection and Familiarity 
Recollection was high for both low and high arousal pictures (see Table 23). 
Analysis of familiarity measures using a 2x2 ANOVA in which arousal and 
cognitive load were the independent variables showed no main effect of arousal 
(F<I), no main effect of cognitive load (F<I) and no Arousal x Cognitive load 
interaction (F 1.34 ý 1.17 p> . 
05). 
1.1.7. Discussion 
The experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that the reduction of 
cognitive resources and not the simultaneous processing of negative and neutral 
pictures produces attenuated emotional responses. Analysis of the experimental 
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results showed that the valence by cognitive load interaction, with smaller startle 
magnitudes in the cognitive load condition, was not due to the manipulation of 
congruence. There was no main effect of congruence nor a valence by congruence 
interaction. The Valence x Cognitive load interaction, however, occurred yet again 
and suggests that it is reduced cognitive resources rather than congruence that 
modulate affective responses to negative pictures. 
Analysis of arousal ratings did show an effect of congruence, however. The 
significant Valence x Cognitive load x Congruence interaction suggested that the 
conscious experience of the stimuli was affected by meanings constructed and the 
sequence in which the pictures were presented. Thus, holding a negative picture in 
mind had an enhancing effect on the rating of a subsequent negative picture and 
holding a neutral picture in mind dampened the experience of a subsequent negative 
picture. 
1.1.8. Summary 
To summarise, manipulations of congruence had no effect on startle 
magnitudes but produced a significant interaction between valence, cognitive load 
and congruence on arousal ratings, with neutral distractor pictures dampening the 
affective response to a following negative picture. By contrast, manipulation of 
cognitive load had an effect on startle magnitudes with a dampening of negative 
affect in the cognitive load condition but no effect on arousal ratings. It was 
concluded that congruence may have an effect on conscious experience but not on 
unconscious affect generation. It was concluded that reduced cognitive resources 
modulate affective responses. 
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Part III 
Implications, Applications and Further Research 
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Chapter 8 
Making Sense of the Evidence 
1.0 Summary 
1.1 Cognitive mechanisms and emotion regulation 
1.1.1. Summary and Results 
This thesis is a report of an experimental investigation into the cognitive 
mechanisms that underlie emotion regulation. Five studies were conducted on the 
cognitive control of emotion. Two studies investigated the effects of direct 
conscious and intentional control on both self-report and psychophysiological 
measures of emotion. Next, three studies investigated the effects of dividing 
cognitive resources on the emotional startle eyeblink paradigm. More specifically, 
Experiments I and 2 manipulated a potential effect of conscious and intentional 
control via an instruction to feel or not feel emotional responses to emotion 
generating pictures. Experiments 3,4 and 5 tested the effect of a concurrent working 
memory task on the emotional startle paradigm. Emotional and neutral pictures from 
the International Affective Picture system (Bradley et al., 1999a, Lang et al., 2001) 
and Google images validated on the experimental population were used to generate 
emotions. 
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In experiments 3-5, cognitive resources were manipulated using a 
working memory task that required participants to hold words or pictures in mind 
whilst viewing and rating emotion generating pictures. The results were compared 
with a control condition with no working memory task. Two independent cognitive 
modalities were tested: verbal (words) and non-verbal (pictures). Memory for black 
and white standardized faces were used specifically to manipulate cognitive 
resources used for visual processing, and memory for words were used to activate 
verbal processing and to replicate the experiment using a different type of material. 
In addition, experiment 5 aimed at testing an alternative explanation for the effects 
of cognitive load. It could be argued that holding in mind a neutral picture while 
viewing an emotional picture "dilutes" the emotional content of the picture being 
viewed. In other words, the emotional content of the picture being viewed is 
diminished because a non-emotional image is being held in mind and provides the 
possibility for participants to focus their attention on an internal neutral image rather 
than on the emotional picture. Thus the neutral image being held in mind would 
provide an opportunity of reappraisal (through detachment, see Gross, 1998). 
Therefore, any effect of a decrease of emotional responses during a cognitive load 
condition could be attributed to a "dilution" of the emotional content rather than by 
an effect of cognitive load per se. Therefore, experiment 5 manipulated the valence 
of pictures held in mind during a concurrent working memory task. The crucial 
condition was when the picture held in mind was congruent with the picture being 
viewed (i. e. both were negative IAPS pictures). A "dilution" process would not be 
possible here, because both image and picture are negative. 
Two measures of emotional responses were taken: physiological 
measures and self reported arousal ratings. In experiments I and 2, HR, GSR and 
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corrugator supercilii activity were the selected physiological measures. The 
emotional startle paradigm was used in experiments 3-5. This paradigm uses a loud 
noise (i. e. the acoustic startle) to generate an eyeblink response that is known to 
covary with affective responses. Thus, when viewing negative pictures, eyeblink 
magnitudes are larger than when viewing neutral pictures and so provide a measure 
of emotional response. 
1.1.2 Cognitive mechanisms and emotion regulation: the results 
No evidence of an effect of conscious and intentional control on HR or 
GSR was found in experiments I and 2. Corrugator supercilii activity and self 
reported arousal ratings did respond, however, with higher supercilii magnitudes and 
higher arousal ratings in the feel than the no feel conditions. 
In experiments 3-5, a classical emotional startle effect was obtained in a 
control condition (no working memory load). However, it was found that a reduction 
of cognitive resources reduced the emotional startle effect. This effect was found in 
all three experiments, attesting to the robustness of this phenomenon. Furthermore, 
no effect of congruence was found in experiment 5 to challenge the results: Working 
memory load dampened the emotional startle effect even when negative emotional 
pictures were used for the working memory task, and thus rules out the alternative 
explanation that results from experiments 3-4 might be explained by re-appraisal 
opportunities provided by the neutral pictures used in the concurrent task. 
1.1.3 Study Limitations 
From the results of experiments 3-5, it is clear that there is compelling 
evidence that cognitive resources are required for the generation of fast emotional 
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responses to negative pictures. What is still unclear is the exact nature of those 
resources. Resources used to hold in mind both verbal items (i. e. words) and non- 
verbal items (i. e. pictures) whilst viewing and rating negative pictures for levels of 
arousal produced attenuated emotional responses. However, what is unclear, and in 
need of further research to clarify, is the exact nature of those resources. It is 
possible, for example, that such resources are required for the visual attention Pessoa 
claims is required for emotion generation (Pessoa et al., 2005a, Pessoa et al., 2002a, 
Pessoa et al., 2002b, Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004), or that emotional responses 
may be inhibited when resources are required for demanding cognitive tasks (Pessoa 
et al., 2005b). 
In experiment 4 (with verbal items for the working memory task), participants 
were free to use both verbal and visual processing to hold a word in mind ready for 
the subsequent word matching task. Both types of processing were possible, 
therefore. Thus, though the fast speed of the modified emotional startle suggests that 
conscious visual attention is not an appropriate explanation, visual attention may be 
required. This is discussed further in the next section. 
To establish the exact nature of the cognitive resources used, future 
experiments would need to separate visual, from verbal processing to 'verify 
attenuated emotions and a modality independent effect. The indications are that 
since the size of the attenuation effect was reduced when using words compared 
with the effect size obtained when using pictures, it is possible that the function of 
cognitive processing is to maintain visual processing. Though further research is 
required to produce a definitive conclusion, the evidence that cognitive resources are 
required for the generation of emotion offers strong support for Pessoa's claim that 
emotion generation involves cognitive modulation (Pessoa et al., 2005b). 
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With reference to experiments I and 2, and attempts made to study the 
effects of conscious and intentional control on emotional responses, it is 
acknowledged. that the use of the acoustic startle would have provided a more 
sensitive measure of emotional response than either HR or GSR and may have 
produced more interesting results. It is also regretted that more time was not 
available to pursue the effect of attenuated emotion in recognition memory found in 
experiment I but not replicated in experiment 2. It is possible that failure to replicate 
the result could have been due to difficulties participants in a within subjects design 
may have had switching from a feel to a no feel instruction and vice versa. 
Interactions between top-down emotion regulation and bottom-up stimulus driven 
generation are hot topics in current research (Vuilleumier, 2005) and investigating a 
potential link between conscious and intentional control and degrees of engagement 
of the self in a picture viewing activity manipulated by instructions, might generate 
interesting results. 
1.1.4 Cognitive resources, attention and emotion generation 
Though the limitations outlined above are acknowledged, the conclusion 
that strong evidence exists to show that reducing cognitive resources can dampen 
emotional responses to external stimuli is a major contribution to an understanding 
of emotion generation. To my knowledge, it is the first time that the need for 
cognitive resources to elicit the emotional startle effect has been demonstrated and 
is, potentially, a useful contribution to current research. 
In recent years, the old Lazarus versus Zajonc debate over the role of cognitive 
processing in emotion generation has resurfaced in attention research. Debate over 
the role of pre-attentive and post-attentive processing of visual stimuli and the 
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generation of emotional responses is on-going and producing conflicting evidence. 
Whilst Vuilleumier consistently produces evidence to support the pre-attentive 
position (Vuilleumier, 2005, Vuilleumier et al., 2001a, Vuilleurnier et al., 2001b), 
Pessoa's results consistently support post-attentive processing (Pessoa et al., 2005a, 
Pessoa et al., 2002a, Pessoa et al., 2002b). Pre-attentive processing refers to low 
level automatic perceptual scanning of the environment independent of cognitive 
resources and focused attention. Post-attentive processing, on the other hand, 
requires focused attention and cognitive resources to guide the processing of 
selected stimuli. By claiming evidence of post-attentive processing of emotional 
generating stimuli, Pessoa is also claiming that emotional responses require 
attentional resources. In fact, he maintains that during demanding cognitive tasks, 
the limbic system may be deactivated and produce a form of emotional blunting 
(Pessoa et al., 2005b). 
Attempts to reconcile the evidence is currently based on questioning 
methodology. For instance, criticisms include the validity of masking speeds used 
to test pre-aftentive processing, and concerns over attentional capacity in a focused 
attentional task which, if not fully utilized, may leave spare capacity for peripheral 
scanning and processing of the peripheral visual field thought to be processed pre- 
attentively (Pessoa et al., 2005a, Pessoa et al., 2002b). Tbough the studies reported 
in this thesis did not clarify the exact role of cognitive processing in emotion 
generation, they do offer potential support for Pessoa's claims that emotion 
generation is not pre-attentive and cognitively independent, and furthermore, do so 
from a different paradigm with a different approach and methodology. 
The emotional startle paradigm differs from fMRI studies, such as those by 
Vuilleumier and Pessoa, by offering unequivocal evidence of emotion modulation. 
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Whilst fMRI can successfully identify changes in amygdala activation during the 
processing of emotion generating stimuli, the amygdala is known also to function to 
produce orienting responses (6hman and Mineka, 2001) and to increase activation 
during effortful cognitive processing tasks (Schaefer et al., 2006). Thus amygdala 
activation identified by fMRl studies cannot be unambiguously attributed to emotion 
modulation. The emotional startle, however, is a direct and unequivocal measure of 
affective response (Bradley et al., 1990). In addition, it is also an extremely fast 
response, with an onset latency of <100ms. Therefore, it is believed to be largely 
automatic (Lang et al., 1998, Vrana and Lang, 1988). 
At the heart of the Vuilleumier versus Pessoa debate is the problem of 
automaticity. Traditionally, emotion generation is believed to be automatic. That is, 
emotional processing is thought to be independent of higher order cognition and 
extremely rapid. An exciting contribution that use of the emotional startle can add to 
the debate is to confirm the rapidity of the emotional response but to seriously 
question cognitive independence. In addition, an important implication of this is that 
emotional responses cannot have been generated solely by the fear cascade circuitry 
described by LeDoux (1996). Though snakes and spiders, loud noises, sudden 
movement and changes in luminance may trigger response tendencies, pictures of 
such stimuli, minus accompanying sound and movement, may not. According to 
LeDoux, emotional responses generated by the fear circuitry engage sub-cortical 
mechanisms to generate the response. Visual stimuli automatically trigger cells in 
the thalamus that activate the amygdala and. the fear cascade that increases heart 
rate, respiration and glucose production in readiness for a fast behavioural response. 
The process is totally independent of cognitive mechanisms. If pictures of threat 
related stimuli used the same mechanisms to generate emotional responses, then 
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they would be generated regardless of any concurrent working memory task and 
would not produce attenuated emotional responses. However, emotional responses 
were generated and attenuated. Higher startle magnitudes produced whilst viewing 
negative compared with neutral pictures is well documented evidence of emotion 
generation (Bradley et al., 1988, Bradley et al., 1990, Bradley et al., 1993a, Bradley 
et al., 1999b, Bradley and Lang, 2000, Lang et al., 2000). It would seem, therefore, 
that passive viewing of negative and threat related pictures generates rapid 
emotional responses but not independent of higher order cognition. Either such 
stimuli do not use the fear circuitry described by LeDoux, or, for humans at least, 
the circuitry is not as entirely independent of cognitive resources as LeDoux 
maintained. To conclude, it would appear that top-down influences on emotional 
responses is much more important than previously thought. 
1.1.5 Resource dependence and emotion regulation 
The role of cognitive resources in ernotion generation identified in this study 
also suggests potential implications for emotion regulation. Specifically, it might be 
possible that division of cognitive resources might account for at least part of the 
effectiveness of usual emotion regulation strategies. For example, it is possible that 
the division of cognitive resources between current appraisal and concurrent re- 
appraisal of the same stimulus during cognitive reappraisal tasks (Gross, 1996, 
Gross, 1998a, Gross, 2002, Gross and Levenson, 1997b, Jackson et al., 2000, 
Ochsner et al., 2004) could in part explain attenuated emotional responses 
regardless of appraisal determined changes. Similarly, therapies that require trauma 
sufferers to remember and describe specific traumas in detail (Philippot et al., 2003) 
again may reduce emotional responses, at least in part, by reducing cognitive 
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resources available for generating the emotion. Eye Movement Desensitization 
Reprocessing (EMDR) may also operate successfully in a similar way and perhaps 
even more directly. EMDR requires trauma victims to recount the details of a 
traumatic experience whilst tracking a moving object e. g. a finger. Thus cognitive 
resources required to activate visual images from memory and track a visual object 
in real time may also result in attenuated emotion. 
The success of therapies may be due to enabling changes to occur in memory. 
Joseph LeDoux maintains that emotional responses to past events are not stored in 
memory but generated anew each time the memory is activated (LeDoux, 1996). 
Thus, memory of being bitten by a dog, for example, may generate feelings of fear 
that were experienced at the time of the event but that are generated and experienced 
again in real time. Reducing cognitive resources at the time of remembering an 
event may reduce resources for the renewed emotional response and thus activate an 
attenuated form compared with the original experience. If current circumstances did 
not increase the intensity of the response, then the current experience and 
subsequent memory may be attenuated. 
Implications for trauma prevention is also a possibility. Training emergency 
service personnel to focus on well-rehearsed procedures and resist temptations to 
focus on visual evidence of physical trauma may also divide resources and attenuate 
emotional responses. Research by Emily Holmes in which participants were 
required to divide attention between a fear generating film and an attention tapping 
task found that subsequent intrusive memories of the film one week later were fewer 
for the tapping task group than the control group (Holmes, 2004). It is possible that 
such results may be explained, again, via the effects of reducing cognitive resources. 
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Emotion generation and regulation, however, are subject to both bottom-up 
stimulus driven mechanisms and top-down executive functions (Vuilleumier, 2005). 
Any simplistic explanation of the processes involved is not proposed. What is 
suggested is that emotion generation requires cognitive resources to generate 
emotional responses to static, visual images and that such processes may operate in 
real life situations and may be relevant to both emotion generation and regulation. 
Much further research is required to test the potential implications of the results of 
this study outlined above. 
1.2 Recognition Memory 
1.2.1 Summary, results, limitations and conclusions 
As a secondary task, not relevant to the main thrust of the thesis and 
having no bearing on the main conclusions of the study, was a surprise recognition 
I 
memory task that followed each experiment. This was undertaken to maximise the 
experimental opportunity and perhaps produce exploratory material that could 
potentially provide useful material for future research. In this task, participants were 
required to look at a randomised selection of old and new pictures (pictures 
previously seen in the experimental task and unseen pictures) and record whether or 
I 
not they had seen them in the experimental programme. If recognised, pictures were 
then marked as remembered, known or familiar. The data collected was analyzed to 
compare remember and know responses using the R/K paradigm and estimates of 
underlying recollection and familiarity processes. Familiar responses were used to 
indicate confidence levels. The overlap between recollection and familiarity 
responses (Jacoby, 1991) was addressed using the fonnula ((k/n)/(I-(r/n)) (where k 
= know responses, r= remember responses and n= the total number of possible 
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responses). Response confidence for remember and know responses (Yonelinas, 
2001) was controlled via instructions (see Appendix 1). Recognition accuracy was 
measured via signal detection d' for valence and arousal generally. 
Interpretations of the results showed some support for existing research 
and offered interesting lines for future investigations. For example, higher 
recognition accuracy was found for neutral than either negative or positive pictures, 
consistent with Maratos, Allan and Rugg (Maratos et al. )and Leiphart, Rosenfeld 
and Gabrieli (Leiphart et al. ). However, these results were inconsistent with Ochsner 
(2000) who found high recognition accuracy for emotional compared to neutral 
pictures. Such contradiction on the effects of emotion on recognition accuracy are 
frequent (Kensinger and Schacter, 2008) Analysis of remember, know and familiar 
responses showed that negative pictures were more frequently remembered than 
positive pictures. High arousal pictures were also more frequently remembered than 
low arousal pictures in all experiments. This finding is in line with consensual 
findings in literature (e. g. (Ochsner, 2000, Sharot et al., 2004)). Recollection and 
familiarity showed similar patterns and again paralleled the findings of Ochsner 
(2000). As a function of valence, recollection was greatest for negative pictures. As 
a function of arousal, recollection was also greater for high arousal than low arousal 
pictures. 
Manipulating cognitive resources actually produced higher levels of 
recollection when resources were reduced in experiments 3 and 4 but there was no 
effect of arousal suggesting, perhaps, an effect of increased effort. There was no 
effect of recollection in experiment 5, however, where levels of uncertainty, made 
visible by a high proportion of familiar responses, were higher than in either of the 
two previous experiments. It was thought that increasing the number and similarity 
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of pictures whilst controlling response times had probably made recollection of 
specific pictures more difficult for both high and low arousal pictures. 
Relevant to this study, was the finding that apart from experiment 1, there was 
no evidence of any Task x Memory x Emotion interaction. It would appear that 
manipulating cognitive resources at encoding did not have an effect on the 
modulation of emotion in memory. It must be re-emphasised, however, that the 
recognition memory task was only undertaken as a secondary and exploratory task 
and a number of design limitations need to be addressed in future research before 
any firm conclusions can be drawn. For example, recognition accuracy overall was 
high (e. g. d' values above 2.0) and was probably the result of too short a delay 
between the experimental and recognition memory task. Consistent with this 
explanation, Sharot & Yonelinas (2008) found that the emotional modulation of 
recollection is a time-dependent process and, in general, no effect of emotion on 
recollection is found when using a recognition test immediately after the study stage. 
Required similarities between pictures in experiment 5, in particular, may have 
primed distinctiveness processing, and this, together with higher arousal levels for 
experimental pictures than foils, may well have produced an inflated bias towards 
remembered pictures. In addition, though participants were fully versed in the 
requirements of the R/K paradigm, they were not required to, practise, before 
undertaking the task and sufficient evidence of their use of the paradigm was not 
taken to verify all the responses. Further research that addressed these issues and 
fully explored both the R/K paradigm and recollection and familiarity processes 
might develop and expand upon the potential effect of conscious and intentional 
control on emotional responses with interesting results. 
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1.3. Conclusions and further research 
Two major conclusions can be drawn from this study. Firstly, there 
appears to be valid evidence that cognitive resources are required for the generation 
of emotional responses to negative pictures, and secondly, that such evidence 
suggests that emotion generation may be rapid but not entirely automatic. 
Implications for an understanding of emotion are both theoretical and practical. 
Definitions of emotion as an automatic reflex may require qualification perhaps with 
reference to specific circumstances, types of stimuli in question or with reference to 
specific- emotion generating mechanisms. It is also suggested that practical 
applications of these results may usefully contribute to trauma prevention 
procedures and an understanding of therapies designed to reduce the emotional 
effccts of trauma. 
It is acknowledged, however, that further research is required to address new 
questions that this study poses. For example, research is required to test the nature 
and possible modality independence of the cognitive resources involved in 
generating emotional responses to negative pictures. Phonological rehearsal of 
rhyming words or the maintenance of simple melodies (e. g by using the tonic sol-fa 
scale) as a concurrent working memory task whilst viewing and rating emotion 
generating pictures, might provide more stringent control of visual processing. 
Studies designed to investigate emotion generating mechanisms, to identify sources 
of activation, and to test for possible differences due to different types of stimuli 
(e. g. static, visual images versus sound and movement cues in films) would be a 
further development as would experiments undertaken to discover exactly how much 
of any motion regulation strategy could be attributed to resource division alone. 
Finally, it is also felt that the effects of a conscious and intentional instruction to feel 
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and not feel emotional responses should be fully explored in order to investigate 
indications that such control may dampen emotionality in memory. It is believed that 
such experiments should be repeated with the acoustic startle as a fast and sensitive 
measure of emotional response and with EEG or fMRI equipment to identify sources 
of activation and changes in response. If emotional attenuation is replicated, then 
further research might, perhaps, usefully explore an engage/disengage instruction to 
indicate whether or not the mechanism involved might operate according to self 
relevance. 
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Appendix 1 
Experiments 1 and 2: Instructions 
Condition 1: Feel 
This programme will show you a selection of pictures 
They will be presented one at a time and remain on the screen for 6 seconds 
Your task is to Look at each picture and Rate how strongly you respond to 
each one 
Use this scale to rate your responses 
Very Weak I Weak 2 Moderate 3 Strong 4 Very Strong 5 
Press a number on the response pad to register the STRENGTH of your 
response 
(Register your First response as quickly as you can but Continue to Look at the 
picture for all 6 seconds 
Ignore the nature of your response which may be positive or negative 
i. e. You may feel very strongly positive or negative but the response is still 5 
Only the STRENGTH is important) 
When requested to do so, Press any Key to Start the programme. 
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Condition 2: No Feel 
This programme will show you a selection of pictures 
They will be presented one at a time and remain on the screen for 6 seconds 
Your task is to Look quickly at each picture and 
Stop the emotional response (i. e. Don't feel it/ Control it) 
Then Rate the strength of any response that you still have. 
Use this scale to rate your responses 
Very Weak I Weak 2 Moderate 3 Strong 4 Very Strong 5 
Press a number on the response pad to register the STRENGTH of your 
response 
Register your FIRST response as quickly as you can but Continue to Look at 
the picture for the full 6 seconds. 
Concentrate on the STRENGTH of the remaining response not the nature 
(i. e. ignore whether it is positive or negative only the STRENGTH is 
important) 
When requested to do so, Press any Key to Start the programme. 
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Experiment 3: Instructions 
Conditions I and 2: No Load and Load 
INTRODUCTION 
In this study there are 2 activities and 3 tasks within each activity. 
Each task lasts no-longer that approximately 5 minutes 
(15 minutes per activity) 
You are requested to keep as still as you can whilst engaged in a task. 
The purpose of the study is to measure your responses to pictures and not to 
measure muscle activity resulting from movement. 
All tasks require you to register the strength of your responses to the pictures 
presented on the computer screen and to complete an additional task involving faces. 
The face tasks require you to make decisions regarding whether a face is a male or a 
female face and whether a face matches a face shown previously in the task. The 
face tasks for the two activities are different but the tasks within each activity are the 
same i. e. the faces change but the instructions remain the same. 
THE PICTURES 
The computer programme will show you a selection of pictures. 
They will be presented one at a time and remain on the screen for 5 seconds. 
Yout- task i-, to) 1()ok at cach pictw-c mid 1-ýItc 110\\ ýti-mil-1k \()11 I-CSI)m1d to Cacli m1c. 
(Ignore whether your feelintgs are positive or negative. 
Only the strength ofthe tcclmg is important. ) 
(Example given 16r cat lo\ cr.,, ami al lergy suffcrcrs) 
Rate the STRENGTH of the feeling you have when you FIRST see the picture. 
Rate what you ACTUALLY feel at that moment in time, NOT what you 
think you 'should" feel. 
(Example given for someone beating the cat) 
Use this scale to rate your responses: 
023456 
I feel nothing 
at all 
I feel 
extremely 
strong emotions 
When the scale appears on the screen, Press the number on the response pad that 
best registers how strongly you feel. You have a maximum of 2 seconds in which to 
respond. The scale will disappear when you press a key or after 2 seconds - 
whichever is the sooner. 
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The Faces 
No Load Activitv 
This activity presents a sequence of 4 screens a number of times. 
Each sequence consists of a face a picture, a rating scale and another face. 
You have two instructions to follow: 
I. Rate ýour rcsponscs tO thC I)ICtL[I'CS 
2. Register whether a face is a inale face or a female I'acc. 
Example: 
0123456 
0123456 
i. e. 
1. Look at the picture and Feel your response. 
2. Rate the Strength of your Feeling when you see the rating scale. 
3. Look at the faces when they appear. 
4. Press a key to register Male Face or Female Face: 
Blue Key: Male Red Kcv: Fcnialc 
5. Repeat the procedure to complete all sequences in the first and subsequent 
two tasks. 
6. At the end of each task, Press any key to start the next. 
7. Stop at Task 3 End. 
( We will take a break, revise and practise the next activity) 
N. B. Participants were told that they would not have to remember all the 
instructions as we would practise the tasks until they could do thern 
satisfactorily. 
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The Faces 
Load Activity 
This activity presents a sequence of screens repeated a number of times. 
Each sequence consists of a face, a picture, a rating scale and another face. 
You have two instructions to follow: 
1. Rate %our respoiiscs to the I)ICILII-CS. 
2. Register whether the face AFTER the picture Is the SAME or DIFFERENT 
from the face iininediately BFFORF the 111OL11-C. 
Example: 
Z. 0123456 
0123456 
i. e. 
I. Look at the face and remember it. 
2. Look at the picture and Feel your response. 
3. Rate the Strength of your Feeling when you see the rating scale. 
4. Look at the next Face that appears and Press a key to register: Same or 
Different 
Blue Key: Same RCd Kcý: I)IH'CICIII 
5. Repeat the procedure to complete all sequences in the first and subsequent 
two tasks. 
6. At the end of each task, Press any key to start the next. 
7. Stop at Task 3 End. 
(We will take a break, revise and practise the next activity) 
N. B. Participants were told that they would not have to remember all the 
instructions as we would practise the tasks until they could do them 
satisfactorily. 
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Instructions for Rememberina the Faces 
The face matching tasks are designed specifically to study visual working 
memory. It is important, therefore, to store visual images of the faces whilst rating 
your responses to the pictures. To do this, use the following strategy: 
Look at the face on the screen and visualise it in your head. 
Look at the picture and feel your response (but keep visualising the 
face in your head to maintain the memory) 
Register the strength of your response to the picture. 
Conjure up the image of the first face and Match it to the next face that 
appears on the screen. 
Register SAME (blue) or DIFFERENT (red) on the response pad. 
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Experiment 4: Instructions 
The information and instruction sheet used in Experiment 3 (introduction 
and The Pictures ) was used again to explain the task requiring emotion 
ratings to pictures. Instructions for the cognitive manipulations were as 
follows: 
The Words 
No Load 
This activity presents a sequence of 3 screens a number of tirnes. 
Each sequence consists of a picture, a rating scale and a word or non-word. 
You have two instructions to follow: 
1. Rate your responses to the pictures. 
I Register whether a string of letters is a \vord or non-word. 
Example: 
4;,.. t 
STAMP 0123456 NAIL r, 
4" k4 
SLdo 1 %P, % . 
0123456 PRITTI 
i. e. 
I. Look at the picture and Feel your response. 
2. Rate the Strength of your Feeling when you see the rating scale. 
3. Look at the letters when they appear. 
4. Press a key to register Word or Non-word. 
Blue Kev: Word Red KC\: Noll-\\ord 
5. Repeat the procedure to complete all sequences in the first and subsequent 
two tasks/ 
6. At the end of each task, Press any key to start the next. 
7. Stop at Task 3 End. 
(We will take a break. revise and practise the next activity) 
N. B. Participants were told that they would not have to remember all the 
instructions as we would practise the tasks until they could do them 
satisfactorily 
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The Words 
Load Activity 
This activity presents a sequence of screens repeated a number of times. 
Each sequence consists of a word, a picture, a rating scale, and another word. 
You have two instructions to follow: 
1.1ZLIte ýOur responscs to the plic(urcs. 
2. Register whether the word AFTER the picture is the SAME or 
DIFFFRFNT fi-oin the word ininiediatcly BFFORF the picture. 
Example: 
0123456 BALL BALL 
r 
0123456 PIPE 
i. e. 
I. Look at the Word and remember it. 
2. Look at the picture and Feel your response. 
3. Rate the Strength of your Feeling when you see the rating scale. 
4. Look at the next Word that appears and Press a key to register: Same or 
Different: Blue Kev: Sanic lzCd Kcy: D11,16'ClIt 
5. Repeat the procedure to complete all sequences in the first and subsequent 
two tasks. 
6. At the end of each task, Press any key to start the next. 
7. Stop at Task 3 End. 
(We will take a break, revise and practise the next task) 
N. B. Participants were told that they would not have to remember all the 
instructions as we would practise the tasks until they could do them 
satisfactorily. 
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Experiment 5: Instructions 
The infon-nation and instruction sheet used in Experiment 3 (Introduction 
and The Pictures ) was used again to explain the task requiring emotion 
ratings to pictures. Instructions for the cognitive manipulations were as 
fOlIONA'S: 
Outdoors/Indoors 
No Load 
This activity presents a sequence of 4 screens a number of times. 
Each sequence consists of a decision picture, another picture, a rating scale and 
a decision picture. 
You have two instructions to follow: 
I. Rate ýOur responses to tlic pictures 
Register whether a scene or ob . ject is 
Indoors or OLitdoors. 
Example: 
0123456 
Indoors/ 0123456 
Outdoors 
i. e. 
1. Look at the I" picture when it appears 
2. Press a key to register Indoors or Outdoors: 
Rcd Kcý: Indoot-, Blue Key: Outdoors 
3. Look at the next picture and Feel your response 
4. Rate the Strenph of your Feeling when you see the rating scale 
5. Look at the 2n decision picture and register I iidom-s/Outdoors 
6. Repeat the procedure to complete all sequences in the first and subsequent 
two tasks 
7. At the endof each task, Press any key to start the next 
8. Stop at Task 3 End 
(We will take a break, revise and practise the next activity) 
N. B. Participants were told that they would not have to remember all the 
instructions as A, c would practise the tasks until they could do them 
satisfactorily. 
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Same/Different 
Load Activitv 
This activity presents a sequence of screens repeated a number of times. 
Each sequence consists of a study picture, a second picture, a rating scale and a 
test picture. 
You have two instructions to follow: 
I. 1ýatc ý oul I. C. "ponsc" to the pictilre". 
2. Register whether the picture AFTER the rating scale is the SAME or 
DIFFERENT from the first picture in tile sequence. 
Example: 
Hold 
in Watch 0123456 
Mind 4 
All 
H old 
Match in Watch 
Mind 
I _j IIII- 
0123456 Match 
I 
i. e 
1. Look at the picture anfd Hold it in Mind. 
2. Look at the picture and Feel your response. 
3. Rate the Strength of your Feeling when you see the rating scale. 
4. Look at the next picture that appears and Press a key to register: 
Same or Different: Blue Kev: Same IýCd Kc\. D11,16'ClIt 
5. Repeat the procedure to complete all sequences in the first and subsequent 
two tasks. 
6. At the end of each task, Press any key to start the next. 
7. Stop at Task 3 End. 
(We Nvill take a break, revise and practise the next activity) 
N. B. Participants were told that they would not have to remember all the 
instructions as we would practise the tasks until they could do thern 
satisfactorily. 
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Reco2nition Memory Task: Instructions 
At the end of the computer activity participants were told that before the 
electrodes were removed, they were required to look at several pages of 
pictures and see if they recognised any of them as having been in the 
programme they had just taken part in. If they recognised a picture, they 
should try to work out how they recognised it i. e. 
If they remembered the picture coming up on the screen, or they remembered a 
particular part of the picture, or something they remembered thinking about at 
the time, (i. e. they had some evidence in their heads to 'prove' that the picture 
was in the programme) they should write the letter R on the acetate covering 
that picture. 
If they Knew that the picture was in the programme but had no mental 
evidence as such to prove it, they just Knew it was there, then they should 
write the letter K on the acetate over that picture. 
If the picture looked familiar so it probably was in the programme but they 
weren't really sure ..... It wasfamiliar so it probably was ... then they should 
write the letter F on the acetate over that picture. 
The following written instructions were then placed in front of the participant 
so that they could refer to them if necessary as they looked at the pictures. 
Instructions 
1. Please look at the laminated picture sheets and identify the pictures you 
recognise as having been in the programme you've just taken part in. 
2. Using the definitions below, write the letter that best corresponds with your 
personal experience of recognizing the picture: 
R= When you saw the picture you had an experience of Remembering it. 
This could have included seeing the picture in your mind's eye, 
Remembering what you thought or pictured when you saw the picture 
on the computer screen, and/or having a sense of yourself in the past. 
K= When you saw the picture you simple Knew that it had been on the 
Computer without any of the other feelings associated with vividly 
Remembering that you had seen the picture before. 
F When you saw the picture you had a feeling of Familiarity with the 
picture and because of that you thought that the picture had been on 
the computer. 
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Experiments Negative 
3&4 
Additional Animal cruelty (e. g. 
categories emaciated animals) 
Unpleasant animals (e. g. 
spiders) 
Expanded Aggression (e. g bombs and 
categories war victims) 
Experiment 5 Death and disease (e. g skin 
Expanded cancers, 
leprosy, smallpox 
categories 
and skin infections) 
Accidents (e. g. housefires) 
N 
None 
Household items (e. g. whisk, 
kettle and plug) 
Household items (e. g. 
glasses, cutlery and bath) 
Clothing (e. g. socks, 
slippers) 
Building materials (e. g. 
bricks, sand and rope) 
Gardens and garden furniture 
(e. g. wooden fence and 
bench) 
Food (e. g. beans and rice) 
Plants (e. g. algae) 
Miscellaneous (e. g. street 
map, bicycle pedal, 
paintbrush and boxes) 
Landscapes (e. g. mud roads, 
woods and traintracks) 
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Appendix 3 
Selected pictures from the 
Internaltional Affective 
Picture System (IAPS) 
Experiment 1: 
Neaative and Neutral Pictures 
Negative 
JAPS 
Number 
Description % 
Agreement 
negative 
(British 
survey) 
2800 Sad child 971 
3015 Accident 100% 
6415 Dead tiger 97% 
3170 Baby and 
tumour 
100% 
6550 Attack 100% 
3120 Dead body 100% 
2205 Couple in 
hospital 
100% 
9320 Vomit 100% 
3064 Mutilation 100% 
9040 Starving 
child 
! 00% 
7359 Pie and 
bug 
100% 
6313 Attack 
(knife) 
97% 
9584 Dentist 97% 
2095 Toddler 
and flies 
100% 
3053 Bum 
victim 
100% 
9301 Dirty toilet 100% 
3168 Mutilation 100% 
3063 Mutilation 100% 
9252 Dead body 100% 
3080 mutilation 100% 
Mean Valence Rating: 3.84 
Neutral 
IAPS 
Number 
Description % 
Agreement 
neutral 
(British 
survey) 
7035 Mug 90% 
7020 Fan 90% 
7010 Basket 971ý6 
7002 Spoon 90% 
7025 Stool 97% 
7950 Tissues 87% 
7235 Chair 87% 
7190 Clock 87% 
7187 Abstract art 87% 
7179 Rug 87% 
7036 Shipyard 90% 
7050 Hair dryer 93% 
7100 Fire 
hydrant 
90% 
7140 Bus 97% 
7161 Pole 97% 
7185 Abstract art 90% 
7224 Filing 
cabinet 
90% 
7595 Traffic 90% 
7705 Cabine 96% 
7080 Fork 87% 
Mean Valence Rating: 3.51 
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Experiment 2* 
Neizative Pictures 
Negative 
LAPS 
Number 
Description 
2800 Sad child 
3063 Mutilation 
1300 Pitbull 
6510 Attack 
9180 Dead cows 
3266 injury 
1050 Snake 
9320 Vomit 
3150 Mutilation 
1114 Snake 
6540 Attack 
9040 Starving child 
6415 Dead tiger 
9301 Dirty toilet 
3053 Bum victim 
3064 Mutilation 
3080 Mutilation 
3261 Tumour 
3140 Dead body 
2053 Baby 
Negative 
IAPS 
Number 
Description 
9220 Cemetery 
3170 Baby and Tumour 
1120 Snal-f- 
9584 Dentist 
2095 Toddler and Flies 
2205 Couple in Hospita 
3168 Mutilation 
3500 Attack 
7359 Pie and bug 
6550 Attack 
6350 Attack 
3400 Severed Hand 
3102 Burn Victim 
9252 Dead body 
3110 Burn victim 
3015 Accident 
6212 Soldier 
1525 Attack dog 
Mean Valence Rating: 3.55 
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Experiment 2: 
Neutral Pictures 
Neutral 
IAPS 
Number 
Description 
7179 Rug 
7235 Chair 
5533 Mushrooms 
7186 Abstract art 
2191 Farmer 
7161 Pole 
7190 Clock 
7705 Cabinet 
7595 Traffic 
7160 Fabric 
7031 Shoes 
7950 Tissues 
7010 Basket 
7175 Lamp 
7036 Shipyard 
7090 Book 
7035 Mug 
7025 Stool 
7187 Abstract Art 
7034 Hammer 
Neutral 
LAPS 
Number 
Description 
7140 Bus 
7030 Iron 
7096 Car 
7004 Spoon 
7000 Rolling pin 
7060 Trashcan 
7211 Clock 
7006 Bowl 
7020 Fan 
7491 Building 
7002 Towel 
7080 Fork 
7050 Hair-dryer 
7224 Filing cabinets 
7504 Stars 
7100 Fire hydrant 
7217 Clothes rack 
7009 Mug 
7185 Abstract art 
Mean Valence Rating: 3.52 
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Experiments 3.4 and 5: 
Negative Pictures 
Negative 
IAPS 
Number 
Description 
1030 Snake 
9921 Fire 
9405 Sliced hand 
9300 Dirty toilet 
3266 Injury 
9911 Car accident 
1650 Jaguar 
9400 Soldier 
3261 Tumour 
6530 Attack 
1019 Snake 
9570 Dog 
3063 Mutilation 
6260 Aimed gun 
3130 Mutilation 
3530 Attack 
3140 Dead body 
1931 Shark 
9040 Starving child 
6313 Attack 
3053 Bum victim 
1726 Tiger 
3168 Mutilation 
6230 Aimed gun 
6834 Police 
6312 Abduction 
6212 Soldier 
6571 Car theft 
6350 Attack 
9630 Bomb 
7359 Pie and bug 
3100 Bum victim 
Neutral 
LAP S 
Number 
Description 
5130 Rocks 
7004 Spoon 
7030 Iron 
7038 Shoes 
7080 Fork 
7161 Pole 
7175 Lamp 
7235 Chair 
7037 Trains 
7205 Scarves 
7950 Tissues 
2840 Chess 
2980 Food basket 
5530 Mushroom 
5750 Nature 
7031 Shoes 
2215 Neutral man 
7184 Abstract art 
7285 Tomatoes 
7710 Bed 
5500 Mushroom 
5720 Farmland 
5020 Flower 
2200 Neutral face 
7190 Clock 
7237 Abstract art 
7590 Traffic 
8311 Golfer 
7010 Basket 
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Experiments 3.4 and 5: 
Neutral Pictures 
Neutral 
IAPS 
Number 
Description 
5120 Pine needles 
7002 Towel 
7025 Stool 
7036 Shipyard 
7060 Trashcan 
7160 Fabric 
7187 Abstract art 
7234 Ironing board 
7000 Rolling pin 
7180 Neon building 
7900 Violin 
2745.1 Shopping 
2890 Twins 
5520 Mushroom 
9700 Trash 
5870 Clouds 
2210 Neutral face 
7207 Beads 
7283 Fruit 
7595 Traffic 
5800 Leaves 
7009 Mug 
7034 Hammer 
7041 Baskets 
7140 Bus 
7179 Rug 
7233 Plate 
7700 Office 
7090 Book 
7500 Building 
9360 Empty pool 
2870 Teenager 
7020 Fan 
7035 Mug 
7050 Hair-dryer 
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Appendix 4: Face Databases 
(randomised selections: cropped) 
Jha Laboratories 
Assistant Professor Amishi Jha, University of Pennsylvania. 
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The Essex Face Database 
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Appendix 5 
Lexical Distractor Items: NIRC Psycholinguistic Database (2006) 
Words: 
Table Cover Porch Cnimb 
Glove Paste Watch Brick 
Patch Tower Bench Slope 
Lobby Glass Maple UAge 
Pedal NVhecl Fence Store 
Stand Elbow Crane Board 
Floor Levcr Plate Shirt 
Clock Trail Latch Ruler 
Track Stool Cloth Wheat 
Non-Words: 
Vclog OI)bb Ospcl Ewath 
Eldap Ooflr Eldap Coolk 
Elbat Karct Tbapc Bnunc 
Dastn 
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Appendix 6 
Extra Negative Google Images 
(random selection) 
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Extra Google Neutral Images 
(random 
T- 5 
selection) 
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Appendix 7 
Ouestionnaires 
State anxiety measure from Spielbergers State Trait anxiety Inventory 
k 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this montent. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give 
the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
Not at all Somewhat 
Moderately Very much 
so so 
1.1 feel calm .................... 1 2 3 4 
2.1 feel secure ................ 
1 2 3 4 
3.1 am tense ................... 1 
2 3 4 
4.1 feel strained ............... 
1 2 3 4 
5.1 feel at ease ................. 
1 2 3 4 
6.1 feel upset .................... 1 
2 3 4 
7.1 am presently 
worrying over possible 1 2 3 4 
misfortunes ....................... 
8.1 feel satisfied ............... 1 
2 3 4 
9.1 feel frightened ............ 
1 2 3 4 
10.1 feel comfortable ........ 
1 2 3 4 
11.1 feel self-confident ...... 
1 2 3 4 
12.1 feel nervous ............... 
1 2 3 4 
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13. lam jittery .................. 1 2 3 4 
14.1 feel indecisive ........... 1 2 3 4 
15. lam relaxed ............. 
1 2 3 4 
16.1 feel content ............... 
1' 2 3 4 
17.1 am worried ................ 
1 2 3 4 
18.1 feel confused ............ 
1 2 3 4 
19.1 feel steady ................. 
1 2 3 4 
20.1 feel pleasant ............... 
1 2 3 4 
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Trait anxiety measure from Spielbergers State Trait anxiety InveflL2rx 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do 
not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to 
describe how you generally feel. 
Almost Some- Often Almost 
never times always 
1.1 feel pleasant ...................................... 1 2 3 4 
2.1 feel nervous and restless .................... 1 2 3 4 
3.1 feel satisfied with myself ................. 1 2 3 4 
4.1 wish I could be as happy as others 
seem to be ................................. 1 2 3 4 
5.1 feel like a failure .......................... 1 2 3 4 
6.1 feel rested ................................. 1 2 3 4 
7.1 am "calm, cool, 'and collected ........... 1 2 3 4 
8.1 feel that difficulties are piling up so 
that I can not overcome them .................... 1 2 3 4 
9.1 worry too much over something that 
really doesn't matter .......................... 1 2 3 4 
10.1 am happy ........................................ 1 2 3 4 
11.1 have disturbing thoughts ................... 1 2 3 4 
12.1 lack self-confidence ........................ 1 2 3 4 
13.1 feel secure ..................................... 1 2 3 4 
227 
14.1 make decisions easily ........................ 
15.1 feel inadequate ......................... 
16. lam content ....................................... 
17. Some unimportant thought runs 
through my mind and bothers 
me .......................................... 
18.1 take disappointments so keenly that 
I can't put them out of my mind ................ 
19.1 am a steady person .................. 
20.1 get in a state of tension or turmoil as 
I think over my recent concerns and 
interests ................ 
2 3 4 
2 
2 
234 
2 3 4 
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The Centre for Epidemiolopical Studies Depression Scale (Ces D) 
Ouestionnaire 
Below is a list of the ways you may sometimes feel or behave. Please indicate 
(bold, highlight, *) how often you have felt this way during thepast week. 
During the past week... Rarely or Some or a Occasionally Most or All 
none of the little of the or a moderate of the time 
time time amount of time 
(i. e. less (i. e. 1-2 days) (i. e. 34 days) (i. e. 5-7 days) than 1 day) 
1.1 was bothered by 0 1 2 3 
things that usually don't 
bother me .................. 
2.1 did not feel like 0 1 2 3 
eating; my appetite was 
poor ........................... 
3.1 felt that I could not 0 1 2 3 
shake off the blues even 
with help from my 
family .............................. 
4.1 felt that I was just as 0 1 2 3 
good as other 
people ................. 
5.1 had trouble keeping 0 1 2 3 
my mind on what I was 
doing ............................. 
6.1 felt 0 1 2 3 
depressed ............... 
7.1 felt that everything 1 0 1 2 3 
did was an effort ........ 
8.1 felt hopeful about 0 1 2 3 
the future ......... 
9.1 thought my life had 0 1 2 3 
been a 
failure .............................. 
10.1 felt 0 1 2 3 
fearful .............................. 
I 
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11. My sleep was 0 1 2 3 
restless ...................... 
12.1 was 0 1 2 3 
happy ............................... 
13.1 talked less than 0 1 2 3 
usual .................... 
14.1 felt 0 1 2 3 
lonely ............................... 
15. People were 0 1 2 3 
unfriendly .................. 
16.1 enjoyed 0 1 2 3 
life ................................... 
17.1 had crying 0 1 2 3 
spells ............................ 
18.1 felt 0 1 2 3 
sad .................................... 
19.1 felt that people 0 1 2 3 
disliked me ........... 
20.1 could not "get 0 1 2 3 
going7 .................... 
